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In this dissertation,

practice.

My

focus

is

I

explore the relationship between legal
theory and legal

on the response of late nineteenth and early
twentieth century

American jurisprudence

to a perceived crisis

m American legal doctrine, a crisis that

threatened to undermine the legitimacy and
authority of the American legal profession.

Uncertainty and complexity

m the law were dominant characterizations of this historical

moment, more generally understood

as a time of rapid social

producing a sense of chaos and fragmentation.

I

and economic growth,

read formalism and realism (both broadly

construed) as forms of legal modernism which provide alternative
discourses of
professional authority, emerging not necessarily as reactions to one
another so
the perceived problems of expertise entailed
principal aim

which serve
and

is to

historical transfonnations.

as to

My

explore and articulate those dimensions of modernist legal thought

as the foundation for this

to suggest

by such

much

some of the

new juridical

discourse of professional authority,

possible implications of failing to look

VI

at the

early tradition of

realist

jurisprudence from this perspective.
In this sense,

more general cntique and

reconstruction of this tradition.

vii

I

seek to lay the foundation for
a

table of contents
l^auc
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION
In

what follows,

I

will argue

from a perspective

thought and legal practice. That

My principal

concern

is

is. I

will

that

draws a conceptual link between

legal

approach each from the perspective
of the other.

with legal theory; yet

1

will

engage with particular

legal theorists

through questions raised by problems
of and for legal practice - specifically,
the response

of Amencan

legal theory to a perceived crisis
in the legitimacy

of the American legal

profession.

has been observed, in another context,
that "theoretical discourses can be
read as

It

responses to histoncal
to social

familiar

study.

and

crises, to unsettling

intellectual turbulence

modes of thinking and

Law and Society

legal theories are built

produced by the disintegration of previously stable or

living" (Best

in Transition,

upon

economic and technological developments, and

and Kellner 1991,

ix).

And,

m their important

Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick contend that

implicit theories of authority.

Many

concerns and

controversies of contemporary jurisprudence have their roots in the
crisis of authority that

has shaken public institutions" (1978,

4).

While Nonet and Selznick were concerned with

the contemporary socio-legal landscape, in the following study of the relationship
of legal

theory and legal practice,

twentieth centuries.

distinctly

It

I

was

return to the earlier period of the late nineteenth and early

in that period

of rapid social and economic change that a

American jurisprudence was bom, one which continues

understanding of law and

politics.

As

such,

it

1

to

shape our

remains important to our understanding of

contemporary

legal thought

and practice. Although the
dominant jurisprudential

movements of the time - formalism,
documented,
understood.

I

believe that the ‘vision of
practice’ each contains has
been less well

It is

to that effort, the attempt to
explore the connection

and justifications of legal

The

sociological jurisprudence, realism have been well-

status

expertise, that

I

wish

of American law, during the

to

make

between

legal theory

a contribution.

historical period

under investigation, was

often characterized by the twin themes
of uncertainty and complexity. Such
a
characterization simultaneously raised the
specter of

politicized (or potentially

My concern is with how these developments might

pohticizable’) judicial system.

threaten to undermine the legitimacy of that
professional class

authority and

power

rest

system of determinate

on

its

monopoly over

(i.e.,

More

specifically,

I

whose

a highly technical language comprising
a

legal rules which, theoretically, derive their

a prior political context.'

lawyers),

am

meaning independent of

interested in specific theoretical

responses to this perceived threat, on behalf of the legal profession’s
claims to expert
authority and, to explore the theoretical implications of these
responses.

As Tocqueville

understood, and contemporary sociologists of the professions have

maintained, the legal profession’s authority clearly seems to derive from an asserted

mastery of a politically neutral and objective body of knowledge. In his

Democracy

in

classic

work.

America, Tocqueville observed, "[sjtudy and specialized knowledge of the

'For example, professions traditionally have been distinguished from other occupations by
the fact that they require a specified level of formal academic training; maintain control

over entry into the profession; are self-regulating; and, make the claim
a

monopoly

over, or special access to, a discrete

2

body of knowledge.

that they possess

law give a

man

a rank apart in society and

intellectual class.

make of lawyers

The exercise of their profession

a

somewhat

daily reminds

privileged

them of this

superiority;

they are the masters of a necessary
and not widely understood science"
(1969/1988, 264).

And, Magah Larson has pointed out
status

that

IS

that professions characteristically
justify their special

by claiming "cognitive exclusiveness":

deemed

crucial to the well-being of society

content, of this "cognitive exclusiveness"
that

it

a unique access to

(

1

977,

another matter however.

is

area of knowledge

The exact

5).

1

some

nature, or

We might assume

consists of technical procedural and
doctrinal knowledge. Yet, any extended

contact with

members of the

profession suggests,

are exceedingly cynical people

when

perhaps with good reason. From the
apparent.

A

it

comes

at best, that this is insufficient.

to an

Lawyers

assessment of the legal system;

‘inside’, the legal

system’s flaws are glaringly

government of laws and not of ‘men’ seems,

for the

and more a naive wish. Judicial decisions often are revealed

to

most

part, less

an ideal,

be the product of personal

bias or political ideology, rather than the neutral, objective application
of the law to the
facts.

First-year law students soon

enough

learn that legal doctrine can be manipulated to

support virtually any position in a given dispute. Uncertainty, or doctrinal indetenninacy,

seems unalterably the

state

of affairs. This,

We are all realists now, or so
dominant school of jurisprudence

it

is

we

are told,

often said. "Realism," says David Luban,

in twentieth-century

is

It is

it

3

19).

"the

as the ‘ordinary religion of the

not a gross exaggeration to say that

believed by every practicing lawyer." (1988,

is

America. This view so pervades

the culture of lawyers that one law school dean described

law-school classroom’.

the lesson of legal realism.

is

What

all

some version of realism

of that might mean, however.

.s

not entirely clear. In tins
dissertation,

analysis - what

I

shall

sometimes

work of Oliver Wendell Holmes,

I

refer to as ‘legal

at

modernism’^ -

of a

that has

line

its

oflegai

origin in the

the legal realists of the
1920s and 1930s, to the

present day. Throughout this
dissertation,

-

critical insights

and extends through the sociological
jurisprudence of

Jr.,

Roscoe Pound, Benjamin Cardozo, and

thought

examine the

I

use the term 'realism' to designate
a style of

once sociological and instrumental

-

that begins with

Holmes and

is

developed by Pound and others. Realism
grew out of a dissatisfaction with aspects
of
accepted legal doctrines and practices;
I

do not wish

to

that

more

we emphasize

had both

its intellectual

forerunners.

important. In this regard,

and reform as

I

However,

its

basic aims.

Holmes through Pound and

5).

for

my purposes,

as

the

agree with Morton Horwitz's suggestion

the continuities in thought between Holmes,

rather than their differences. (Horwitz 1992,

of a challenge

critique

deny many of the important differences
between what we know

American Legal Realism and
similarities are

it

Pound and

the Realists,

Horwitz views the development from

other Progressive thinkers, to the Realists, as the
continuation

to legal orthodoxy's (Langdellian formalism) separation

of law and

politics.

This emphasis, according to Horwitz, combined with a thorough-going
"cognitive
relativism," constitute realism's lasting contribution to

In contrast to Horwitz, there are

who

argue that legal realism simply

have suggested

borrow

this

that realism

some

American

scholars, such as Laura

‘failed’ as a jurisprudential

emerged

legal thought. (1992, 6).

Kalman

movement. While others

as a jurisprudential analogue of the

term from David Luban (1994).

4

(1986),

New

Deal; with

the passing of this period in

Gilmore maintained

which our

legal

The

was due

crisis

American

that realism

history, so too

emerged

system passed during the
to an overload

system was beginning

to

break

as "the

first

went realism.’ Finally, Grant

academic formulation of a

crisis

through

half of this century." (Gilmore
1961, 1037).

on legal doctrine, with the

down of its own

result that "our case-law

weight." According to Gilmore,

"[tjoward the end of the nineteenth eentury
the rate of acceleration in printed
case reports

became nightmansh....This
century.... This

flood set in during the

phenomenon

strikes at the root

last

quarter of the nineteenth

of a case-law system." (Gilmore 1961,

1041). Yet, on Gilmore’s reading, the problem
has been solved and the crisis has passed;
the system

worked

itself pure; "[wjithout

machine was put back

in

anyone quite knowing how, the broken-down

running order - as

if by

an inspired job of tinkering." (Gilmore

1961, 1048).

Against those

and

who

argue that realism failed, or passed into history

political circumstances that

gave

rise to

it

came

to

an end,

I

when

would suggest

the social

that the

fundamental problem for realism remains: the indeterminacy of legal rules and
the
unconstrained nature of judicial decision-making. This

is

Horwitz’s contribution to our

understanding of the place of realism in American legal thought. However, against

^Ronen Shamir (1995) offers a unique version of what is, otherwise, a fairly common
interpretation of the emergence of realism. Shamir appropriates Bourdieu’s concept of
the "legal field" to suggest that certain academic lawyers deployed realist jurisprudential

arguments, during the

crisis

posed by the

order to gain dominance within the

field.

New

Deal for certain segments of the

Nonetheless, Shamir’s analysis

conclusion that realism was tied to a specific social and political context
Deal), and not

more general problems

in the

still

(i.e.,

the

development of American law, as

argue.

5

elite bar, in

leads to the

1

New

wish

to

Honvitz,

I

wMl argue

,ha,

reaHsm

both the conflation of law and

is

no, sin, ply a challenge ,o
legal onhodoxy, bu, ,ha,

politics,

and cognitive relativism (or

a, leas,

some of its

theoretically derived effects),
are important to a reconstituted
discourse of legal authority

and professional expert, se/ That

Contemporary

legal

is,

realism

is

academics with a

the principal discourse of'legal

critical perspective,

others involved with the Critical
Legal Studies

Movement, argue

the realist project,' while sociologists
and political scientists
intellectual

program

that seeks to resurrect

modenhsnf.

such as Horwitz and
for the need to resurrect

seem genuinely puzzled by an

something which they believe has never

disappeared. For example, Harry Stumpf
wryly suggests that "[t]he political
jurisprudent

can read most of critical legal thought with
a big yawn, concluding
at least

that

law professors, or

a vocal minority of them, have finally joined
the club." (Stumpf 1988, 37)
Nevertheless, despite important differences, most
legal academics and social

scientists share the

legal world.

view

that realism has

And, while the

shaped our current understanding of the socio-

interpretations of realism's impact vary,

I

would suggest

that

the dominant perspective views realism as a positive step
beyond a (willfully) naive

formalist understanding of the law; that

do not mean

to suggest that

whatever

Horwitz ignores

thought; indeed, he explicitly situates

ment with Horwitz concerns

is,

it

its

own

this aspect

shortcomings, realism was a

of progressive or

within the context of modernism.

realist legal

My disagree-

his apparent disregard for the realist reconstruction of a

discourse of professional authority within, and as a response

to,

the perceived crisis of

modernism.
^Contemporary

warrant our attention.
empirical

sometimes divided over which aspects of realism
For example, John Henry Schlegel (1995) seeks to emphasize the

critical legal theorists are

work of the

while Gary Peller (1985) and Joseph Singer (1984) emphasize the role of indeterminacy and cognitive relativism.
realists,

6

helpful development ,ha,

moved

us beyond the glaring inadequacies
of legal fonnalism as

an explanatoo' framework,
particularly

in its

Langdellian fotm.‘

As John Brigham and

Christine Harrington note, "[s]ocio-legal
scholars, particularly in the
United States, have

understood law through a version of
realism for some

view

that

time....

judges and legal scholars are naive and
trapped

has grown progressively more influential
until

it

in a

may now be

At

least since the 1930s, the

formal orientation to rules
described as the framework

of the legal establishment." (1989, 41).

Working from

a perspective that emphasizes the
constitutive

law as producing

that sees

social world,

effects in the

Brigham and Harrington seek

to

develop a post-realist approach that

own

concerns for understanding the

importance of institutions and "grounding socio-legal research

Brigham and Harrington's

analysis

a view

world rather than as merely reflective of a larger

incorporates the insights of realism" with their

42).

power of law,

is

in social relations." (1989,

an original and important contribution to our

understanding of realist and post-realist socio-legal scholarship. Their principal
aim,

however,
Stumpf,

is

to highlight the paradoxical aspects

who welcomes

critical legal

academics

of the

latter

to the fold

Brigham and Harrington discern something more

body of work. Unlike

with

little

more than a yawn,

in the realist-inspired

work of CLS and

the judicial behavioralism of social scientists such as Harold Spaeth and Jeffrey Segal.

Brigham and Harrington understand realism

itself as a

form, both institutional and

discursive, of legal authority.

^For example, the judicial behavioralists, Harold Spaeth and Jeffrey Segal, locate the
"genesis" of their "attitudinal model" in the

work of the

(Spaeth and Segal 1993, 65).
7

legal realists

of the 1920s.

They observe
although

It IS

that an "interesting

treated as a given

by

legal

paradox about legal realism today

academics and social

continually advanced as a vanguard
project."
the realist perspective

-

(

1

scientists,

it

is that,

is

also

989, 41). This paradox veils a lacuna

in

the absence of any sustained
discussion of the institutional

sources of legal power. Brigham and
Harrington argue that this absence
results from the
fact that "the institutional

power of a

assertion oi realism." (1989, 41).

As

legal

community

is,

a system of authority, according to

Harrington, realism possesses three interrelated
aspects:
vision of law;

it

institutionalizes realism in the legal

indeterminate. (1989, 43).

view

that

law

is

They maintain

it

continual

Brigham and

recreates a naive fomiaiist

academy; and,

it

asserts that law is

that "[rjealism as legal authority

promotes the

indeterminate but leaves intact social arrangements
and institutions

determined by law." (1989, 42). That

outcomes,

in part, linked to the

rather, individual interests

is,

legal rules (the 'law')

do not determine

and behavior do determine outcomes

Brigham and Harrington's work

is

richly suggestive

legal

in court.

and offers many possible

avenues for future scholarship. Of particular importance here

is

the argument regarding

the relationship between legal indeterminacy and the constitution of institutional
authority.

However,

their explication

of indeterminacy

is

underdeveloped

context, suggesting at one point that indeterminacy critique

characteristic of

concerned
in

"modem

legal scholarship." (1989, 44).

to identify realism as a

is

in

terms of its historical

a relatively recent

Moreover, they seem primarily

system of authority of socio-legal scholarship, especially

terms of its production within the contemporary legal academy.

8

This dissertation seeks

to elaborate

and develop Brigham and
Harrington's original

mstghts by historically situating the
emergence of legal indetcnninaey as
a legal and
professional problem. Further,

1

want

relationship between indeterminacy
and

not an artifact of

modem

I

realist theoretical

will argue that,

viewed

Holmes
work

-

carefully develop the reciprocal

modem

legal scholarship, hut

writings of Oliver Wendell

between

more

to

realist

can be traced

To

in 1870.

legal authority.

that end,

jurisprudence

historically, realism

-

1

Indetemiinacy critique

is

to the earliest extra-judicial

will suggest a relationship

and the larger legal profession.

can be seen as a discourse of professional

expertise and legal authority that emerges in
response to specific social and historical
conditions.

It

stands as an adjunct

to,

and

some sense

in

a replacement of, formalism as

the principal legitimating discourse of legal
authority. This, in turn, suggests a further
point: the jurisprudential 'response' to the crisis of
legal

modernism

(uncertainty, or

doctrinal indeterminacy) emerged, in large part, from
within an institutional space created

by the

legal profession to deal with this very problem; that

While

1

do not wish

to

is,

the law school.

diminish the genuine insights of realism

contributions to socio-lcgal scholarship,

1

will also suggest the

need

awareness of the internal and external dimensions of realism. By

in

for a

tenns of its

heightened

'internal',

1

mean an

epistemological framework and corresponding discourse that originates within the legal
profession

itself.^

We

arc

most familiar with

jurisprudential writings of a

academy. By

^By

'external',

‘legal profession’,

1

1

its

theoretical articulation through the

number of scholars working within

am

referring to the

mean

the

American

legal

work of scholars who have appropriated

the bench, practicing bar, and the legal academy.

9

certain

key insights of realism

legal world.

In

representative

gains

full

my opinion,

it

in order to

is diffieult to

mode of thought -

definition only

analyze the legal profession and
the larger soc.o-

when

disentangle the two. Realism

a discourse of expertise and
professional

is.

in

power

situated against a larger historical
backdrop.

With

this

m mind,

I

it

might

at first

-

that

To

incorporate the insights of realism into
contemporary socio-Iegal analysis, then,

problematic enterprise than

Us origin, a

is

a

more

seem.

will attempt to provide a decidedly
different analysis of the

nature and development of the engagement
between realist legal thought, broadly

understood, and

stated,

its

assumed point of critical departure - Langdellian
formalism. Simply

my argument is that both

formalism and realism are jurisprudential languages
of

power - discourses of expertise which
closure.

To defend such

a claim,

I

function to produce forms of social or professional

will adopt a critical perspective external to
the

jurisprudential debates themselves.* This

not a

is

work o/jurisprudence, but

a theoretical

analysis of the social conditions in which particular types of
jurisprudential discourse have

emerged. In another context, Steven Best and Douglas Kellner have suggested
the
importance of engaging with theoretical discourse. They point out

and ideas

articulate novel social experiences

*For example,

who views

I

would juxtapose

that,

"[n]ew theories

and a proliferation of emergent discourses

my use of jurisprudence with that of Ronald

legal theory as providing the first

Dworkin’s engagement with jurisprudence

is

and best defense of ‘law’s empire’;
designed to defend law’s integrity while

demonstrating theory’s central and lasting significance

The Politics of Jurisprudence, Roger

to law. (See:

Dworkin

1986). In

Dworkin, correctly in my view,
knowledge of law to legal ‘insiders’. (1989, 10).

Cotterrell criticizes

for ultimately limiting the production and

Dworkin,

10

therefore suggests tha, important
transfomiations are taking
place in society and ct.lturc

(1991,

ix).

Although
I

wish

I

am mmdful of the

to

argue for a close link between
legal thought and legal
practice,

fact that

such an analysis always risks
being misunderstood for the

claim that legal development
urges,

we need

analyses

is

simply a struggle of competing
ideas. As Morton Horwitz

to cease discussing legal
theory in an historical

m social

and historical context. Nonetheless,

vacuum, and relocate our

believe jurisprudential discourse

I

provides important insight into the nature
of social and legal change. For
example,
following Weber,
legal closure

we

can look to jurisprudence

by legitimating

much of this work,

on a purely exegetical

I

level, albeit not in

following Pierre Bourdieu's injunction,
free

how

it

serves as a

mechanism of

the profession's status and authority.

Consequently, throughout
legal theorists

to see

my

engage with the texts of specific
an ahistorical manner. However,

ultimate aim

is

to articulate a line

of analysis

"from the dominant junsprudential debate concerning law,
between

asserts the absolute

autonomy of the juridical form

which

in relation to the social world,

and

instrumentalism, which conceives of law as a reflection, or a tool in
the service of

dominant groups. (Bourdieu 1987, 814).

Specifically,

I

will argue that instrumentalism,

or realism, should not be understood simply as a reaction to Langdellian-inspired

fomialism; but, that both can be understood as emerging in response

to the

same

phenomenon —

a perceived crisis of legal and professional authority deriving from a

condition that

describe as 'legal modernism'.

1
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To

ignore this aspect of realism risks

eliding

its

role in the constitution of the
authority of modem law and

its

carriers, the legal

profession.^

In laying out a partial history
of this development, focusing

from

that history,

I

do not wish

my

argument

to

on certain key

texts

be understood as calling for the return

to

a pre-realist, or formalist, grounding
for professional authonty.
Nothing could be further

from the case. Rather,

in

suggesting that realism should be
understood not so

much

critique of formalism, but as another
attempt to ground professional authority,
call into question the

order that

we might

very conflation of law with the legal
profession.

I

wish

I

to

as a

wish

do

to

this in

lay claim to the ethical project of law
- justice - a project that

otherwise seems secondary to the processes of
professional closure.

The

dissertation unfolds as follows: In Chapter

Two,

I

briefly discuss the concepts

of professional autonomy and closure. The claim of specialized
knowledge and expertise
is

the principle

by which professionals

are typically siad to secure their socio-economic

advantages in society. In the case of the legal profession, the language
of law constitutes
the

knowledge base of lawyers. Attempting

professional knowledge and legal closure,

different strategies used

that the

by both

I

to establish the theoretical link

between

suggest the need to be sensitive to the

formalist and realist approaches to effect closure.

emergence of formalism was

inspired, in large part,

by

I

argue

a perceived threat to the

epistemological structure of legal doctrine, thereby threatening the legitimacy of the legal
profession as a whole.

I

give

some

attention to the rise of Langdell and his attempt to

an important essay, representative of the ‘realism as reaction’ view, see Thomas
Grey (1983, 3), where he notes that "classical orthodoxy [Langdellian formalism] is the
thesis to which modem American legal thought has been the antithesis."
“^For

12

construct a scientific and autonomous
legal system for the

seldom considered as
rather

Langdelliamsm

realist reaction.

the

a serious intellectual infiuence

first

,s

is

fact that

concerns that would

inspired a

Langdell

later

is really

be developed

his intellectual progeny.

The examination then moves on
Holmes’ work

Langdell

mode of thought which

My argument is that such an analysis misses the
many of the

law.

on the development of American
law;

given attention mainly as that

legal modernist, anticipating

by Holmes and

common

lies

to

Holmes

in

Chapter Three. At the heart of

the central problem of judicial
subjectivity: the judge’s

unconstrained - that

is,

power

is

legally

indeterminate - and hence, potentially
political in nature. This

suggests important implications for the theoretical
foundations of professional authority;
the manifestations of which

may be found

at

both the level of individual lawyer/client

relationships and, correspondingly, through concerns
for the legitimacy of the legal

profession as a whole. Chapters Four and Five, respectively,
deal with Pound and

Cardozo. Both,

I

argue,

jurisprudence, and add

fill

new

out the vision of legal practice suggested by Holmes’
layers of meaning to the space of law

his imaginative defense of the

change, and Cardozo

s

common

it

suggests. Pound, in

law during a period of rapid social and economic

elaboration of a modernist form of common law adjudication that

recognizes the inevitability of chaos and flux, provide important adjuncts to the

Holmesian

American

vision. Together, they provide the foundation for

legal

modernism, the

legal realists during the 1920s

for certain elements within the

central insights of which

initial

what may be referred

were then

rearticulated

to as

by the

and 1930s, and which now may be viewed as an orthodoxy
contemporary American

13

legal

academy and

practicing bar.

I

conclude, in Chapter Six, on a
contemporary note, by looking

important post-realist theorists

who have

at

the

work of several

addressed the relationship between
legal theory

and practice.
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CHAPTER 2
law, politics, and the authority
of experts

Uncertainty and Complexity in the
In a

Murphy
written

compelling discussion of the epistemic
properties of the

common

notes that, ”[t]he dominant image
of law in Western thought

down and

systematic (or

common
century

Law

fixed, so that, fixed,

law emerged from

breakdown of the

'writ'

this general image...."

the

common

of something

and purposive

(Murphy 1994,

73).

alteration.

The

In late nineteenth

law was a rather messy place. With the

system and forms of action, the

common

law had

Further, an explosion in published case reports,
exacerbated

Company s development of a national

Tim

can be the object of informed interpretation,

at least orderly) exposition,
explicit critique

Amenca, however,

structure.

it

is

law,

lost its internal

by West Publishing

reporter system, illustrated inconsistencies and

contradictions between (and sometimes within) jurisdictions.

Such a

situation threatened to reveal a crisis of doctrinal uncertainty
that

would

ultimately undermine the authority of the judicial process. Calls to
organize or 'arrange'
the

common

law, or for codification, were increasingly

common, both within

resurgent professional associations and legislative assemblies. For example,

public statements by

members of the

elite

the

if

newly

one reads

bar during the late nineteenth and early

twentieth centuries, one recognizes that lawyers believed they faced something tantamount
to a 'legitimation crisis' in the foundational principles of liberal legalism

objectivity,

-

neutrality,

and the rule of law. There was an articulated sense of fragmentation, of a

15

threat to the poss.b.lity of
'legal truth'.

Atnencan Law

Institute in 1923,

Such concerns culminated

whose founders

identified the

complexity of the law as undermining
popular respect
the authority of the legal
profession. (See

ALI

for the

the fonnation

of the

grow.ng uncerta.nty and

law and, thereby, threatening

1923).

Langdelhan formalism may be understood

as

one response

to this situation.

It

represented a desire to purge the law
of the taint of’politics'; to take the
idea of an

autonomous
legal

legal

system senously, thereby making law

'seientific';

and, thus, to resituate

knowledge on firmer epistemological foundations.
Although reformist

realism

is less

and the

legal profession, however,

example,

commonly understood

and more as a reaction against formalism.'®
For

Morton Horwitz's second volume on
is

'Classical Legal Thought'

'°For a

as a direct response to a legitimacy
crisis of the law

this basic opposition serves as a principal
organizing

1992). Horwitz's focus

more general

to

theme

for legal historian

the history of American legal development.
(Horwitz

on the struggle of legal formalism

-

in nature,

-

in his terminology,

maintain and defend the separation of law and politics."

history from this perspective, the classic

0949/1975). For a more

specifically legal analysis, see

work is Morton White
Ronen Shamir (1993). Shamir

development of American law in terms of a dialectical movement between
of thought that display formal or substantive rationality; one always in response to,

interprets the
styles

or reaction against, the other.

Compare Neil Duxbury

(1995, 2); Duxbury challenges this’
‘pendulum swing’ understanding of the history of American jurisprudence. In its place,
Duxbury argues that "American jurisprudence since 1870 is characterized not by the
pendulum swing view of history but by complex patterns of ideas. Jurisprudential ideas
are rarely

bom;

equally rarely do they die."

"‘Classical Legal Thought’, a term which Horwitz borrows from

includes the Langdelhan formalists of the

late

Duncan Kennedy,

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as

well as the ‘legal process’ school of thought which emerged in the 1950s and continues
to hold a place of importance in the legal academy today.
16

Arrayed

m opposition to Classical

thinkers from Holmes, through

Legal Thought, Honvitz situates
'Progressive' legal

Pound and

the Legal Realists to

CLS,

all

of whom are

characterized by their reaction against
formalism in terms of an attempt
to undennine the
formalist separation of law and
politics.

Horwitz’s argument suggests four
stages in the evolution of American
law since
1

870. Classical Legal Thought, which
aspired to construct a system of
scientific

jurisprudence, dominated American law
between 1870 and 1905. The second stage
of

Horwitz

s

analysis

is

charactenzed by the development and
consolidation of the

Progressive critique of Classical Legal Thought
and the
distinguishing feature here

final stages

is

rise

of Legal Realism. The

the rejection of the law/politics distinction.

The

third

and

of the development of American law are marked
by the decline of Realism

in

the post-war period and the rise of the legal process
school in the period from 1945 to

1960. In response to the revived formalism of the process
school of jurisprudence, which

attempted a reconstruction of the law/politics distinction, Horwitz
documents a resurgence

of challenges

to this distinction in the post-realist

To support

his argument,

Horwitz

work of Law and Economics, and CLS.

identifies

some of the

theoretical

mechanisms

Classical Legal Thought deployed to maintain the separation of law and politics:
the

public/private distinction; the creation of abstract and general legal categories which could

be mechanically applied
formalistic

in particular cases;

mode of legal

and the introduction and development of a

reasoning. Horwitz observes that Classical Legal Thought

fraught with inherent contradictions which

of increasing modernization and

became only more pronounced during

industrial development,

17

was

a period

and which made attempts

to

defend the autonomy of the law
inereasingly more

emergence of "institutional and
he
claims, "triggered the
109)

crisis

difficult.

Horwitz focuses on the

ideological changes" in
contract and cotporate law
which,

of legitimacy

at

the turn of the century."
(Horwitz 1992,

.

A

substantial portion of Horwitz’s
argument

Wendell Holmes and

his

mfluenee on the

later

is

devoted

work of Oliver

to the

Progressive eritique of Classieal
Legal

Thought. Horwitz eharaeterizes Holmes’s
extra-judieial writings between
1870 and 1897
10)
as an important manifestation of
the

Horwitz suggests
to ’’The Path

that

1

.

Holmes’s ’’own

of the Law”

and legal thought and

in

intellectual

’late’

this

erisis in Classieal

journey from The

1897 parallels a major change

in the structures

Horwitz supports

finds an ’early’ and

emergenee of a

of legitimacy

in the

in

all

Common Law

American

social,

in

1881

economic

two periods.” (Horwitz 1992,

claim by advancing an interpretation of
Holmes’s work that

Holmes. The former was marked by a type of formalism
which

sought external and objective standards for adjudication.
The
Horwitz, abandoned

Legal Thought.

such

efforts.

’late’

Holmes, according

The publication of ’’The Path of the Law”

to

established

moment at which advanced legal thinkers renounced the belief in a conception
of legal thought independent of politics and separate from social reality.
From this
the

moment

on, the late-nineteenth-century ideal of an internally
self-consistent and

autonomous system of legal ideals, free from the corrupting influence of politics,
was brought constantly under attack. (Horwitz 1992, 142).
There

is

much

to agree

with

in

important to emphasize that formalism

perceived

crisis

Horwitz’s analysis; however,

itself

emerged,

I

believe

in large part, as a

it

is

response to a

of legal and professional authority, and was not simply a doctrinal

instrument of capitalist

interests.

Further, Horwitz’s supporting claim that the shift from

18

an

-early- to

American

a

-late-

Holmes

legal thought,

matured and developed

m his early work.

tracks larger developments

is, I

will contend,

as a legal theonst.

m the legitimating structures of

somewhat misleading.
And, there

is

Certainly,

Holmes

a conceptualistie element
evident

Nevertheless, from his essays in the
early 1870s to the -watershed-

address of 1897, Holmes articulates a
vision of law which emphasizes
concepts of

perspectivism and legal indeterminacy.
Moreover, Holmes- work, although
cognizant of
the inadequacy of formalism as an
explanatory framework,
articulate the foundations

development, with formalism, and

fails to

in

work can be seen

response to a larger

new language of professional

acknowledge

the development of the legal profession-s

rhetoric

grounded

in the

as

marking a

crisis

parallel

of legal and professional

expertise and power. Horwitz-s interpretation

and thus ignores the ways

this

equally concerned to

of a new discourse of professional authority.
Often written from

the perspective of the lawyer, Holmes-s

authority, of a

is

in

which realism

power through

is itself

complicit in

the construction of a professional

indeterminacy of legal doctrine. The weaknesses of Horwitz-s

interpretation are evident in his characterization of Holmes- -external
standard- of liability

as a type of formalism.

As

I

theoretical foundations of a

management of legal
The

more

will argue in Chapter Three, such a

new

discourse of professional authority grounded in the

uncertainty.

political scientist,

similar to

view misses the

my own.

In

James

Foster, provides an analysis that

is,

in

some ways,

The Ideology of Apolitical Politics (1986), Foster focuses on

the concept of liberal legalism as a hegemonic ideology.

He

argues that the legal

profession in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was preoccupied with the
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need

10

respond lo a 'leg.lima.ion

crisis'.

legitimacy of the capitalist system

itself.

Wlrat

was

al siakc,

Conllating

legal profession, he notes that,
"[c]onscquenees

tite

Oowing

according

interests

|.oslcr,

was

the

of capital, sn, and the

Iron, the private

ownersinp of

production for profit were causing
growing numbers of people seriously
lo question
capitalism,....

Government by lawyers was being challenged."

(Foster 1<)86, 52). In

response, conservative lawyers attempted
a resurrection of forgotten

'truths'

and patriotic

values

-

and

guardians, lawyers. Moreover, Foster
documents legal conservatives' role in

Its

the virtues of the

American

eonslilulional republic, veneration oflhc
rule of law

reviving the bar association movement,
arguing for

its

instrumental role as the protector of

threatened American virtues.

What
that finds

only

A

production.

interesting in Foster's analysis, however,

IS

elite,

is

that

he avoids an interpretation

or conservative lawyers complicit in this process
of ideological

progressive wing of the legal profession, according to Foster,
maintained

that the conservative response

was reactionary and,

ultimately self-defeating.

The

legal

progressives acknowledged problems in the administration of justice,
particularly as a
result

of the

bar's

connections to large-scale capitalist

reform remained relatively modest and
structure.

movement
patriotism.

More

interests.

However,

their calls for

failed to challenge the prevailing capitalist

importantly, legal progressives championed the emergent bar association

as a vehicle to articulate the virtues of 'professionalism', as opposed to

And,

for the legal progressives, professionalism

technical competence.
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was defined by an

apolitical

Foster's analysis

profession's activities

oversimplify the

full

is

compelling on one

were solely

in

level.

response to a

Yet, by arguing that the legal

crisis

of capitalism, he seems

nature of the response. Foster's
account characterizes law and

pnncipal carriers simply as instruments

in the

Foster never acknowledges that the

to

—

legal conservatives

result,

and progressives

crisis threatening the legitimacy

itself

Shifting the focus from the

misses

which both

might have been an epistemological

and authority of the profession

production, to

'crisis'

its

maintenance of capitalist domination,

thereby denying any possibility for a
relatively autonomous legal system.
As a

were responding

to

more immediate problems of capitalist organization
and

more overarching epistemological problems allows us

that the practicing bar

and

legal theorists alike

to see

what Foster

were struggling with the

legitimacy of the intellectual foundations of the law and, as
a result, with the legitimacy of
a profession

whose

authority

This struggle was engaged

in

was dependent on a monopoly over
by both formalist and

this

knowledge

realist legal theorists.

base.

And, while

I

not want to suggest that realism was not, in large part, constituted by a
reaction to

perceived inadequacies in formalism,

I

do believe

that a different perspective reveals

aspects of realism that have, for too long, been ignored.

this dissertation is to situate

The perspective

that

I

adopt

both formalism and realism within the context of 'legal

modernism'.
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in

do

(Legal) Mode,,, ism

Modernism
modernism'

is

a„d the
is

Crisis ofAuihorii}, i„ A,„erica„

generally understood as an aesthetic
category. That

most often understood

modernism was more than simpiy an
discreet historicai era. Yet,

is

it

is,

to refer to a particuiar iiterary
period,

emerged sometime around i890 and ended

which

Chare
the tcnn

one which

rotighiy in the eariy i930s. Sureiy,
however,

aesthetic

phenomenon; and more than simpiy a

does seem to have had certain defined
characteristics, one of

said to be the desire for order through
the visuai arts or iiterature.
According to

Margaret Davies,

''[t]he

basic idea of

modernism was

that art

was

a

way of transcending

the poiiticai and sociai chaos of the
times, of attaining a higher significance
than that wiiich

was apparent

in the lived world.

Art became a search for aesthetic unity,
order, and

universality - outside history, and outside social
contexts." (Davies 1994, 221). For

many

modernist writers, suggests Davies, "[bjeneath the chaos
of texts, there [was] an
underlying 'universal book'."

My claim
legal thought,

is that to

we must

properly understand the development of modem American

situate

it

within the larger social and cultural context of

modernism. Rather than viewing the work of Holmes and
as a reaction against fomialism,

we must

his intellectual

progeny simply

instead see both formalism and realism as

jurisprudential responses to the perceived crisis of modernism. Obviously, the responses

took different forms; but, our reading of the difference must be understood within a larger
historical

and cultural context. According

modernism springs from
knowledge

is

to

James Kloppenberg,

"[t]he culture

the unsettling but liberating experience of uncertainty.

recognized as contingent, standards that seemed stable

22

start to

of

When

wobble.

convictions that

felt solid start to

(Kloppenberg 1995. 69).

it is

competing junsprudential
former

may

crumble, and revolutionary
fontts of expression emerge."

my

argument

strategies to

that

formalism and realism emerged
as

meet the uneertainty oUegal
modernism. The

be understood as a strategy of
'transcendence'

-

a search for. and an appeal
to

overarching universal legal principles
which would resolve the doctrinal
indetenninacy and

chaos of the moment. The

on a recognition of the

latter

may

inevitability

be understood as a strategy of
'immanence', based

of uncertainty; a recognition which
resulted

not to transcend legal uncertainty, but
to

mam,ge

in efforts

from within a space of professional

it

expertise.'^

To
for the

better sttuate the concept of

development of American

of American cultural and
United States during
people,

we had

legal thought,

intellectual

life.

as an explanatory frame of reference

we

can gain some insight from historians

Robert Wiebe. for example, has described the

this period as a "distended society,"

our way.

lost

modernism

He

where many

felt that,

as a

writes:

was initially inspired by a reading of Karl Llewellyn’s The Common Law
Tradition -Deciding Appeals (1960), where, in the opening
pages, he describes a "loss

‘^This idea

of faith" among lawyers in the work product of the appellate courts. Llewellyn
sets out
his purpose the project of debunking what he believed to be the
"myth" of uncertainty

as

which had, he conceded, contributed to this crisis of confidence among members of the
practicing bar. While he did not believe there existed a logical certainty that allowed
for
of judicial decision-making, he did believe "that the work of our
over the country is reckonable." (1960, 4). More importantly, perhaps,

scientific prediction

appellate courts

was

all

the influence of

Ronen Shamir’s Managing Legal

New Deal (1995), directly from
less, my own analysis differs in

which

I

Uncertainty: Elite Lawyers in the

borrow the notion captured

in his title.

Nonethe-

important respects from his interpretation of the relation-

ship between formalists and realists. Specifically, Shamir views the development of

American

legal thought to

move

in a

‘pendulum-like’ fashion, with realism emerging as a

direct reaction against formalism. For the reasons given above,

23

I

disagree.

America

in the late nineteenth
century was a society without a
core.
a tonal centers of authority
and information which might have

swin changes. American institutions
were
where family and church, education and

It lacked those
given order to such

still

oriented toward eomnnii

press, professions

y fc
and governmem aH

argely found their meaning by
the way they fit one with another
inside a town or a
detached portion of a city. As men
ranged farther and farther from their
comimmities they tried desperately to
understand the larger world in terms
of their
small, femiltar environment. They
tried, in other words, to
master an impersonal
world through the customs of a personal
society. They failed, usually
without
recognizing why; and that failure to
comprehend a society they were helping to
make contained the essence of the nation's story.

(Wiebe 1967,

And,

in his recent

book, the American intellectual historian
John Patrick Diggins

rebukes American pragmatism for

its

alleged failure to resolve the

For Diggins, modernism can be defined
cognition.

we have

In a

"lost

traditional

in

in the possibility

'crisis

of modernisin'.

terms of the problem of belief and the limits
of

post-Darwmian world of rapid

our belief

12)

industrial

of objective

modes of acquiring knowledge." (Diggins

expansion and social dislocation,

truth

and have

1994,

7).

The

lost

our

faith in the

resultant crisis

is

the

product of a recognition of the loss of these traditional foundations
for legitimate
authority.

Diggins' critique

is

grounded

consequence of modemism, has
crisis

in his assertion that

failed to

make good on

its

pragmatism, because

'promise' of a resolution to the

over the loss of foundations for legitimate authority. For Diggins, pragmatism

merely served as an apology
dissertation deals with

work

for the acceptance

that

was

of the modernist condition. While

either instrumental to the

pragmatist tradition (Holmes), or with work that emerges from

Cardozo),

is,

itself a

1

am

this

development of the

it (i.c..

Pound and

not interested in developing a critique along Diggins' line of analysis; that

a straightforward critique of pragmatism.
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Rather,

thts cns.s

am more concerned

of modernism. There

this point

more

1

having

to

do with

only as a

I

believe, a

number of implications

of realist expertise and

'reaction’ against formalism,

critical analysis

both formalism and rcalisn, as
rcspottses to
to

be drawn from

the legitimation of legal/expert
authority. That

directly at the contours

simply as a

are.

to situate

we

authority,

is,

by looking

by not viewing realism

avoid the limitation of understanding
realism

of systemic distortions or breakdowns.
Viewing realism

principally as a reaction to formalism
provides a decidedly truncated analysis
which veils
the

emergence of realist

Realtsm as

'expertise'

'reaction' suggests

-

a reconstituted legitimation of
legal authority.

something almost ud hoc

constructed discourse of legal authority.

As

in nature, rather

a corrective,

account of the 'cognitive exclusiveness’ that Magali

I

than a socially

would suggest

Sarfatti

that a full

Larson (1977) identified as

important to professional authority, must more seriously
evaluate the constitutive elements

of the relationship between realism and
But, what does this

new

legal uncertainty or doctrinal indetenninacy.'^

rhetoric of power look like

--

a realist discourse of professional

authority?

Legal Modernism and the Problem of Trust
David Luban suggests

that

modernism can be understood by reference

to the

metaphor of the 'Copemican Revolution'. Copernicus, Luban

notes, "taught us to mistrust

common

criticizable

sense, to

view

it

as merely a belief system resting

‘^Larson defines this as a unique access to
to the well-being

some

of society. (See Larson 1977,
25

on

area of knowledge that

15).

is

deemed

crucial

presuppositions." (Luban 1994, 19).
IS

The

that "[t]he truth about legal
structures

in, pi, cation

must be radically

manifest themselves in practice."
(Luban 1994,

compelling; and

much of the work

with this metaphor. The

of 'Copemtcanisn,' forthe legal
.nind

3).

from the way they

Luban’s insight here

that follows relies

realist introduction

different

is

on the simple image

profound and
he conveys

that

of such concepts as uncertainty or

tndeterminacy, and the concomitant emphasis
on 'perspective' serve to define the contours

of the

legal manifestations

of Luban's post-Copemican world.

position pregnant with possibility

century to the present day, have

more democratic space

- one

made

for social

and

which

It is

a jurispnidential

critical legal theorists,

great use. Specifically,

political contestation

suggesting an indeterminate juridical future subject

it

from the turn of the

would seem

to create a

over legal meaning, thereby

to progressive transformation, rather

than a closed set of limited alternatives.

However, even

as

informs a style of legal reasoning and practice, the emphasis
of

it

realism on legal uncertainty, and the professional knowledge deployed
to 'manage'

new problems amenable

to

it,

pose

normative intervention. In her important essay, "Genealogy

and Jurisprudence: Nietzsche, Nihilism, and the Social Scientification of Law," Marianne
Constable (1994) laments the gradual expulsion of justice from
expulsion'

is

modem

law.

The

brought about by the 'wedding' of law and social science, a union

first

suggested by Holmes, and ultimately brought to fruition in the work of Legal Realism and
its

contemporary

intellectual heirs:

Constable's analysis

of the

is

'Law and Economics', and

Critical Legal Studies.

prompted by an imaginative reading of Nietzsche's Twilight

Idols', specifically, his six-stage history

of Western metaphysics:
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"How

the 'Real

World’

-

at

Last

Became

a Myth."

Her purpose

a legal thought that, fragmented though

origins, to the insights of Oliver

it

is

may

to

show "how 20th-century

be, often traces

Wendell Holmes

-

its

legal thought

impetus,

corresponds to the

not

its

final stages

of

if

Nietzsche’s history of metaphysics."
(Constable 1994, 555). According to
Constable,
the

first five

stages of Nietzsche’s history can be
taken to sketch the way in which
jurisprudence, like metaphysics, has, through
reason, long sought its foundations in
truths residing
a ’real world’ outside of, beyond, and even
in opposition to ’life’
this world. Justice lies, respectively,
in the virtue of the wise citizen of
the polis
the natural law of the divinity of the
unattainable world beyond,

m

m
m

in the moral law
of Kant’s categorical imperative, in the positive law
of the empiricists and
utihtanans, and m the social policy and distributive
justice of economists and

philosophers. Striving for such justice signifies to
Nietzsche a need and desire to
escape one s condition, as one turns to an illusory
better world that is believed to

be

’real’.

(555).

Similar to Cuban’s understanding of legal modernism.
Constable understands the
’social scientification’

of the law

Western metaphysics

—

phenomena

- which

As

about perceptions and beliefs.

final stages

up "the task of grasping the so-called

as taking

or appearances.

corresponds to Nietzsche’s

it

does

And

so, its

knowledge comes

reality

its

own

world of surfaces and behavior legal world.

of

to constitute the ’truth’

as sociology looks to appearances, justice disappears."

(Constable 1994, 555). The ideal of justice - in Nietzsche’s reversal, what
rendered unknowable on

of

terms.

now

The apparent world, or what

constitutes the basis for

Sociology merges with law, assumes

its

is

simultaneously renders problematic;" (Constable 1994, 556)

real -

knowledge of the socio-

realities’,

or, in

now

"provides

which [sociology]

other words, "sociology

simultaneously provides and becomes the law of society." (Constable 1994, 589).
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is

observable - a

discursive space, and

access to a law disengaged from justice and attached to ’social

is

The problem
engage with,

is

for Constable, a

problem which

that the social scientification

of law

this dissertation seeks, in part,
to

is

the product of, and in turn seeks
to

describe, a "social world [which] presents
itself in terms of the regularities
or laws that

comprise the domain of knowledge of the social
sciences, which knowledge

in turn

informs the social policies of government."
(Constable 1994, 563). Realism purports to

demystify the ideological constructs of the various
manifestations of legal formalism

in

order to rehabilitate law's instrumental capacity
to serve the ends of social and economic
justice.

However,

as Austin Sarat notes in his

[ijnstead of enabling a

new

legality

engaged

commentary on Constable's
in the process

essay,

of building a more humane

world, realists and their intellectual progeny have been, albeit
unintentionally, the

handmaidens of an expanded
precisely because they are

state

power whose regulatory

effects are

more informed by knowledge of the

more

insidious

social world." (Sarat 1994,

563).

Constable's appropriation of Nietzsche

perspective

is

useful for

my

is

both provocative and suggestive. Such a

analysis of the nature of a realist discourse of expertise.

identification

of an "actuarial"

interest, is, in

many ways,

justice, as the product

similar to

of a jurisprudence of risk and social

my own emphasis on

uncertainty and doctrinal indeterminacy.

It is

a realist discourse of socio-legal

a discourse that embodies

legal closure, while reconstituting the legitimation of expertise through

profession can articulate and justify the law of the

Her

modem

state.

new forms of

which the

legal

The seeds of this

discourse can be discerned in the jurispmdential writings of that line of critical legal work,

from Holmes forward, which stands

in apparent opposition to legal formalism.
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The

'opposition'

By doing

IS real.

so,

expertise.

we

However,

it

Subsumed within

of this dissertation

grounded

To

simply focus on

the rhetoric of realism

is that

is

new

repeated tinfolding.

its

(realist)

discourse of

the simultaneous 'recognition' of

new forms of legal knowledge

the authority of modern law,

to

and

manage

its

it.

carriers,

is

A

central

largely

in this conjunction.

clarify these points,

discourse of expertise.

My

to

ignore the parallel development of this

uncertainty and the production of
thesis

misleading

is

analysis

is

1

it

is

necessary to elaborate on what

will attempt to

accomplish

is

meant by a

realist

that task in the following chapters.

motivated both by empirical and normative concerns and

is

well captured

the seminal study from the 1930s on the professions
by Carr-Saunders and Wilson.

contend that "[tjhc association between

scientific inquiry

become

is

a prime necessity.

Knowledge

art

is

They

of government has

power. Authority without knowledge

powerless. Power dissociated from knowledge

modern world works out

and the

in

is

a revolutionary force. Unless the

a satisfactory relationship

between expert knowledge and

popular control the days of democracy arc numbered." (Carr- Saunders and Wilson 1933,
485-86). In modern society, the professions''’ arc the principal

sites for the

knowledge; consequently, they assume an ever greater importance
its

production of

to the state in terms

of

capacity to govern.'^ Carr-Saunders and Wilson go on to argue that against the

'‘‘Again,

1

include both the legal

academy and

practitioners, along with the judiciary, in

my

definition of the legal profession..

'^This

is

of Terrence Halliday’s work. Beyond Monopoly: Lawyers,
and Professional Empowerment (1987). One can also usefully compare here,
work of Anthony Giddens; sec, in particular. The Consecptences of Modernity

a central concern

State Crises,
the recent
(

1

990).
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professions, "stands the democracy in
need of an expert.
relationship between

The professions

knowledge and power

is

The establishment of a

right

the central problem of modem
democracy."

"are not the only repositories of
knowledge, but they are the repositories

of a very special kind of knowledge; and
the problem of the establishment of
proper
relations

between them and the democratic

state is

one of the urgent problems of the day."

(Carr-Saunders and Wilson 1933, 486).

The questions Carr-Saunders and Wilson confronted
were, of course, not new. As
Stephen Esquith has noted, "Max Weber was the
central place of expert authority" in

his discussion

of Weber's work

political education.

"beyond the
and do

their duty;

it

in a larger

For Esquith,

traditional

modem

first" to

grapple with "identifying the

society. (Esquith 1994, 41).

examination of the

modem problem

this is a situation characterized

problem of teaching private

Esquith locates

by

of liberal

the attempt to go

citizens to respect the rights

of others

has been one of creating an appropriate system of tmst and expert

authority." (Esquith 1994, 41). According to Esquith, Weber's importance,

was

to argue

dominant form of authority in modem liberal societies has become the
authority of those who have organized the production of scientific and technical
knowledge and have retained exclusive jurisdiction over its interpretation and
that the

deployment. One of the keys

been the development of
specialized languages and methods-principles, laws, and rules. These abstractions
have become the coin of the realm. This is why Weber called modem expert
to this enterprise has

authority 'rational-legal' authority. According to Weber, it is through compliance
with the judgements of experts, rationally articulated in formal terms, that the

modem

secular values of security, procedural fairness, and wealth have been better

realized. (Esquith 1994, 41).

Given the complexity of modem
expertise

become

all

the

more important

society, the

for us to
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problems of access

engage with. In

to,

and tmst

this dissertation,

I

in

focus

on the jurisprudential constructions of legal
crisis for the legal profession as a

expertise; the response

question: what

Fovntcilisni

is

und the

power

is,

democratize the space in which

then, a goal of this work.

we

It is

provide answers to the

law?

work. The Promise of American

in the

37). This certainly

of Legol A.utonomy

C^oiistitutioii

In his classic

political

to

to a

whole. Delineating the characteristics of
an important

component of legal professional knowledge - realism motivated by the desire

of legal theory

Life,

Herbert Croly characterized

United States as "government by lawyers." (Croly 1909/1965, 131-

was not an observation new

to Croly.

More than seventy

years earlier,

Alexis de Tocqueville identified the central role of the legal profession to
American social

and

political life.

Indeed, Tocqueville described a popular reverence for the virtues of

legalism that inevitably elevated

"So

in the

United States there

the law as a natural

that all classes

show

paternal love for

From

a

enemy

it."

is

its

professional carriers to a place of prominence as well:

no numerous and perpetually turbulent crowd regarding

to fear

and suspect.

On

the contrary, one

is

bound

to notice

great confidence in their country's legislation, feeling a sort of

(Tocqueville 1966/1988, 241).

somewhat

different perspective, the

contemporary sociologist of the

professions, Magali Larson, suggests that the primary aim of the legal profession

secure

its

is to

position in the hierarchy of a given order, not to change this order in any

fundamental way. The livelihoods of lawyers, says Larson, "depend on the

stability

and

legitimacy of a given institutional and legal framework. In the wider sense of the word.
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the legal

mind

is

therefore inherently conservative."
(Larson 1977, 168). Lawyers’ stake in

stability, in turn, is a

"powerful source of conformity with the existing
social order."

(Larson 1977, 229). Larson

is clear,

however,

to highlight the

uniqueness of the

modem

professions. She maintains that any suggestion
of an historical "continuity of older

professions with their pre-industrial past [Tocqueville’s
point of reference]

apparent than real." (Larson 1977, xvi). For Larson, the
recent social products

whose emergence coincides with

modem professions
industrialization.

more

is

are relatively

Modem

professions, she explains, are quite different from their historical
predecessors.

modem

legal profession arose in a social, economic,

from the one

and cultural

that sustained the traditional legal profession

gentlemanly profession - the ‘lawyer-statesman’

The source of professional power

that

and

its

The

setting vastly different

ideology of a

Anthony Kronman (1993) pines

in pre-industrial society derived not

for.

from training or

credentialling, but from social position and association with elite patrons. Yet, as social

conditions changed with the onset of industrial society, so too did the bases for
professional power:

"From dependence upon

upon the judgement of a
upon

tightly knit

specific formal training and

while the

criteria

modem

legal profession

the

power and

community, the

anonymous

prestige of elite patrons or

modem professions came

certificates."

(Larson 1977,

4).

to

depend

Moreover,

undoubtedly incorporated some pre-industrial status

and ideological orientations,

it

also faced the

need

to

develop

new

sources of

professional authority.

Terence Halliday reminds us

that "[t]he politics

of expertise are contingent on an

authority that can be constmcted only through assiduous and persistent effort." (Halliday
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1987, 59). Beginning ,n the 1870s, the
American legal profession once again turned
to bar
associations as the central

mechanism

to assert its professional

authority. This

development followed over three decades

were not active

in pursuing professional goals
collectively,

fell

into disrepute

in

mandate and construct

that

which lawyers as a group

and

between the 1830s and 1870s - largely as a

in

which bar associations

result

of the egalitarian

pressures of the Jacksonian era. This period has
been characterized by Roscoe Pound and
Others as an era of professional "decadence."
(Pound 1953, 223).

But bar associations were not the only
In fact,

by the mid-nineteenth

by the development of the

institutional source

of professional power.

century, bar associations had been eclipsed in

modem

law school. As part of their efforts

many

respects

to elevate

professional status and authority, bar associations had quite consciously
drawn on an
earlier ideological

model of gentlemanly

the legal profession

modeled

status

and authority. Through bar associations,

legal education in a

This often consisted of a requirement for a

manner

'liberal'

befitting such gentlemanly status.

education followed by training in a

system of apprenticeship monitored by the associations themselves. Yet, some segments
of the profession realized
law as a

scientific

constmct the

that there

was considerable power

system rather than a disjointed

set

to

be derived from viewing

of mles, and they attempted to

institutional base appropriate for reshaping legal education along these lines:

the university-affiliated law school.'*'

'^For a history of the development of American legal education, see:

(1979), Robert Stevens (1983), and William LaPiana (1994).
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Anthony Chase

The emergence of the law

school, of a university-based legal
education,

was

the

product of the legal profession's desire for
intellectual legitimacy. Vying with
the other
professions for cultural authority, the legal
profession had grown uncomfortably
familiar

with the inadequacies of the apprentice method.
As Robert Stevens observed: "Legal
education had

failed,

m an earlier period, to produce the aristocracy that Tocqueville had

purported to see." (Stevens 1983, 41).
[t]he

law schools were

upgrade the

On

the other hand,

offering... a systematic,

intellectual quality

academic experience designed
of law and lawyers and thus enhance their

to

professional status. There had been, so it was claimed
by the 1870s, a 'downward
tendency', and law had gone from 'a liberal science to
a mechanical trade'. Yet 'the
science of law was the science of mankind', and lawyers
were being urged
to 'help

solve the moral problems upon which the progress of the law
depends

'

(Stevens

1983,24).
But, the effort to reconstruct the intellectual foundations of
the law and the legal

profession

was motivated by

larger social

and cultural concerns. Where Tocqueville had

observed a remarkable absence of 'fear' of the law
incorrectly), the leaders

of the American

different situation. Indeed, as

1830s (however correctly or

in the

bar, in the

1870s and 1880s, perceived a radically

James Foster suggests, lawyers during

responding to what amounted to a legitimation

crisis.

its

period were

(Foster 1986, 9-11). According to

Foster, "[djuring these years, the cumulative impact of a

economic transformations unleashed

this

whole century's

social trends

and

considerable turmoil upon the nation. Far-

reaching modifications in the organization and ownership of production, in the character

of work,

in the structure

of income and wealth, and

in the

occasioned fundamental tensions throughout American
the influence and authority of the bar

was

composition of society

life."

(Foster 1986, 10). Although

certainly in question, in Foster's analysis, at
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issue

was

the legitimacy of capitalism

ownership of production

for profit

itself:

"Consequences Howing from the private

were causing growing numbers of people
seriously

to

question capitalism. Government by lawyers
was being challenged." (Foster 1986, 52).
Foster argues that

responded

lawyers of both progressive and conservative
perspectives,

elite

to this crisis

of capitalism by rearticulating their

own

versions of the ideology of

"apolitical politics."

Foster's underlying assumption

of legalism are synonymous;

that a crisis

notion that liberal legal ideology

provocative claim

of the bar

in

that the ideology

is

of capitalism subsumes a

somehow

argument. Foster's claim that the

would suggest

that his conflation

somewhat problematic. Most simply,

I

believe

not a

for

it

more

is

late

nineteenth and early

important and

I

want

to

pursue

it;

of the ideologies of capitalism and legalism

my concerns,

and continuing dominance of realism, both within the
Moreover,

is

and of itself, and Foster provides lengthy quotes from several
leaders

to support his

I

of legalism. The

crisis

supports the capitalist system

twentieth-century bar confronted a legitimation crisis

however,

of capitalism and the ideology

it

fails to

legal

is

explain the emergence

academy and

the profession.

profitable to locate the profession's perception of a crisis

within the larger context of modernism - that the

crisis

was

cultural

and cognitive -

everything was in flux and the law provided no refuge. For example, in 1887,

at the

same

time that Christopher Columbus Langdell was delivering his "Harvard Celebration
Speech," the highly influential

jurist,

Thomas M. Cooley spoke

to the

Georgia Bar

Association on the "uncertainty of the law." Responding to the bar’s concerns that

becoming

the object of ridicule due to the public’s perception that the law
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was

it

was

uncertain.

Cooley defiantly

no

asserted: "I shall

affi™ and endeavor

to

this

paper that there

substantial foundation whatever for
these reproaches, these gibes and
jeers.

true in

any sense that the law

is

uncertain;

it is

in fact

and

to

be more worthy of trust than anything

Yet, as

Wayne Hobson

ts

not

It is

so far from being true that, on the

contrary, the law will be found on
investigation to have
it,

show by

else."

more elements of certainty about

(Cooley 1887, 110).

has observed:

To recognize that lawyers thought they faced such a
crisis, however,
same thing as saying that they were describing objective
reality.

happening

to the public perception

have more

to

of law and lawyers

is

not the

Something was

in these years, but

it

may

do with the general revolt against formalism in
social thought and
with broad shifts in public culture from Victorian
to modem than with a 'mere'
delegitimization of law and lawyers.... There was no
out-and-out attack on lawyers
and the rule of law. Rather, law suffered a major challenge
to its
position as the

leading profession in American

life

as the medical profession

assumed

that role. In

addition, the rise of the social sciences and the
transformation of politics and
business generated new ideas and new cultural authorities in
domains lawyers

come

to believe

were

their

had

own. (Hobson 1987, 138).

My argument, then, is that the 'crisis' of legal modernism created a set of perceived
dangers

to

which

legal theorists

legitimacy of the profession was

responded because they perceived the continued
at stake.

The sense of chaos and

flux, the

indeterminacy

of legal doctrine, threatened the authority of law and, by implication, the authority of a
legal profession

legitimate

whose

prestige, power,

monopoly over

particularly in

its

and wealth, depended upon the claim

autonomous body of law. Formalism,

a determinate and

Langdellian mode,

initially

provided an appealing response to the chaos

and uncertainty: transcendence through an appeal
scientific legal principles, uniquely discoverable

experts. But,

it

was only one response, one

to a

that
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to a

body of neutral, objective and

by a professionally trained

class of

would ultimately prove incapable of

explaining the processes of legal
development in the wake of external
social and
intellectual developments.

Accordingly,

I

would argue

as well, that the role of lawyers
cannot be adequately

grasped without a concurrent study of
the law and legal theory that
characterize a given

economic and
social

political order.

For example, as Alan Norrie has suggested,

developments are inextricably intertwined; the
production of theory

'social process',

because

"it

intellectual

is

and

already a

occurs within a tradition provided by a
community of

intellectuals." (Norrie 1993, 1-2).

The

'intellectual' is 'social'

because "the production of

ideas occurs within given socioeconomic
conditions, at two different but connected
levels;" Norrie writes:

One

one hand, the movements of legal theory respond to the
inner logic of
Theory orients itself, or rather is oriented, within
an already established set of intellectual practices and
paradigms, which it works to
repeat or change. Theory responds to what already exists,
revealing, with the
benefit of hindsight, an inherent logic, whether of continuity
or discontinuity.... At
the most fundamental level, the basic ideas of a tradition
are historical products
emerging out of a particular social period.. ..At a more specific level,
the ideas of
the

earlier positions within [a] field.

a

period are social and historical in that the basic intellectual structures,
which are
handed down from the past and engaged with in the present, are mediated and
redirected according to the preoccupations of the here and now. History
provides
the structure and the color of theory, but

it is the intellectual who works on the
material and produces the accomplished product. (Norrie 1993,
2).

Students of the legal profession sometimes underestimate the impact of legal ideas

on the practices of lawyers (whereas jurists and
changes

in legal

legal historians

sometimes describe the

thought as struggles of ideas). The history of lawyers and the

organization of the legal profession should not be studied independently of the history of
legal thought.

Law

is

not only a system of abstract ideas 'out there', but also a concrete
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mechanism of social

closure.

According

"legal closure can be treated primarily
as a
political practice attempt to

The

classic

enhance

Roger

to

their

Cotterrell,

when viewed

sociologically,

means by which various forms of legal or

own

legitimacy." (Cotterrell 1993,
175).

Weberian notion of social closure, says Frank
Parkin,

refers to "the

process by which social collectivities seek to
maximize rewards by restricting access to
resources and opportunities to a limited circle
of eligibles." (Parkin 1979, 44). While
traditional principles

specialized

of social closure are

knowledge and expertise

own market

the law allows

A

them

profession.

by which professionals secure

The claim of lawyers

to restrict entry to the profession

monopoly of expertise enhances

dependency of clients on
legal

the principle

and nationality, the claim of
their

advantages. In the case of lawyers, the language of law
constitutes the

knowledge base of the

regulation.

is

class, race, religion,

their services,

to

and

have a specialized expertise

to insist

on a

right

in

of self-

the social status of lawyers, increases the

and allows them

to control the

pace and scope of

development. In Cotterrell's view, "professional claims of special expertise are

significantly underpinned

by the idea

knowledge; or a special logic of law

and experience;

or,

more broadly,

that there is a distinctive,

to

autonomous

legal

be understood only through specialised training

that there

is

manner of marshalling and of working with

a certain indefinable style of thought, a

ideas,

which constitutes 'thinking

like a

lawyer'." (Cotterrell 1993, 176).

Law, however,

is

principal 'language of the

immediate bearing on

not simply another currency of professional closure but also the

state'.

social,

Lawyers' use and treatment of legal principles have

economic, and

political issues at large,
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and seems

to situate

lawyers

in

a potentially powerful social
position. Recognition of this
fact compels us to

determine what the collective role of
lawyers has been

power

in the

United States. Certainly,

been covered

to

some

in classical social thought; for

in the exercise

and distribution of

extent at least, this teiritory has
already

example, Weber considered the role of
legal

experts in the development of 'formal-rational'
law.

He

argued that the development of

capitalism, the bureaucratic state, and the
legal system, were interdependent
processes of

mutual affirmation and consolidation.
order to satisfy

its

demands

A capitalist market 'needed' a particular type of legal

for predictable

and calculable economic transactions

impersonal system of production and exchange. The
bureaucratic
distinct type

law

in

an

state apparatus, as a

of political authority, 'needed' an institutionalized and
centralized system of

in order to satisfy its interest in an orderly

normative control of fragmented and

geographically dispersed social and economic units. In both cases,
law served not only as
a normative system of regulation, but also as a legitimation

economic and

political relations

'impartial' logic

In

mechanism

of domination and rationalized them by invoking an

of rules and doctrines.

Weber's scheme, the role of legal experts, as a group

some independence from

political

that could assert at least

and economic groups, was crucial for the development

of law as a heuristically consistent and

self-referential system:

specialized legal knowledge created the professional lawyer,"

in turn,

"The increased need

Weber

had considerable influence on the "formation of law through

(Weber 1978,

that objectified

775).
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for

argued, and lawyers,

legal invention."

An

important aspect of both the Weberian
and Marxian traditions of socio-legal

studies has concentrated, respectively,
on law as a legit, mation mechanism,
and on law as

an ideological system.
literature

attitudes,

(Hunt

In particular, the

whose main purpose has been
and

beliefs,

IQS.S, 13).

study of law as ideology has produced
a rich
to "explore the connection

on the one hand, and economic and

From

this perspective,

between

political interests,

ideas,

on the other."

law as an ideology has the function of

"cementing together the social formation under the
aegis of the dominant

class."

(Poulantzas 1978, 88).

Within

this tradition, the

main object of studying the law

seemingly autonomous, neutral, and class-free nature of law,
and

mechanisms by which law becomes

is

to

capitalist class, or, in

more

the

to unravel the

a vehicle in the legitimation and reproduction of a

given social order. Depending on the particular object of study, law

system of rules which directly

unmask

reflects capitalist interests

is

critiqued either as a

and protects the privileges of the

sophisticated versions, as a system of rules

whose form,

if not

content, reconstruets capitalist interests as universal values and protects the
ability of the

economically and politically powerful

to

defend the status-quo. (Hunt 1985).

crude and sophisticated legitimation argument, the idea of autonomous law
seriously.

While there

autonomous law and

is

is

In both the

taken

an ongoing effort to unravel the correspondence between

a given social order, there

is

also the

acknowledgment

that

it

is

preeisely this appearance of autonomy that enables law to legitimize a given social order.

As

Cotterrell observes:
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legal closure refers to the
multifaceted but ubiquitous idea
that law ,s in some
ay, radically autonomous,
self-reproducing or self-validating
in relation to an
environment defined as extralegar....To
adopt

an idea of legafZurTistochim
self-standing and imeducible or has
an independent integrity which
is
nomally unproblematic, natural or self-generated,
not dependent on cLtingent
links with an extralegal environment
of knowledge or practice. (Cotterrell
1993,
that

law

IS

A crucial
sustained?

Who

question, therefore,

how

are the actual producers

autonomy? Obviously,
State

is

such autonomous law

of law, and how, and why, do they

this is not a function that is directly
carried out

managers, but by a specialized class of experts

experts

is

considered, critical students of law

judiciary.

Yet,

it

produced and

is

seems

(e.g.,

in the law.

realism and

that, traditionally, little attention

When
CLS)

by

insist

on

its

capitalists or

the role of legal

tend to focus on the

has been given to the role of

lawyers in private practice, and to the relationship between
practitioners discursive
constructions of the law and dominant theoretical
representations of the legal system..

Moreover,

little

attention has been given to the fact that courts are
merely a part, albeit a

highly important part, of the legal profession.

One might

institutions that only act after a concrete 'case'

is

of disputes

suggest that courts are reactive

brought before them. The construction

m legal terms and the channeling of certain types of cases to the judicial arena,

therefore, are tasks that are performed

economic issues

into a discreet legal language, lawyers

role in the construction

'^For example,

by lawyers. Thus, by transforming

of law as an autonomous and

James Herget
is,

'neutral'

to play

and

an important

system of specialized

locates the source of this perspective in

Holmes’ work:
on American jurisprudence from which it has not
the limitation of legal theory to a theory of judicial decision-

"[Holmes’] early leadership placed a
altogether recovered, that

would seem

social

tilt

making." (Herget 1990, 46).
41

expertise. This

would tend

to explain the appeal

of formalism; however

explain the emergence of realism in legal
thought,

academy, or the deployment of realist tropes

its

offers

it

ultimate assimilation

little to

mto the

legal

in actual practice.

Professional Knowledge and the Problem
of Closure
In Stanley Fish's

(Fish 1994, 141).

What he means by

or declared subordinate

in a

word,

to

law wishes

its

be

memorable phrase,

to,

some

distinct, not

"[t]he

law wishes

this is "that the

law does not wish

something

else." (Fish 1994, 141).

is, it

It

means

desires that the

is

as well that "the

components of

describing here

concretely, the legal profession's) desire to achieve closure.

the social conditions

be absorbed by,

to

self-declaring and not be in need of piecing out

supplementary discourse." (Fish 1994, 141). What Fish

more

have a formal existence."

other -nonlegal- structure of concern; the law
wishes,

m its distinctness to be perspicuous; that

autonomous existence be

to

which constituted

seek closure in a variety of ways

legal

I

modernism compelled

— principally through

is

by some
the law’s (or,

have suggested

that

the legal profession to

the jurisprudential regimes of

formalism and realism. Borrowing an analytical distinction from Roger

Cotterrell,'*

I

will

argue that formalism attempted a type of normative closure, whereas realism attempted a
type of discursive closure. (Cotterrell 1993, 178-185). In the remainder of this chapter,

I

‘^Cotterrell equates "normative closure" with a type

of positivism that emphasizes a sharp
between the legal and the non-legal. "Discursive closure," on the other hand,
"a conception of law as a distinct discourse, possessing its own integrity, its own

distinction
is

criteria

of significance and validation,

objects of which

it

its

own means of cognition and of constituting

speaks." (Cotterrell 1993, 183 emphasis added).
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the

will elaborate

on the former;

I

will discuss the contours

of the

latter in the

chapters to

follow.

In

The System of Professions
(1988), the sociologist Andrew Abbott
provides a

helpful analytical framework from
which to theorize the link between
professional

knowledge and

legal closure. Abbott's discussion

relative ability to assert 'jurisdiction'.

jurisdictional claim, a profession

According

must

to

to Abbott, in order to

make

situate its practices within an overall

knowledge which provides a profession with a
importance given by Abbott

of professional work revolves around

special type of legitimacy.

its

a successful

system of

Hence

the

forms of professional knowledge which are
governed by

academics:

Academic knowledge legitimizes professional work by clarifying
its foundations
and tracing them to major cultural values. In most modem
professions,

these have

been the values of rationality,
demonstrate the

and science. Academic professionals
and the scientifically logical character of

logic,

rigor, the clarity,

professional work, thereby legitimating that

work

in the context

of larger values.

(Abbott 1988, 54).

For Abbott, the prestige of academic knowledge
legitimacy

assert

its

derived from the compelling

science as a manifestation of rational activity geared towards the solution of

human problems through
work may be

is

the systematic reduction of uncertainty.'^

attributed to science, the greater

autonomy. According

profession's abstract

knowledge

its

ability to

hold to

The more
its

professional

jurisdiction and to

to Abbott, the scientific producers that generate the

are assigned with

two main

responsibilities: First, they are

responsible for "the generation of new diagnoses, treatments, and inference methods."

'‘'For

an interesting history of the concept of legal science, see M.H. Hoeflich (1986).
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(Abbott 1988, 55). The institutional
location of academics, away from
practice, leaves

them

free to

engage

in the 'purely' rational activity

of systematization and abstraction
of

incoming information. Second, academies
are responsible

new

and training of

professionals. Besides the important
task of producing the profession's
practitioners,

this function creates the

The

for the selection

symbolic bond between practical work and

scientific abstraction.

profession's scientific knowledge, therefore,
constitutes the heart of a profession's

jurisdiction and

its

ability to

defend

The

it.

foundation for professional knowledge

stakes in the construction of a 'scientific'

are, then,

obviously quite high.

In the case of law and legal work, the rise
of 'scientific' legal thought and

its

accompanying professional jurisdiction came about with the
appearance of what Weber
called 'formal-rational' law.

(Weber 1978, 656). Weber described

the essential properties

of formal-rational law as consisting of five basic postulates:
every concrete legal decision be the 'application' of an abstract legal
proposition to a concrete fact situation'^ second, that if must be possible in
every
concrete case to derive the decision from abstract legal propositions by means
of
First, that

legal logic; third, that the

law must actually or virtually constitute a 'gapless'
system of legal propositions, or must, at least, be treated as if it were such a
gapless system; fourth, that whatever cannot be 'construed' rationally in legal terms
is also legally irrelevant; and fifth, that every social action of human
beings must
always be visualized as either an 'application' or 'execution' of legal propositions, or
as an 'infringement' thereof, since the 'gaplessness' of the legal system must result
in a gapless 'legal ordering'

The idea

was

of all social conduct. (Weber 1978, 657).

that the legal order represented a 'gapless'

a legal solution to every problem and that the method

solution

was determined by

a distinct

mode of legal

solution to every legal problem could be

known
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system suggested that there
at arriving at the 'correct'

reasoning. This did not

beforehand, but

it

at least

mean

that the

ensured that the

method' by which
evident

were reached was predetemimed.
This was particularly

m the procedural, rather than the substantive,

and Seiznick, the

maxim

legal decisions

that

rise

aspects of law. According to
Nonet

of autonomous law, therefore, was
strongly associated with the

"procedure

is

justice, are the first ends

the heart of law"

-

"regularity

and

fairness, not substantive

and the main competence of the legal
order." (Nonet and

Seiznick 1978, 54).

Weber

associated the development of a formal-rational
legal system with the civil

law system of continental Europe.
that formal-rationahty

It

was

in civil

law countries (most notably Germany),

developed as a result of the formal separation between
legal

practice and academic legal training. For Weber,
legal thought that facilitated the

it

was

the particular nature of academic

development of formal-rationality: "The

legal concepts

produced by academic law-teaching bear the character of abstract
norms, which,
principle, are

formed and distinguished from one another by a rigorously formal
and

rational legal interpretation of meaning."

produced "law as a
787). Thus,

at least in

craft,"

(Weber 1978,

789).

Where

academic training produced "law as a science." (Weber 1978,

Weber thought of the Anglo-American law

as an "empirical art"

based on precedents, analogies and distinctions. (Weber 1978, 890).
rational than continental

European law and could not develop

as long as legal education

For Weber,

legal apprenticeship

had been

who was

in the

into a

It

was

more

which was

essentially less

rational system

hands of practitioners. (Weber 1978, 787).

interested in the relationship

between formal-rationality and

capitalism, the irrationality of English law created the "English problem," since formal-

rationality

was

part of a system that responded to and facilitated the capitalist market
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demand

for consistency, certainty

England saw the emergence of a
problem by arguing

and predictability. Nonetheless,
Weber recognized

full capitalistic

that capitalism

developed

that

system and explained himself'ouf
of the

’in

spite

of the absence of formal-rational

law.

Weber’s emphasis on the idea of ’’appheation
of ’legal propositions’ logieally
derived from statutory texts”

may have

Anglo-American law, through
rationalized system. In fact,

conceived as possible only

different

caused him to underestimate the degree

in the

same

direction that

Weber

law world. As Alan Hunt suggests, Weber’s

analysis implied that a process of ’internal
rationalization’ took place within the

law system as well. ’Empirical’
abstract

fact finding

rationalization that English jurists in the

in

own

common

evolved into a rational system consisting of

and general rules and principles: ”So great has been

English law

which

means, gradually evolved towards a similar

American law moved

in the civil

to

modem period

this

process of internal

have been able

to

conceive of

terms of pure law’, of it consisting of a gapless, rigorously
deductive

system of abstract rules which Weber would have considered possible only

in a codified

system.” (Hunt 1978, 124).

The Weberian notion of formal-rationality
jurisprudential concept,

law

is

is

practically identical with the

autonomy of law. The autonomy of law

rests

on the claim

that

separated not only from other systems of knowledge but, in particular, from the

nomiative influence of politics. The autonomous qualities of legal thought and practice
are based

on the assertion

that legal thought is scientific, in the sense that

consistent, abstract, systematic, and

'a political’.
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it

is

internally

In order to

develop and maintain their position
of cultural and

American lawyers have

traditionally asserted the existence
of,

abstract system of knowledge,

The

political authority,

and monopoly over, an

which served as the foundation of their
exclusive

expertise.

construction of autonomous law ensured
the status of lawyers as impartial
experts,

allowed them

to

speak authoritatively about the law, and,
ultimately, enabled lawyers to

use legal knowledge as a principle of
normative closure.

Legal Autonomy and Normative Closure

The idea of autonomous law developed
the

1

9th century with the emergence of what

is

in the

United States in the second half of

often referred to as Classical Legal

Thought.^® The rise of Classical Legal Thought marked
the development of concepts that

became key values
rule

m both American jurisprudence and the American political culture: the

of law, the autonomy of law, and law as a

and practitioners was
politics

to portray the legal

[t]he rise

other.

effort

of legal thinkers

As Ronen Shamir

of classical legal thought was marked by an

system as an autonomous and
shifting the focus

The main

system as distinct from the pulls and pressures of

on the one hand and the economic market on the

observed,

is,

'science'.

scientific system."

(Shamir 1993,

from the substantive aspects of law

effort to portray the legal

51).

This was done by

to its purely formal qualities.

law was portrayed as a systematic elaboration of concepts,

rules,

and norms

that

determined legal results independently of the surrounding social context.

^°See, for example,

Duncan Kennedy

(1980), and
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has

Morton Horwitz (1977, 1992).

That

According
transformation

to

Horwitz, the emergence of an
autonomous system of law marked
a

m its social

functions as well. Rather than
being an 'instrumenf ,n the

hands of groups who used the law

mold

to

social relations in light

of their

self-interests,

the transformation of the law
objectified these relations and cloaked
them in a neutral,
class-free,

order.

and formal discourse,

that

provided a rational justification for the
existing social

The formalization of law, says Horwitz, meant

automatically assured of judicial protection.
The

was worth

demands were
formalized

The occasional cases

paying.

in

far

outweighed by the

in

'price' capitalists

which

fact that

that capitalist interests could not
be

key

had to pay, however,

the legal system failed to

legal propositions

meet

capitalist

and doctrines were

a particular point in time where "the legal system
had been reshaped to the

advantage of men of commerce and industry

consumers, and other

less

at the

expense of farmers, workers,

powerful groups within the society." (Horwitz 1977,
254).

Further, as Horwitz and others have suggested,

it

is

possible that cases in which capitalist

expectations were disappointed by the law only served to highlight
the law’s autonomous
nature and ensured

A classic
law secured

its

overall legitimizing capacity.

example

that is often

capitalist interests is the

contract.' In the case

of Coppage

v.

given to demonstrate the manner in which fomial

way

courts interpreted the concept of 'freedom of

Kansas, the Supreme Court invalidated

legislation that outlawed yellow-dog contracts.

enactment by arguing

that

The

state

State of Kansas defended

its

yellow-dog contracts were entered under conditions of coercion

because the weak market position of employees prevented them from refusing
into such contracts. Thus, the defense

of the law was based on the argument
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to enter

that yellow-

dog contracts should not have enjoyed

The Supreme Court

of the Treedom of contract'

doctrine.

rejected these arguments.

The important
formalistic reasoning.

contracts

the protection

point about this ruling

The

was

court found that the

that

it

was decided on grounds of rigidly

common

law excused nonperformance of

m cases where they were entered under conditions of duress,

definition of duress did not include

but

it

ruled that the

economic pressure. Arguments concerning
the

coercive nature of yellow-dog contracts, therefore,
could not be accepted. Thus, as
Elizabeth

Mensch has

observed, the result was reached, not because
the court failed to

acknowledge the substantive economic inequality between
employers and employees, but
because legal reasoning 'compelled'

The

it

to

apply formal legal

court took the side of employers not because

it

employees; such a view of the court, says Mensch,

criteria.

(Mensch 1990,

was substantively biased

against

"trivializes the underlying

power of the

classical conceptual scheme." Rather, the court adopted an
'objective' position

derived from

It is

became

its

commitment

to the

form of law, and not

13-37).

which was

to its substantive content.

precisely because of the distinct features of such legal reasoning that law

a legitimating vehicle for existing economic relations. Discussing the economic

consequences of formal-rational law, Weber noted

that "the parties interested in

the market thus are also interested in such a legal order."

Morton Horwitz observed

that: "If a flexible,

(Weber 1978,

power

in

730). Similarly,

instrumental conception of law

was

necessary to promote the transformation of the post-revolutionary American legal system,

it

was no longer needed once

the major beneficiaries of that transformation had obtained

the bulk of their objectives. Indeed, once successful, those groups could only benefit if
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both the recent origins and the foundations

in policy

and group self-interest of all newly

established legal doctrines could be
disguised." (Horwitz 1977, 254)

Kennedy, Horwitz and others maintain
scientific legal

that the

system provided the most powerful

appearance of an autonomous and

'disguise'

with which to veil the

self-

interested origins of the prevailing judicial
doctrines of the day. Moreover, capitalist

groups were not the only beneficiaries from
the emergence of autonomous law.
important was the formal separation between law
and

law established the crucial

The

rise

of an autonomous

emergence of the

modem

according to Weber

(i.e.,

link

legal

issue

system was enhanced by, and

In

Weber s

modem

state.

in turn affected, the

modes of authority,

charismatic and traditional), rested on the belief in the
legitimacy
rational bureaucratic state referred to the belief in
the

of enacted mles and the

commands,"

less

Again, Weber's theory of

political authority in the

bureaucratic state. While previous

of a particular law-giver, the
legality

between law and

politics.

No

right

as the source for

its

of those elevated to authority under such mles
legitimacy.

(Weber 1978, 215).

analysis, the ability of political authority to derive

the legal order depended on

two

to

its

legitimacy from

essential conditions. First, that the legal system

formal and rational and hence capable of demonstrating
procedural autonomy. Second, in conformity with the

its

first

internal consistency

was

and

condition, that the level of

abstraction and generality of legal mles ensured that "the typical person in authority, the

'superior',

own

was himself subject

dispositions and

to

an impersonal order by orienting his actions to

commands." (Weber 1978, 217).
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it

in his

It

to

clear, therefore, that in order
for the legal

is

be clearly distinguished from

political

system to legttimize authority,

power. Further,

if

we

it

had

aecept the basic Weberian

postulate that every system of authority
"attempts to establish and to cultivate
the belief in
its

legitimacy" (Weber 1978, 213)

law'

1

was especially important

we

in the

can understand

"building of the

why

the establishment of the 'rule
of

new American

state."

(Skowronck

982). According to Stephen Skowronek,
in comparison to the European
states, the

American governmental

many have

structure in the mid-nineteenth century

refused to consider

Skowronek, was

a "state

institutional systems.

it

a state at

all."

(1982,

5).

was "so

peculiar that

Early America, says

of parties and courts" which were the only nationally
integrated

Further, according to

Skowronek, while American

parties

came

to

represent different social agendas, the perceived legitimacy
of court decisions provided

some measure of coherence
at least partially,

to the national system:

"The only

institutions that could stand,

outside direct party domination and claim to complement
the parties in

the performance of., basic constituent tasks were the courts,"
writes Skowronek; and they

have done so by "binding the

legal apparatus

of government," shaping the boundaries of

"intergovernmental relations," defining relations between state and society, and,

by

filling "a

governmental vacuum

left

by abortive experiments

promotion of economic development." (1982,

The autonomy of law
credibility to political and

industrial

would

thus

became

27).

in

which provided

search of stability during a period of rapid

and administrative expansion. The search by

'freeze' their

in the administrative

a principle of legitimation

economic forces

in general,

capitalist

groups for an order that

economic advantages (Horwitz's emphasis), and the search by
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state

managers

in the progressive era for
a legi,i„u,cy

were highly eondueivc

to ideas that rested the
foundations

and formal impartiality.

autonomy have

led

ofe.perlise (Skowronek's enrphasis),

In faet, the elaborate legal

Nonet and Seizniek

of law on

values of seienee

ll,e

proeedures that aceonrpanied legal

to argue that the

autonomy of law

'histone bargain': "Legal institutions
purchase procedural

autonomy

rested

at the price

on a
of

substantive subordination." (1978,
58).

The idea of autonomous law, however, also
legitimated the efforts of lawyers
secure their

own

claims to professional authority. Certainly,
as Horwitz has argued, the

transformation of American law had to do,

approach

to

to

law had exhausted

in large part,

itself as far as

concerned. Yet, the instrumental approach

to

with the fact that the instrumental

commercial and
law also led

authority of courts and the cognitive foundation of
the

industrial

to ideas that

common

groups were

undermined the

law and

its

principal

‘guardians’ - lawyers.

The overthrow of the

old order after the American revolution

the popular perception that the legitimacy of law

was accompanied by

was not derived from

the natural order of

things but from the conscious will of a sovereign that represented the
will and power of
the people.

In the first

insist that the

common

decades

that

followed the revolution,

law expressed the popular

this perception led jurists to

will; a perception that in fact facilitated

the instrumental approach to law that characterized the legal system in the

century.

power

In the

1820s and 1830s, however, the conception of law

led to a codification

movement

in

first

terms of will and

that sought to replace the court-centered
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half of the

common

law with formal

legislation.^'

The

codification

movement posed

a direct threat to the

prerogatives of courts and jurists because
"any special claims of the profession
to

determine the nature and scope of legal
development [were] undermined." (Horwitz
1977,
257).

The more laws

are formally articulated and
presented as concrete 'packages' of

rules and stipulations, the

who

more law can be commented upon and

interpreted

by people

are not trained in the law, the lesser
the ability of professionals to engage
in

‘mystification’ practices that create a social
distance between professionals and their
chents.^^

It

was

the threat of legislation as an alternative source
of law that gave a

decisive push to the idea of law as a science.
in turn,

allowed jurists

to

advance towards

The emphasis on

full

the scientific nature of law,

professionalization.

A scientific law, they

argued, could only be grounded in a judge-made law which
was based on distinct

of legal-scientific reasoning. Thus,
"underlying conviction held by

legislatures."

response to the codification movement, the

nineteenth century legal thinkers [was] that the course

all

of American legal change should,

in

modes

if possible,

be developed by courts and not by

(Horwitz 1977, 256).

In applying abstract principles to concrete cases, and in drawing distinctions

between pre-established

legal categories, judges

were

to apply strict rules

of legal

reasoning that de-contextualized the cases on which they were to pass judgment. The

^'For an extensive discussion of this period, see Charles
^^Peter

Cook

(1981).

Goodrich (1986) provides a fascinating discussion of the nature and problems of
and reading.

legal writing
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application of a distinct formal legal
reasoning, therefore,

was an

integral part

of the

general assertion that the legal system has
evolved into an autonomous system
whose

had been daily demonstrated

-closedness’

cases. Legislation,

that

on the other hand, was portrayed as a flow
of arbitrary

exposed the law

Law had

to

acts

of power

an uneven development and unpredictable
and abrupt changes.

be separated from

to

m the application of legal rules to particular

politics,

and

this separation

could only be assumed by a

judiciary that disengaged itself from other systems
of knowledge.

According
law from

politics,

to this view, legislation threatened to blur the
fragile line that separated

while the judicial process ensured

this separation.

emphasis on the formal aspects of law, therefore, came a strong

With the growing

anti-legislative trend

an "upsurge injudicial review of legislation." (Horwitz 1977,
259). In

law as a science was linked

to the insistence

in years to

fear

short, the idea

of

on the unchallenged supremacy of the courts

to articulate legal doctrines; the preservation

accompanying

and

of this judicial supremacy, and the

of legislation constituted the primary orientation of the

legal profession

come.

The

separation between law and politics and the assertion of the autonomy of law

would seem

to

converge with the professional concerns of lawyers. To a greater extent

than perhaps any other profession, lawyers' basic interest are to establish mechanisms that
will distinguish

them from, on

the one hand, other systems of ideas, and,

on the other

hand, from their clients. The inherent nature of law, more than other systems of

knowledge

that solve

'human problems',

is that it

purports to solve problems that are in

themselves subjectively construed by the legal system. This
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is

particularly evident in the

difficulty

of separating law and

profession's ability to ground

denves from

politics, a separation that is
essential for the legal

its

claims to professional authority in
an expertise that

a neutral and objective production
of knowledge. Importantly, then,
the

vulnerability of law to external interference
(i.e„ ‘politics’), results in the
legal profession's

unstable 'cognitive basis', and in a constant
search for transcendent values that will
legitimize the profession’s authority.

A system of law that could be convincingly described

as a scientific system demonstrated the
transcendent aspects of law as an unbiased
and

objective system of knowledge.

The sense of chaos and

uncertainty brought about

by rapid socio-economic

change, and the corresponding cultural and intellectual
developments characterized as
'modernist', with their attendant dangers for the continuing
authority of the legal

profession because of the apparent threat to undermine

condition of legal modernism

of a

scientific

-

its

claims to expertise

—

the

argued for the paramount importance of the construction

and autonomous law. Peter Goodrich describes the situation well:

The intellectual and cultural climate of the late nineteenth century was. ..strongly
imbued with the atmosphere of radical transition. The Industrial Revolution had,
with unprecedented speed, begun to destroy the traditional agriculturally based
communities and customary orders. ...The widespread cultural sense of
dispossession, disinheritance and disorder received striking expression in the
political philosophies of the period. The radical, rapid and uncontrolled economic

and social change threw up the mildly apocalyptic sense that everything was
possible, that the world would soon be either lost or gained, destroyed or saved.
(Goodrich 1986, 210).

The
principle

task of transcending this chaos, of finding refuge in the certainty of legal

by advancing

scholars and found

the idea of law as a science,

its earliest

was

initially

assumed by academic

expression in the effort to arrange legal materials in
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Whereas Blackstone's Commentaries were

treatises.

the beginning of the century, a

of law towards
lines or,

more

its

Numerous

end.

treatises

scholars contributed to the
systematization

sought to rearrange the law along
functional

boldly, to offer general theories of
particular areas of the law.

Friedman estimates

that 1,000 treatises

(Friedman 1973, 541-46). The
torts,

number of legal

practically the only such source
at

Lawrence

were published between 1850 and 1900.
covered the important legal subjects of the day:

treatises

evidence, contracts, and so forth. Others were
less ambitious and dealt with more

discreet areas of the law. Nevertheless, the
declared purpose of most treatises
restate the

lawyer.

common

Beyond

law

in a systematic

manner and

their functional purpose,

systematization of law reflected

its

in

ways

that

would help

was

to

the practicing

however, lay the deeper conviction

that the

self-contained nature and demonstrated the certainty of

law. In contrast to statutes that threatened to undermine the
certainty and continuity of

law, the gradual development of law on a case-by-case basis
ensured

The systematic arrangement of these

predictability.

categories ensured that the

The

treatises, therefore,

method by which

shared

common

cases,

consistency and

and the formalization of legal

legal decisions

ground

its

were reached were

in their attempt to render the

scientific.

law more

certain, generalized, formal and, ultimately, scientific.

It

was not

corresponded

coincidental that the emphasis on the scientific nature of law

to the rise

apprenticeship.

of the

modem

As law became more

approach than the one

that could

law school as an alternative

'scientific', its

be offered by a law

to legal

study required a more systematic

office.

In

1

800, fourteen of the

nineteen jurisdictions in America required apprenticeship to enter the bar.
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By

1860, only

nine out of thirty nine jurisdictions
required

it.

On

the other hand, "starting about
the

middle of the nineteenth century, law schools
began

to proliferate [and] the

number of law

schools doubled in the twenty years between
1889-90 and 1909-10, while the number
of

law students increased more than fourfold."
(Abel 1989,

The
articulated

link

between science and the

41).

of academic legal education was explicitly

rise

by Christopher Columbus Langdell

in his

"Harvard Celebration Speech," where

he sought to justify the law school's place within the
newly emergent university.
Langdell's statement merits quoting

[I]t

was indispensable

at length:

two things— that law is a science, and
of that science are contained in printed books. If law

to establish at least

that all the available materials

be not a science, a university will consult its own dignity in declining
to teach
it be not a science, it is a species of
handicraft, and may best be learned

it.

If

by serving

an apprenticeship to one
disputed that
all

it

is

who

practises

it.

If

it

be a science,

it

will scarcely be

one of the creates and most difficult of sciences, and that it needs
most enlightened seat of learning can throw upon it. Again,

the light that the

law can only be learned and taught in a university by means of printed books. ...But
if printed books are the ultimate sources of all legal knowledge,—
if every student

who would

obtain any mastery of law as a science must resort to these ultimate
sources, and if the only assistance which it is possible for the learner to receive

is

such as can be afforded by teachers who have traveled the same road before him,then a university, and a university alone, can afford every possible facility for
teaching and learning law.. ..We have also constantly inculcated the idea that the
library is the proper workshop of professors and students alike; that it is to us all
that the laboratories

museum of natural

of the university are

history

is

to the

chemists and physicists,

to the zoologists, all that the botanical

all that

garden

the

is to

the botanists. (Langdell 1887, 124).

Langdell's efforts on behalf of a

new

science of law must be understood within a

"broader crisis of Western culture and society" (Ross 1995,

and authority

— modernism —

Kennedy and Horwitz

1),

the crisis of knowledge

against which, formalism responded. Historians such as

offer compelling indictments of formalism, or Classical Legal
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Thought. But, to focus on fotmalism
as

emergent

capitalist class

and thereby
period.

As

could conceal

way

seems

still

For the

1).

to

miss an important element of this

"new uncertainty" which modernism

legal profession, at least,

it

formalism seemed to

presented the means by which to

And, Langdell provided an early and

the formalist understanding of law as science;

been.

enthusiastic, albeit tmncated, defense of

however confused he ultimately may have

In this regard, Langdell's efforts to enable the
'scientific' discovery

principles were, in

transcend

which a newly

"led to efforts to reconstruct knowledge,
value, and

to),

out of the chaos of modem times;

it.

a 'disguise', under

prior instrumental approach to
the legal system,

the histonan Dorothy Ross
observes, the

representation." (Ross 1995,

transcend

its

stabilize its current position,

produced (or responded

offer a

more than

little

some ways,

as

much

of legal

a denial of legal uncertainty, as a desire to

it.

The

rise

of academic

legal education

case-method as the embodiment of a

was coupled with

scientific

the development of the

method of legal thought and

education.^^

^^Langdell has been universally criticized for holding an oudated and/or simpleminded
conception of science. (See, e.g., Stevens 1983, 52-53). For my interests, however,

whether or not Langdell understood scientific method is largely beside the point. Rather,
what is important is how Langdell constructed a response to a perceived crisis - how he
perceived that
al

crisis,

and

why

that response

was important

to considerations

of profession-

expertise and authority.

^^Whether Langdell’s peculiar understanding of law as science and the case method are
one and the same is contested territory. For example, Paul Carrington (1995) argues that

we

we must get rid of the former. But,
William LaPiana (1995) maintains that the two are far more intertwined, and rightfully
Indeed, LaPiana does not seek to apologize for the simplicities of Langdell’s ‘legal
can, and should, preserve the latter but that

science’, but finds

much

to

admire

to opt for Carrington’s strategy.

own

so.

seemed

in

it.

In his

That

is,

they found Langdell’s understanding of science

time, Langdell’s early disciples

to be, at best, anachronistic; and, at worst, reactionary
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and misguided. Yet, they saw

real

The case-method was based on

the perception of law as a
unique science which contained

certain principles and doctrines
that could be discovered through
a systematic analysis of

appellate court decisions.

Ames, from 1870
legal thought

It

to 1910.

developed and matured during the terms
of Langdell and

According

to this view,

and education, law was a science -

appellate court decisions.

which came

to

dominate American

and materials of this science were

The bound and published

appellate reports, the materials

necessary to fully engage this science, could
be found

in the

law

library.

Thus, the

apparent chaotic mass of judicial opinions
could be rendered certain, their underlying
principles expertly

[principles] as to

drawn

be able

For Langdell,

out.

to

is

The idea of autonomous
at the

have such a mastery of these

apply them with constant

tangled skein of human affairs,

academics, but

"[t]o

same time

facility

and certainty

to the ever-

what constitutes a true lawyer." (Langdell 1871,

law, then,

was developed and advanced by

vi).

legal

the reliance on judicial cases strengthened the centrality
of

courts as the principal producers of legal knowledge. Accordingly,
an important element

of this new

scientific

system was

and applied existing laws
law.

The

distinction

that

to insist that

were implicit

judges did not make laws, they only found

in previous precedents; they

discovered the

between law-finding and law-making was fundamental because

only the former view that could legitimize the idea of law as a science, whereas the

exposed

its

potentially arbitrary nature. Indeed, legal rules were produced

it

was

latter

by judges

in the

value in the case method. Thus, they sought to liberate the case method from Langdellian
legal science. One would no longer use the case method to scientifically discover universal legal principles. Instead, in
istic to

Ames

teach law students

how

experienced hands, the case method was a valuable heurto think like

a lawyer. (See,

1907, 1012-1027).
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e.g..

Keener 1888,

iii-iv;

and

course of the judicial decision-making
process, yet over time, with the
compelling force of

time immemorial and

been

'out there',

tradition, these rules

had become

and subsequently constrained the

objectified, as if they

ability

of judges

had always

shape the law simply

to

as they pleased.

The claim

that

law was a science and

that

system was based on the centrality of the court

in

it

had

to

be treated as an autonomous

producing and developing legal

knowledge. Courts, and not the academy, were
the source from which the profession
derived

its

legitimacy. For Langdell, the

important and influential one.
inherent

Its

academy was a mere

function

m the law that would make

it

was

adjunct, albeit an extremely

to find a rational conceptual structure

possible forjudges to be transmitters of a content

already contained in the law.

The

courts,

and especially appellate courts, according

to this legal structure,

were

the undisputed center of legal authority and the principal site
for the production of new
legal

knowledge. The ideology of Langdellian formalism

thus, not only portrayed

law as a

science, but also situated the judiciary as the producers of this scientific
knowledge.

The

idea of judgeship as an authoritative symbol, says Stephen Botein, "loomed large
in the

process by which lawyers articulated ideology to establish their professional authority

modem

American

society." (Botein 1983, 49). Yet,

he did, Langdell exposed a problem inherent

by focusing on

As Susan

consequent

fact that the

law

is

of law and, thereby,

Stewart has observed, in

another context, such a focus points to "the irreducible fact that law
to the

appellate opinions as

in the very ‘writteness’

ultimately threatened to undermine the status of law.

in

is

written and hence

subject to temporality and interpretation." (Stewart
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1991,

That

3).

IS,

Langdell called attention

to,

but could not solve the core
problem for

modernist jurisprudence: indeterminaey
arises because the [written] law
requires
application, and application requires
judicial interpretation. Although
the problem

seemed

inherent to the very fact of law, Langdell
apparently believed if could be solved
mtlun the

law as well - through an appeal
Langdell

s

to the transcendent nature

contemporary. Holmes, did not share

of legal writing. However,

this faith in law’s ability to solve
its

problems. Finding no real solution to the problem
of indeterminacy in the law

Holmes (and

own

itself.

his intellectual heirs) turned instead to the
observable facts of judicial power.

Thus, the aspirational ideas of transcendence and
legal certainty comprise the core

of the formalist response

to the crisis

of legal modernism. Autonomous law through a

process of normative closure was the goal that was sought.
This can be contrasted with
the realist response.

attempt to

manage

An

approach,

I

legal uncertainty

will argue, that emphasizes

and

its effects,

immanence^^ - the

rather than striving for transcendence

through the discovery of legal principle. And, instead of attempting

autonomy, a type of heteronomy would
strategies

prevail.

The

result

was

to

produce legal

the development of new

of intellectual and professional closure: a discursive, or experientially mediated

system of closure.

am

using this in a fairly underdeveloped way, and

it

should not be confused with the

concept of ‘immanent critique’ associated with the Frankfurt School of critical theory.
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CHAPTER 3
HOLMES, INDETERMINACY, AND THE
LOGIC OF EXPERIENCE

Holmes- contemporary, Christopher
Columbus Langdell thought
opinions of a

common

law system could provide the basis

that the judicial

for a scientific

approach to the

study and practice of law. Holmes
found Langdell’s approach ultimately
appealing on

pedagogical grounds, recalling his
details", but, as

own

legal education as consisting

of a "ragbag of

he would with Austin, Holmes disagreed
with Langdell's essentially

formalist approach to legal reasoning.
Langdell,

who Holmes would

describe as our

greatest living "legal theologian", located
the source and authority of the law
within the
textual artifacts of judicial decision-making
- published appellate opinions.

The key

to

resolving confusion in the law was to isolate and
identify the fundamental legal principles

by properly ordering and

structuring these texts.

For Holmes, on the other hand, the source of the law would
ultimately prove
non-textual, resolution of uncertainty

was

to

to

be

be achieved by strategies of containment

external to the text and identified with the lawyer's perspective.
Nevertheless, Holmes'
early scholarly efforts appeared to

Langdell

s

come from

the

same

conceptualistic motivations as had

work. Yet, his conceptualism and his sympathetic reading of Austin's analytical

jurisprudence existed in an uneasy tension with an importantly different perspective.

David Luban characterizes Holmes

as a "case study of the modernist predicament in law;"

and for Luban, the core of modernism "consists

in using the characteristic

discipline to criticize the discipline itself" (Luban
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1

994, 38-39).

In his

methods of a

first

major

substantive piece of legal scholarship,
"Codes, and the Arrangement of
the Law,”

(1870/1995) and an important book notice
published two years
critically interrogated Austinian
analytical legal theory

and

later

(1872/1995), Holmes

initially tested the

prediction as a theoretical corrective.
Just where Holmes stood on
Austin

some

dispute

among Holmes

work. Rather,

I

am

is

concept of

a matter of

scholars,^ the details of which are
beyond the scope of this

interested in identifying his earliest
approximations of what today

understood as legal indeterminacy.

1

wish to then suggest a link between

this notion

is

and

Holmes' critique of Austin's "command theory
of law" and the development of
prediction" as a response.

From

this,

1

suggest

we

can glimpse the outlines of a

new

discourse of professional authority.

Holmes choice of a
initial

title

for his first

major

article is revealing.

It

expresses his

predisposition toward the importance of conceptual
clarity and a rigorous

philosophical analysis of the law. Although critical of Austin’s
analytical jurisprudence,

Holmes was,

to

some

extent,

working within an Austinian framework. Indeed, Holmes

does not abandon his admiration for the Austinian analytical project
without reluctance,
despite the seriousness of his criticisms.

amend

It

seems

the Austinian model, not to undermine

form or another, take Austin

s

approach

it.

that his original motivation

Nonetheless,

to task for

all

was

to

of his criticisms,

in

being philosophically too narrow.

one

And

the underlying tensions between the two thinkers are soon enough revealed. In other

words. Holmes merely

flirts

^^See, for example, H.L.

differences.

Holmes was

with the attraction of a philosophically sophisticated

Pohlman (1984), who seems

to suggest that,

with some minor

essentially carrying out an Austinian program.
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arrangement ofthe law

-

albeit

always gives the impression

What

attracts

one based on a

that this

Holmes

to

is all

codes

philosophical arrangement that would
lawyer," says Holmes, "is he
others. But,

few lawyers are

"well-arranged body of law"

"would not only

train the

remove obstacles from

is

that they are

make

is its

and

supposed to be based on a

a ’'corpus Juris possible."

all

all

to learn their business."

heuristic benellts

to

"The perfect

the ties between a given case and

have

mind of the student

his path

law model. Nonetheless, he

rather beside the point.

who commands
perfect,

common

and

its

The

all

virtue of a

expediency: Such a code

a sound legal habit of thought, but
would

which he now only overcomes

and reflection." (Holmes 1870/1995, 214).
Experience

is

after years

of experience

subsumed under

doctrinal

arrangement.

This, however, appears to Holmes, ultimately, to
be a rather unrealistic goal for

both legal education and legal practice. Holmes therefore
strives to come up with a more

and

flexible

less philosophically inclusive

arrangement." The problem
inevitably creates

new

is

that

and compartmentalized "method of

however well arranged

obstacles. Excessive reliance

leads to the neglect of new experience.

the code,

set

ultimately and

on the arrangements fixed

The arrangements can become

they originally were structured by experience, they function,

were

it

in the past

so rigid that even if

in fact, as if their

boundaries

independently of experience.

In

endorsing a

constraints imposed

common

by

civil

from the obvious benefits

to

law model of classification. Holmes hoped

to

avoid the

law systems and domestic codification proposals. Quite apart
be derived from adopting as one's model, the outlines of a
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system already
begins his

1

m plaee, he favors the common law for more

870

article

decides the case

with the statement

that, "[i]t is the

substantive reasons.

merit of the

common

Holmes

law

that

it

and determines the principle
afterwards." (Holmes 1870/1995,
212).

first

In resisting the attraction

of codes. Holmes betrays his
predilection

for theorizing

from the

practicing lawyer's point of view.Practicing lawyers are content to
decide what to do

with a given fact pattern "without being
very clear as to the ratio decidendi."
(Holmes
1

870/1 995, 2 1

even

2).

It is

if the principle

not

uncommon

for

them

to decide

on a particular course of action

does not speak to the facts of the case.
Holmes

authority of Lord Mansfield to bear
witness to this phenomenon.
refers to a

neophyte judge

who

we

The Mansfield quote

acts prudently if he states his conclusions
without giving

his reasons; his intuition will probably
be right while his reasons
fact that

cites the familiar

wrong

— testifying

to the

correctly rely on extrarational or extralegal
factors in the decision-making

process. That

is

experience

is

required to correlate the facts with the rules of
law.

Questioning "whether Austin did not exaggerate the importance
of the distinctions

he drew," Holmes complained of the narrowness of Austin's
definition of the law,
curiously,

it

"seems

1870/1995, 215).

to

If

since,

be of practical rather than philosophical value." (Holmes

Holmes' identification of "distinctions"

refers to an analytical

ordering of a complex host of legal, moral, and political notions, their
respective meanings

and interrelationships, what does he mean by "practical" value, when
structure

is

what was supposed

to

recommend

it

in the first

place?

its

By

philosophical

practical,

it

seems

^^See Holmes’ 1885 speech before the Suffolk Bar Association, where he asked, "[w]hat
a court would be, unaided? The law is made by the Bar, even more than by the Bench."

(1885/1920, 25).
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I

lolmos .ncans

atlenhon

,ha,

i,

served

,l,e

purposes of, he working lawyer,

to the lael that a "dellnilc
political superior", the

the source of law, controls

human conduct hy

permuting certain classes ofaclions.
Does
I

ittimes' thotight

hetween

who needs

is

the threat of lorce or sanctions,
enjoining or

this

simply represent a riindamcntal
tension

his desire for a philosophically
superior

work

is at

pay

Auslinian "sovereign" which

approach

analysis aiul his adoption of the
practit.oticr's perspective? Perhaps,
hut,
that sottiething tnore

(o

I

in

to legal

wotild stiggest

here; a dissatislactioti with the
Atisiiniati conccpttial

categories, as well as the stiggcstioti of
a need lor a revitalized discottrsc
olcvcry.lay
praclicc.

Attstin's dditiilion

may he

consistent with the

way lawyers

cttrrctilly

the law, though not enotigh "stihstatilial
distinctiotis" have been drawn to
attalylically stgttilicaiU.

practice

is

complicated

analytical cracks,

h'or

in a

I

lohnes,

it

concrete way: too

that the

is

it

too general, and legal activity in theory
and

is

much

fbe weaknesses surface precisely

are drawn, and the worry

make

approach

outcome

will

legal subtlety falls

the point

at

show

between the

where these distinctions

the analytical arrangement to be

empty of content.
Ratber than the problem ol codes

more troubled by
authority.

1

s

command

pronouncement

theory, in the

commands

of themselves,

o( individuals

who

is

theory", the law

however. Holmes

is

is

a function

to the

who empowers

is

much

of political

what the sovereign says

backed up by the threat offeree originating,

o( the sovereign,

lolmcs directs his criticism

body

and

Austin's supposition that the validity of the law

Under Austin

Livery legal

in

it

is.

at least in

others to enforce his will.

concept of a sanctioning authority, the individual or

qualify as the sovereign power,
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fhc problem, for Holmes,

is

the

difficulty

power

of locating the force behind
the law; determ, ning
where and with

resides.

His claim

is that

any attempt

to identify the locus

who

the

of sovereign power

reveals the conceptual shortcomings
of Austin’s definition of the law.

not impossible, task to pinpoint
jnst

whom

It is

a difficult, if

has the power to impose sanctions
and compel

obedience, and to determine precisely
the source of this power, for
"who has the sovereign

power, and whether such a power exists
1

870/ 995, 2
1

1

Holmes

5).

at all,

are questions of fact and degree."

resists Austin's attempt to locate
the source

of the law

determinate political superior; rather, he
implies here, and would emphasize

Book Notice" of
This

IS

not at

all

IS

later in the

a simple form of legal pluralism.
Rather, Holmes' point

what the law

is

and

who

enforces

To make such

it.

is

seems

"the definiteness of

to suggest, that

it is

its

is

that

What

not as important to

And,

know who

here.

Holmes

enforces the law, but that

it is

explicitly situates lawyers,

theorizing law from the lawyer’s perspective,

at

the eenter of his reeonfiguration of

Austin's basic jurisprudential question:

is

law? Glossing Austin, Holmes notes

[a]

What

sovereign or political superior secures obedience to his

But

how

is this

commands by

rise to lawyers,

whose only coneem

rules as the courts enforce. Rules not enforced

imperative, are the study of no profession.
to

that.

his

material, except as enhancing the likelihood that they will

be obeyed? Courts, however, give

of jurisprudence has

is

expression and the certainty of its being enforced,"
which

enforced. (Holmes 1870/1995, 215).

courts.

it

a determination

involves a knowledge and understanding of the
gray, penumbral areas of the law.
clear

in a

1872, the role of indeterminate sources of
power.

more than

clear

(Holmes

It

be so carefully determined. (1870/1995, 215).
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is

with such

by them, although equally
is on this aceount that the province

As Herget

observes, Holmes' expression of
indeterminacy, although

"incomplete," was not surprising for one
steeped

somewhat

m a common law tradition that

recognized and accepted as authoritative,
the proposition that judges make
law." (Herget
1995, 64). However, to

not be enforced,

new

site

is

know

those rules which will be enforced,
and those which will

knowledge generally unavailable

(beyond the rules themselves)

professional expertise through a

for the

to the

layman;

rather,

it

becomes

a

development and promulgation of

new language of power. Holmes

suggests, then, that

within the legal spectrum, rules serve their
regulative function without necessarily coming

from a uniquely determinate source of power. Instead,
we must look
rule of law, for

others that are

some

more

modes of regulating conduct

less definite

definite

and

are

at

the purpose of a

more

effective than

official.

This leads Holmes to introduce the idea of "prediction" as

it

relates to the

law

in

general and judicial decision-making in particular. Returning to a
discussion of Austin in
his

book notice of 1872

School),

Holmes

[i]t

(a

summary of lectures on jurisprudence given

clarifies his position

must be remembered...

makes

lawyers' law, even

at

Harvard

on the nature and sources of law. He notes

in a civilized state

when

it

is

Law
that,

not the will of the sovereign that

what a body of subjects,
namely, the judges, by whom it is enforced, say is his will. The judges have other
motives for decision, outside their own arbitrary will, beside the commands of their
that

is its

source, but

And whether those other motives are, or are not, equally compulsory,
immaterial, if they are sufficiently likely to prevail to afford a ground for
sovereign.

prediction.

The only question

for the

lawyer

is,

how

will the judges act?

(1872/1995,295).

It is

heirs.

important to note here

Holmes

is

that,

unlike the position of some of his later "realist"

thinking about something more than a crude judicial behaviorism.
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is

Instead, he is careful to

draw

the distinction

between motives which cannot
be

relied

upon

as a ground for prediction because
of the extent of their arbitrariness
and those which can

because of their generality. The
lawyer's

knowledge, requires a higher

level

task, the construction

of analysis: "Any motive for

constitution, statute, custom, or
precedent,

generality of cases to prevail,

is

of professional legal

which can be

relied

[a judge's] action,

upon as

be

it

likely in the

worthy of consideration as one of the
sources of law....

Singular motives, like the blandishments
of the emperor's wife, are not a ground
of
prediction, and are therefore not considered."

The

target of

(Holmes 1872/1995, 295)

Holmes' growing skepticism revolved around
Austin's formalism

(as

did his complaints with Langdell), the
attempt to enlist a monolithic theoretical
structure
to justify the classification

of legal concepts and relations

in a self-consistent, deductively

necessary, pre-determined way. Although he
endorsed efforts to bring law within the orbit

of scientific authority, he did so on the condition
force legal facts to

fit

that the techniques

employed did not

within a fixed categorical framework or scheme to
which they did

not belong. Legal codes,

new

that matter, neither did the

or old, did not, in the long run, satisfy this condition.
For

common

law,

when judges

failed to exercise their

power of

review to meet changing social conditions and needs, inflexibly following,
and further
entrenching, established precedent for no other reason than

Holmes attempt

to shift the

emphasis within

legal theory

its

status as precedent.

and legal discourse, from a

purely analytical ‘method of arrangement’ - the logic of the law - to an approach that
privileges the language of experience

work

in

was already evident

1870, however tentative the analysis.
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in his first

major jurisprudential

Holmes and the Logic of Legal
Experience: The
In the Preface to

gestation that

The

distinctly

This book

IS

Common

Common Law, Holmes describes the

would ultimately give

emergence of a

Gvotrih of the

birth to this

Lan,

long intellectual

most important document

in the

new jurisprudence:

written in pursuance of a plan
which

I

have long had
in the

bulT
but I should
sho W

in mind I had
American Law Review

h hI" have attempted
hardly
the task of writing a connected
treatise at the
presen time had it not been for the
invitation to deliver a course
of Lectures at the
in Boston
I have made such
use as I thought fit of my articles in
iheT
the
Law Review, but much of what has been taken
from that source has been
rewritten, and enlarged, and the
greater part of the work is new
li cv
3 ).
( 1 651 / 1963
,

Indeed, throughout the book.

previously published

articles.

Holmes

interpolates and integrates material from
his

However,

if

we examine

the text as a whole,

we

can

discover a unifying thread which suggests that
a general standard of liability, based on
objective or external

tests,

has emerged from the stream of legal experience.
This,

a particular form of human experience

which cuts across the

traditional boundaries

itself, is

of

substantive law, deploying both analytical and historical
methods, with the ultimate goal of
arriving at the

same conclusions. To say

the stream of human experience neither

that

for

it

is

that the stream

means

that the

of legal experience

former

is

is

a species of

reducible to the latter nor

a compartmentalized aspect of it. In the interest of providing formal
guidelines

human conduct and

relations, all that is

meant

is that

legal experience draws, to

varying degrees, on the wellsprings of human experience, for the law

of extrarational and extralegal considerations as
Legal experience

is

it

is

as

much

a product

of distinctively legal considerations.

constitutive of human experience.
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is

Only when these

extralegal considerations

and judges take heed, and, even

then,

make

seldom are they

their

fully

way

into the

law do lawyers

aware of the many fontts and

disguises these seemingly
unavoidable undercurrents take.
Legal notions petmeate the
law, building layer upon layer
of meanings that impede the
search for understanding.

Recognizing

that the stuff of the

principal aim, in the

first

law

chapter,

is

is to

a shifting connguration of
meanings. Holmes'
bring these undercurrents to the
surface, to

distinguish the extralegal from the
legal, and to
legal concepts

have as

constants which

their origin

may change,

some of the

but not so

changing conditions, circumstances, or

Holmes focuses on
because

it is,

form, as the motivation behind the relations
between

desires. Their desire to seek relief

cold, yet strangely comforting fictions.

security

that, as a

as

is

Holmes argues

superficial reading of the first Lecture

this will

of one

-

human

beings

sort or another,

form of the satisfaction of

motivated

that

that

at

bottom by vengeance

in

an examination of the

vengeance and not compensation or

the determining factor in affixing the limits of

whole,

of

naked rage, and sometimes overlaid with

and anthropological sources will reveal

is

A

to suffering injury

naturally, seeking relief in the

one form or another, sometimes appearing

historical

that they are unrecognizable,
in the face

the idea of vengeance as his interpretive
device precisely

human beings do what comes
human

constants of human nature and
experience,

situations.

and other beings and objects. In response

basic

the evolution of the law and

according to him, one of the constants of human
nature and conduct

m transmuted

lurking

much

show how

liability.

might leave the misleading impression

be a work of legal history, with a modest dose of general theory
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thrown

in for

good measure. However. Holmes
uses

wh.ch he would paint hisjurisprudential

tins 'history

vision. Specif,cally.

he

more
is

as the canvas

interested in

forms and concepts change and develop,
perish and survive, are relegated
history, yet continue to operate
under another

These

stature.

relics

how

on
legal

to the dustbin

of

name, retaining only traces of their
past

of the past are preserved, long

after their original motivation
has

receded into the multilayered historical
background, because they are convenient,

legally,

politically, morally, theologically,
economically, metaphysically, and/or
socially.

According

to

Holmes, they often are paraded as a palatable
smokescreen

for the 'real'

reasons and motivations behind the preservation
or transformation of a legal concept or
rule

of law;

legal justifications

and explanations function as the

legal tip

of the extralegal

iceberg.

The ringing opening

lines

of The

revealed in the text itself This subtext
Langdell's thought

legal edueation

Common Law

-

is

Common Law

are informed

by a history not

produced by Holmes' misgivings about Dean

already by 1881, assuming a dominant position within
American

and the profession as a whole. Shortly

after the publication

in 1881, in a letter to Sir Frederick Pollock,

Holmes

of The

characterized

Langdellian legal science as representing "the powers of darkness."
(1961, 16-17). As
early as 1872,

Holmes had suggested

Langdell's 'case method' lacked sufficient intellectual

breadth; however, such misgivings did not ultimately foreclose Holmes'

own

the Langdellian approach. In his 'Harvard Celebration Speech' of 1886,

Holmes

acknowledged

its

adoption of

superiority as a pedagogical technique. Nevertheless, Holmes' final

position on Langdellianism

was something

less than charitable.
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In particular,

he

challenged Langdell's understanding
of law as 'scienee'

-

a seience based

on the

relentless

analytical effort to organize the
principles underlying law in
terms of that

which

is

discovered in books

One

(i.e.,

case reports).

year before the publication of The

Common Law, Holmes published

an

unsigned review of the second edition of
Langdell's casebook on contracts,
where Holmes
tdentifies Langdell as our "greatest
living theologian." (1880,
233-234). This accusation

rested on Holmes' belief that Langdell's
system represented an updated and
secularized

version of a familiar stoty

- natural

law theory masquerading as legal science.

It is

this

feature of Langdellian formalism that
incurred Holmes' biting irony, not the
attempt to
raise

law to the level of general theory, and to argue

More

systematic way.

closure

—

specifically,

new approach

a

to the

of law and a theory of adjudication
in experience,

books', without

one

demanding

According
irrelevant,

Holmes objected

it

could be scientific

to

problem of closure, opting

that

for an

it

of legal

implied.

open-ended system

converged on an external standard of liability

that respected the

that either

in a

to the Langdellian notion

the self-sufficient, hermetic, deductively necessary
system that

Holmes urged

grounded

that

primacy of 'law

be converted

into, or

over 'law

in

reduced to the other.

Holmes, Langdellian formalism tended

and irrelevant matters relevant. What mattered

in action*

to

make

relevant matters

for Langdell

was

the internal

consistency of the postulated system, with a mass of details caught up in an unyielding
logical embrace,

unjust results.

and not

that a closer look

Holmes did not

might show

reject the very idea

formalist notion that consistency must be had at
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that this often leads to absurd

of consistency;

all costs.

On

rather,

and

he resisted the

the contrary, according to

Holmes, a

legal syslem, in insliimionalizing
eertain aspects

of social expenence,

may

survive and even nourish whtle
nirting with eertain logical
inconsistencies. This
the law, as

Holmes made

human produchon

in

clear, is not predoininaittly
a logical affair, btit

which consistency ultimately tnay
be gained

is

because

an evolving

throtigh professional

experience.

Langdcll’s attempt to reduce the
concrete facts ofthe existing
system to logical

axioms, Irom which certain consequences
easily

may he

Holmes, nothing more than the unfortunate
example

was

science

in

in

deduced, was, according

to

which the champion of legal

danger of becoming decidedly unscientific,
"and of leading

to a

misapprehension ofthe nature of the problem and
the data." (1880, 234). Holmes did
not
elaborate on this point, but the idea seems
to be that the scientific method
ofthe formalist

was

limited to analytical pronouncements, through
which the integrity ofthe closed system

could be saved, the consequence being that

it

turned up empty

when confronted with

the

hard facts of experience which actually constituted
the existing system. In other words,
this sort

be.

of legal science had no empirical

basis,

no matter how analytically robust

For Holmes, the poverty of Langdellian formalism stemmed
from

for the richness

and open-endedness of experienee,

inconsistency, and

its

its

its

it

may

failure to account

aversion to uncertainty and

urge to cover up error and control the legal process through the

invention of fictions found by expert readings of appellate opinions..

Holmes' critique of Langdellian formalism may be reduced
did not do justice to the

life

ofthe law, the feelings,

to the fact that the latter

intuitions, desires, needs,

and

felt

necessities, articulate and inarticulate, shaping the substance of the law, that, in a general
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sense, give

it its

form. This explains Holmes'
emphasis on the experiential side
of the

methodological and explanatory equation,
and putative failure
Clearly,

Holmes does

to

give logic

its

proper due.

not completely disavow the
role of logic, yet, he seems
not to have

thought through the precise relation
between logic and experience. Did
he intend to give

them equal

What

billing or should logic take a

exactly

would

this 'logic'

back

seat to experience,

look like? Did he

mean

and

if so, to

to reserve a place,

what extent?

with an

independent base of operation, for the sort of
logic generally characterized by
demonstrative reasoning, namely, the logic
of pure analysis or the method of deduction?
Or, did he only

at the

mean

to

admit logic into his experiential framework
as a supplemental tool

disposal of the logic of experience or the
historical method?

acceptable logic a logic reconstituted by the logic
of experience?
alternatives, then, best characterizes the

The

Common Law, where he
The

object of this

accomplish

view

articulated in the

Or

is

the only

Which of these

famous

first

paragraph of

announced;

book

is to

present a general view of the

this task, other tools are

needed besides

Common Law. To

It is something to show
of a system requires a particular result, but it is not all. The life
of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities
of the

logic.

that the consistency

time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of
public policy,
or unconscious, even the prejudices judges share with their

avowed

fellow-men, have had a
do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men
should be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development
through
many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and
corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to know what it is, we must know
what it has been, and what it tends to become. (1881/1963, 5).

good deal more

to

The two sentences preceding
clear that

Holmes

left

some room

the famous

for logic,

even

'life

of the law' phrase make perfectly

if they

only

tell

us that

some

"other tools

besides logic" are needed to "present a general view," a philosophically and historically
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grounded view of the
erram he wished

eommon

to cover.

account for a particular

He

rule,

law. Yet,

Holmes was

maintained that sometimes

it

(1881/1963,
First, the

common

that

5).

He

sense

is

sufficient to

he "shall use the history of our
law

necessary to explain a conception or
to interpret a

is

mark off the histoneal

while others can only be understood
by reference to their

pnmitive antecedents. For example, he
indicates
so far as

eareful to

rule, but

no

further."

points to two errors which the study
of history will help prevent.

supposition that "because an idea seems very
familiar and natural to us, that

has always been so." (1881/1963,
us with very

little

5).

And, second, the supposition

information, the result being that

we assume

too

it

that history supplies

much

about

human

nature in lieu of providing an account, a sort
of fallacy of both history and psychology.
IS at this

It

point that he launches into his examination
of the general grounds of liability, civil

and criminal, both of which are seen

The lesson Holmes draws from

as "very

much

a study of tendencies." (1881/1963,

this historical analysis is that the doctrine

5).

of liability

without fault originates in the natural tendency of human
beings to attach blame, or
liability, to the

being.

Human

offending object, whether

it

be a physical object, an animal, or a human

nature ultimately cannot be separated from the history of human
affairs,

from the assorted markings

left

by

legal

forms

in the

channeling of the stream of legal

experience.

After a lengthy historical analysis of the early forms of liability. Holmes picks up

where he

left

illustrates the

off after the opening paragraph, and concludes that historical analysis "well

paradox of form and substance

merely logical point of view"

is guilty.

in the

development of the law" of which "the

(1881/1963, 31). Legal forms seem to develop in a
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logical

way. From the outs.de

at least, the

law looks as

if

it

appearances are deceptive, according
to Holmes, as the law

follows a logical pattern, but
is

not merely logical.

He

explains:

The

official

theory

,s

each

that

new

mg precedents.

xis

some

earlier

decision follows syllogistically
from the

But just as the elavicle in the cat only
creature to which a collar-bone
was useful,

law long after the use they once
served
been forgotten. The result of following

tells of the existence of
precedents survive in the

an end and the reason for them
has
them must often be failure and confusion
irom the merely logical point of view.
(1881/1963, 5).

Holmes does not maintain
he suggests that through

and locate a

mere

form

legal

'survivor'

logic in large

it

involves

historical analysis,

fail.

Rather,

can probe beneath the surface of the law

m relation to the substantive law undergirding, revealing

side of the paradox, according to

is legislative."

revolves around

its

we

of view must always

own

it

as the

internal development, a

measure shaped by external forces or extralegal
considerations.

growth of the law
is

that the logical point

has become. The law obeys the logic of its

The other

the law

is at

its

Holmes,

is that

"in substance the

(1881/1963, 31). The courts' usual explanation of what

logical form, but the 'deeper sense,'

its

normative

thrust,

legislative grounds.

The very considerations which judges most

rarely mention, and always with an
apology, are the secret root from which the law draws all the juices of life.
I mean,
of course, considerations of what is expedient for the community concerned. Every

important principle which

is

developed by

litigation is in fact and at bottom the
understood views of public policy^ most generally,
to be sure, under our practice and traditions, the unconscious result of instinctive

result

of more or

less definitely

preferences and inarticulate convictions, but none the less traceable to views of
public policy in the last analysis. And as the law is administered by able and

experienced men,
will

be found

who know
when

too

much

to sacrifice

good sense

to a syllogism,

it

way that has been
and will be shown in this book, new reasons more fitted to the time have been
found for them, and that they gradually receive a new content, and at last a new
form, from the grounds to which they are transplanted. (1881/1963, 31-32).
that,

ancient rules maintain themselves in the
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Holmes’ appeal

to public policy is

another

way of stating

the specific substantive

functton the external standard of
liability represents. Public
policy
the community, through

practical matter,

its official

expenenced

representatives, thinks is in

its

is

a reflection

best interests.

officials are reluctant to
reconstruct a

whole

legal

of what

As

a

system or

area of law because the facts do
not comport with the received
explanation for a particular
decision. Instead, they find or invent

new reasons more

and generally they are not so novel as

to require anything

abandonment and

revision.

Change

transformation of old forms into

m effect,

Form,
and

meaning

the

which

that they both, in their

knowledge required

knowledge but

takes place

when new

follows content and function. The process

The purpose of Holmes'

gam

more than

is

translate into both judicial

own way, make

for the revision

for the sake of satisfying

is

content

is

introduced.

a function of both articulate

and legislative

the law.

historical inquiry into the nature

history of what the law has been

constructive

more continuous than discontinuous. Gradual

new ones

inarticulate tendencies, tendencies

function,

to

is

accurately reflecting the times,

and growth of the law

is

of the law, not knowledge for the sake of

some more

or less definite social need. "The

necessary to the knowledge of what the law

is."

Investigation into the grounds of policy often reveals that rules are
justified by policies

which

are products of invention, fictions invented "to account for

survivals from

more primitive

truth

in fact

times." (1881/1963, 33). In a compelling set of passages

that illuminate his pragmatic epistemological tendencies.

The

what are

law

Holmes

writes:

always approaching, and never reaching, consistency.
is forever adopting new principles from life at one end, and it always retains old
ones from history at the other, which have not yet been absorbed or sloughed off
It

will

is,

that the

become

is

entirely consistent only

when
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it

ceases to grow.. ..If truth were not

It

often suggested by error, if
old implements could not be
adjusted to

0™ 96Tr2-33r
In part, the object

show
It

of Holmes’ investigation

that the various forms

also

was

which was

to

show

into the roots

of liability spring "from the

that the determination

new

uses

of modem law was to

common

ground of revenge;"

but.

of liability was a legal matter, the
object of

to adjudicate conflicts according
to a

developing ‘objective’ (read professional)

or external standard that distinguished
legal from extralegal considerations,
even though,
as

Holmes would concede,

the law has a moral basis.

The

result is that,

while the terminology of morals is still retained,
and while the law does still and
always,
a certain sense, measure legal liability
by moral standards, it
nevertheless, by the very necessity of its nature,
is continually transmuting those
moral standards into external or objective ones,
from which the actual guilt of the
party concerned is wholly eliminated.
(1881/1963, 33).

m

In

Its

preoccupation with the relation between language, law,
morality, and meaning,

passage serves as a bridge

to

Holmes' most important work, "The Path of the Law"

this

-

the

source for Holmes' fullest statement of the predictive theory
of the law, and the foundation
for an actuarial Jurisprudence

which informs the discourse of legal modernism.

Holmes' landmark essay, "The Path of the Law," the

fullest

expression of his

predictive theory of law, served as the primary source for that peculiarly
American

jurisprudence

-

legal realism

-

that

was

articulated

during the 1920s and 1930s. Along with The

from within the

Common Law, "The

remains the high water mark of Holmes' contribution
the law in terms oi prediction was, in

had been saying

all

some

to

American

sense, another

elite

Path of the Law"

legal thought.

Defining

way of stating what Holmes

along about coming up with an external standard of
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law schools

liability that

would

adequately account for the
growth and development of the
law and legal concepts.
Prediction as such

characteristic

was not tntended

of the

as a

comprehensive theory of law but as
u defining

legal process, an explanatory
touchstone

of the perspectival process

leading to the resolution of
legal disputes, which,
according to Holmes, was the
main

purpose of the law

to

begin with. Although Holmes
would time and again invoke the

notion of prediction in terms of how
the public force was brought
to bear through the
instrumentality of the courts, the
epistemological underpinnings of
prediction are often

overshadowed by

his preoccupation with the
search for

an external standard anchored

m

legal practice.

Holmes delivered

new law

building.

It is

the address at Boston University
in honor of the dedication of
its

probably

considerable bearing on

its style,

the opportunity to situate

fair to

say that the occasion for the speech had

organization, and content.

many of his remarks

in

The context

offered

Holmes

terms of the nature and problems of legal

edueation, and the close proximity to his alma mater,
allowed

Holmes

to focus his critical

gaze across the river toward Langdell's Harvard. Holmes'
preoccupation with legal
education

owed

method, than

went

way

less to

any lingering objections he might have had

to the jurisprudence

to great lengths to

make

it

such a curriculum seemed

to Langdell's case

to entail.

Indeed,

clear that his acceptance of Langdell's case

Holmes

method

in

no

implied an endorsement of its underlying jurisprudential framework.
As the most

visible feature

of Langdell's program of educational reform. Holmes' worry was

unnaturally limited the reach of legal education

bogus

legal science in the

at the

same time

that

it

that

it

raised the flag of a

hope of creating the impression of the existence of a necessary
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connection between legal education
and legal philosophy. According
to Holmes, the reach

of Langdell's method was limited by

its

neglect of history as a

way of understanding

the

law, and the supposition that the
law could be reduced to a few ahistorical
principles that

paid

little

heed

From

to its formal

the

first line to

methodological presuppositions.
the

last, in its

concern of "The Path of the Law"
education

in the

United

States.'**

is

structure and

its

arguments, the underlying

with the theoretical and practical aspects
of legal

Like Langdell, Holmes perceived certain
threats

to the

legitimacy of the legal profession's authority;
and, like Langdell, Holmes saw the important
role

of

legal education

Holmes understood

m responding to this

legal

legitimation crisis. Unlike Langdell, however.

knowledge and expertise

as being

grounded not

in abstract

principles, but professional experience.

The

essay'^

may

can be described as the

be understood as composed of two principal

'limits

of the law' argument, while the second concerns the forces

which determine the growth and content of the
being concerned with method because

it

We can think of the

law.

deals with the law

— on

terms of the failure of logical method, or what Holmes refers
forms;" (1897/1920, 184), and

historical

'^For a

-

on the positive side

method. (1897/1920, 184-198). The

good discussion of this

parts: the first part

point, see

first

-

in

second part as

the negative side

to as the "fallacy

—

in

of logical

terms of the fruitfulness of the

part of the essay is devoted to an

William Twining (1973).

of the address has produced a number of excellent
David Seipp (1997), and the individual contributions to "The Path of
the Law After One Hundred Years" {Harvard Law Review 1997), and "The Path of the
Law 100 Years Later" {Brooklyn Law Review 1997).

''^The recent centennial anniversary

interpretations. See:
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analysis of the

first fallacy':

essay also include Holmes'

the confounding of morality
with law.

fullest articulation

The

first

part

of the

of the predictive theo^ and the
had n.an

argument. The second part of the essay
contains Holmes' views on judging
and policy,
legal history

theme. Read

and legal education
in this

in their theoretical aspects,
and, the 'life-in-the-law'

way, the essay serves as a demonstration
of Holmes' perspectival

understanding of the law.

The

predictive theory and the bad

man argument

are analytical instruments

deploys to construct theoretical space for the
external standard, a standard that has
roots

m human nature and conduct.

Langdell

s

ahistoncism,

it is

This standard

is,

in

some sense

ahistorical not in the sense that

it

Holmes
its

ahistorical; but, unlike

ignores social and moral

values as contributing to the law and legal concepts
and their development, but in the

sense that morality and law should be distinguished.
That

is,

they should, as far as

possible, be kept distinct in matters of actionability and
adjudication.

brought, the action

is

legal considerations

a case

is

taken with the expectation that the decision will rest on
the relevant

and not on nonlegal or extralegal factors

do with shaping the law, but are not relevant

embedded

When

in the law, that law's

development

that

may have something to

in a purely legal sense. That morality

is

best illuminated against

its

is

social

background, that the descriptive inevitably contains a normative element, does not mean,
for

Holmes,

that a decision should

be rendered by appealing

to

anything but narrowly legal

considerations. Is this simply an example of a latent formalism emerging within Holmes'

jurisprudence?

Is this

merely a more sophisticated rendering of Langdell's understanding

that legal science, properly

named, analytically separate the purely
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legal

from extra-legal

considerations? Holmes' concerns
are heuristic, and are developed
with sensitivity to the

importance of perspeetive. Again, his
context

is

framed by pedagogical and
professional

concerns, and their interrelationship.
Holmes' claim

should not be confounded or confused;

any ultimate sense. That

is,

he

is

it

is

is

that

moral and legal considerations

not a claim that they can be kept
separate in

not arguing for a

strict separation,

but for the importance

of maintaining distinctions for heuristic
and analytical purposes.

The Logic of Legal Experience
would

I

like to

begin

my discussion of "The Path of the Law"

by

first

turning to the

second half of the essay. In an important passage,
Holmes notes:

You may

assume, with Hobbes and Bentham and Austin, that
all law emanates
from the sovereign, even when the first human beings
to enunciate it
are the

j

udges, or you

one

is all

may think

that

law

my present purpose.

to

is

the voice of the Zeitgeist, or

Even

what you

like. It

every decision required the sanction of an
emperor with despotic power and a whimsical turn of mind, we
should be
interested none the less, still with a view to prediction,
in discovering some order,
if

some rational explanation, and some principle of growth for the rules
which he
down. In every system there are such explanations and principles to
be found
179 ).
( 1897 / 1920

laid

,

Holmes'

fidelity to predictive theory

the law are concerned,

empowered

to

it

makes no

and the claim

difference

that so far as the

growth and content of

what the force behind the law

means only

who

is

determine legal validity), does not mean that the brand of sanctioning

authority one subscribes to has no bearing on the shape of the law in

it

is (i.e.,

that

it

all its

aspects; rather,

has no particular bearing with respect to discovering some 'principle

of growth.'
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To

explain

how

rules actually develop in
light

of the method of prediction

is to

affirm a rational method grounded
in experience, rather than
one grounded in
‘transcendent’ authorities.

retelling. Indeed,

The place of logic

Holmes

that the only force at

is

work

in the

law

is

a familiar story, but one
worth

quick to point out that the logical
fallacy refers to "the notion

in the

development of law

is

logic." (1897/1920, 180.

My

emphasis). The crucial qualification ’only’
leaves room for logic of a certain
kind, meaning
not only the logic experience but the
logic that answers a rather global
description, the
sort

of processes human beings display

principle of order

is

in reasoning, explanation,

and inquiry, where a

assumed.

What Holmes

objects to

is

the supposition that the law

is

an axiomatic system,

from which judges unerringly can deduce the correct
judgment once the
are identified.

The law

is

right.

of a judge

who would

not reach a judgment until he

Holmes fondly
was

certain

it

was

Generalizing this strategy makes judicial reasoning a matter of
simple calculation

a Euclidean geometry. This

one

and issues

not susceptible to such a logically exclusive analysis
in which

decisions are the logical outcome of predetermined rules
of conduct.
recites the story

facts

right answer;

and

that,

is

based on the familiar formalist notion

given the requisite ability and provided with sufficient

information,

all

disposition.

As Holmes understood

the judge has to do

this process: "the

that there is exactly

is to

it,

persist

and he eventually will reach the proper

the training of the lawyer and judge lent itself to

language of judicial decision

(1897/1920, 181).
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is

mainly the language of logic."

—

According

to

Holmes,

logical

form was deployed as a useful
(or necessary) shroud

with which to conceal the actual
reason on which a particular
decision was based. Logical

form epitomized the constructed
virtues of impartiality,
disinterestedness, and detachment;
of treating

all

cases on their

own

merits, and like cases alike

-

deflect attention from the actual
biases that drove the decision.

a form which served to

Holmes explains

as

follows:

ehmd

the logical form lies a judgment
as to the relative worth and
importance of
competing legislative grounds, often an
inarticulate and unconscious
judgment it is
true, and yet the very root and
nerve of the whole proceeding. You
can give any
conclusion a logical form. You always can
imply a condition in a contract But

why do you imply

'

because of some belief as to the practice
of the
community or of a class, or because of some opinion
as to policy, or, in short,
because of some attitude of yours upon a matter
not capable of exact
it? It is

'

logical

conclusions. Such matters really are battle
grounds where the
for determinations that shall be good
for all time,

more than embody
not realize

change
matter

man

how

means do not exist
and where the decision can do no

the preference of a given

large a part of our law

is

body in a given time and place. We do
open to reconsideration upon a slight

in the habit

how

ready

has a right to

of the public mind. No concrete proposition is self
evident, no
be to accept it, not even Mr Herbert Spencer's 'Every
do what he wills, provided he interferes not with a like
right on

we may

the part of his neighbors.' (1897/1920, 181-182).

This implies that the law belongs

to a

continuum of experience, where the "principles

governing other phenomena also govern the law." The desires,
needs,
preferences, fears, and goals which

make up

shape the content of the law, giving the form

interests,

these considerations, the other phenomena.

its

concrete, if at times seemingly arbitrary.

direction.

The public policy dimension of the

legal

system

is

a shorthand for saying that the

law must balance the preferences and needs of a community with the preferences and
needs of its individual members, some of which stray from the norm
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for

any number of

reasons;

that the

fiat,

law

occupational hazard, and the

Indeed,

m general, and the ascnptmn of habdhy m

actuarial science.

composes

like.

The idea behind

the discourse of legal

this actuarial

modernism

-

Holmes hmts
partmular,

jurisprudence

is that

here, as elsewhere,

may be modeled

- what I have

certain segments of the

suggested

community

assume greater nsk than other segments
precisely because they have
something
their actions or occupations.

The assumption of these

risks is permitted,

after

to

gam by

sometimes even

encouraged, because they increase the
likelihood that the community
as a whole also

somehow

will benefit.

A cost-benefit analysis, marshaling available

information resources,

provided by the technology of the sciences,
including the social sciences,
presumably will

be able

to

graph the relative risk incurred by pursuing
a particular policy, job, or action;

and, whether the nsks outweigh the
benefits or, whether the benefits
outweigh the risks.

On one
public good

state

IS

reading, our legal system
best served

by

necessarily

legislators

altar

make them

may

set the

said to operate

on the supposition

free competition, politically, economically,

of affairs which Holmes seemed

formulated on the

is

to endorse.

The values ascribed

that the

and socially

to the

of the public good are relative and not absolute, but

-

a

judgments

this

does not

arbitrary or capricious, despite the fact that
judges, juries,

and

course of public policy on the basis of political or economic
bias.

Indeed, such considerations have a large role in shaping public
policy and setting legal

requirements. Logical form cannot presume to incorporate these competing
tendencies

without the help of skillful lawyers and judges clothing their arguments and decisions
the appropriate legal dress. So,

on the one hand, we

only state of affairs in which an employer

is

find judges instructing juries that the

justifiably liable for his employee's injury
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in

is if

the employer

is

deemed

negligent

-

a strict legal requirement
for liability,

restrictions are limited, favoring
the efftc.ent running

where the

of the free market system.

On

the

other hand, despite these instructions,
juries nevertheless tend to
find for the plaintiff, the
implication being that they presumably
identify with the 'common’
person, an individual

member of the community

such as themselves. According

to

Holmes, such a tension

exists,

because the traditional policy of our law
prudent man might have foreseen the

is to

confine liability to cases where a

injury, or at least the danger,
while the

inclination of a very large part of the
community
persons insure the safety of those with
whom

is to

make

certain classes of

they deal. (1897/1920, 182)

The

rationale behind these actions

dangerous or reasonably dangerous

is

that the

community

as a whole, in allowing

activities to proceed, will benefit,

and

that,

from

their

perspective, the standard of negligence does
not hold the employer (or other potential
tortfeasor) sufficiently liable.

Holmes’ solution was

the community's 'inclination'. That

had changed from

is,

to

combine the

traditional policy with

he was well aware that the standards of tort

their primitive origins

where the wrong attached

to a particular

offending object, and damages were assessed in an 'ungeneralized'
way, to
inclusive versions, where a

and injured party was

felt

need

to insist

on a

direct connection

less likely to exist; especially since the

liability

modem more

between tortfeasor

former

may now be

an

impersonal corporation, such as a factory or railroad, responsible for the
tortious injury.

For Holmes, the analysis revolved around the calculation of social, economic,
political

and legal

The

'costs';

liability for

the public.

them

The public

is

estimated, and sooner or later goes into the price paid by

really pays the

damages, and the question of liability,
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if

pressed far enough, is really
the question how far it is
desirable
^ ur
should insure the safety of those
whose work it uses. (1897/1920,
183).

Saddled with disproportionate
economic burdens. one segment of
the community might

recommend one

policy and another segment a
different policy. At bottom,
according to

Holmes, what was

at

stake

was

the price the public

was

willing to pay for the benefits
they

derived from a particular policy.

Holmes- ’exposure’ of the logical fallacy
gives way
state

of the law

fact that

and the

It IS

’path’

We

’’and the ideal

toward which

it

to

an examination of the present

tends,” though he never loses
sight of the

a ’’philosophical reaction” to logical
form. His topic

he traces has an organic and teleological
are far from the point of view

still

reached

it

or can reach

it

as yet.

which

I

cast.

is

the path of the law,

For example:

desire to see reached.

No

one has

We are only at the beginning of a philosophical

and of a reconsideration of the worth of
doctrine which for the most part
are taken for granted without any deliberate,
conscious, and systematic

reaction,
still

questioning of their grounds. The development
of our law has gone on for nearly a
like the development of a plant, each
generation taking the
inevitable next step, mind, like matter, simply
obeying a law of spontaneous
growth. It is perfectly natural and right that it should
be so. (1897/1920, 185).

thousand years,

The

inevitability

dynamic

of growth

is

character, that there

not a matter of causal necessity, but a function
of the law’s

must be a next

evolutionary, relative to time and place,

is

not decreed as a matter of form.

in its

whatever

step,

moving

at

to other

moments

in its

is

more

teleology

is

A legal concept may be analyzed at any given moment
tells

the

whole story unless

it is

development within the context of its evolving uses and

abuses, a task for historical analysis.

[A] body of law

may be. The

a particular, if variable, rate. Progress

development, but such an analysis by no means

compared

it

As Holmes

rational

notes:

and more civilized when every rule it contains
which it subserves, and when the

referred articulately and definitely to an end
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is

For Holmes, histoncal analysis
allows us

to

discover

ability to identify reasons is
a precondition for

about those

rules.

the possibility of a

will

That

is,

more

man may be

the

to

historical analysis: "For the rational
study

man of the

present, but the

without

at least

-

if

we blindly

man of the

future

is

of the law the black-

the

man of statistics

187).

Holmes, we are unlikely

with perceived public needs

be unresponsive

making evaluative or normative
claims

sophisticated methodological arsenal
in which the social sciences

and the master of economics." (1897/1920,
According

Our

do.

skepticism promotes reevaluation.
Moreover, the future offers

supplement logical and

letter

why we have the rules we

to replace or refine laws that are
at variance

accept what

is

handed down

The law

to us.

will

pressing problems cannot be addressed and
appropriate remedies found

some sense of the

force of these problems,

where they come from and

where they might be headed. Obedient acceptance of legal
precedent does not serve a
principal function of the law,

its

responsiveness to social problems. Holmes

is

clear

on

this point:

revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it
was laid
in the time of Henry IV It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon
It is

.

laid

down have vanished

long since, and the rule simply persists

down

which it was
from blind

imitation of the past. (1897/1920, 187).

A rule of law seldom serves the exact social end for which
owing

its

formal existence

at least in part to the accretions
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it

originally

was

articulated,

of history. In recognition of

this,

Holmes

justification

urges us to be aware of the
inevitable judicial smokescreen
offered

of these

historical relics,

Nevertheless,

He does

Holmes

not valorize historical

the law and

making

it

purposes the only interest

shall

acumen

pitfall

for its

own

to the

cover important

to social

needs and goals.

to

To

legal history.

this end.

of antiquarianism" and reminds us
it

Holmes

that "for

our

throws on the present." To that

day when the part played by history

be very small, and instead of ingenious
research

on a study of the ends sought

shifts in legal policy.

sake, but for the sake of
understanding

in the past is for the light

Holmes looks "forward

of dogma

to

warns us against being too consumed
by

more responsive

cautions us to "beware of the

end,

also

which serve

in

be attained and the reasons

we

in the explanation

shall

spend our energy

for desiring them."

(1897/1920, 195).

Near the end of the address. Holmes makes what,

initially at least,

seem

to

be some

rather puzzling remarks, given his emphasis
on the importance of practical experience.

He

notes that:

We have too

little

not practical

details.... Theory is

as the architect

is

theory in the law rather than too much.... Theory
the

the

most important

part of the

most important man who takes

is

my

subject,

dogma of the

law,

part in the building of a

house. (1897/1920, 198,200).
Yet, for Holmes, the theoretical focus seems to be on the study of legal
history; again,

not for the sake of historical knowledge in
history, the "practical details," reveal

concepts. Amidst the trees

we have

some

itself,

but because he thinks the minutiae of

larger point about the evolution of legal

trouble seeing the forest; above the forest

trouble seeing the individual trees. For Holmes, legal thickets are

the forest

-

its

virtually impenetrable to all but the expert,
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much

we have

like the trees in

and even the expert often loses

his

'

way, sometimes as the

result

of his own cleverness.

In the law, this confusion
takes the

form of excessive distinction-drawing,
the production of fictions,
and the
often

and

bom of practical

fictions in all their

necessity.

The aim of theory

myriad forms

in the

is

like,

which

are

to unearth these legal
d.stinctions

attempt to divine a more coherent

understanding of the law: ''Jurisprudence,"
Holmes

asserts, "is

simply law

in its

most

generalized part." (1897/1920, 195).

Meaning and Legal Discourse: Looking

An
turn

emphasis on

my attention

to

legal experts

-

animates the

I

am

part

of the address.

the relationship between legal discourse and

how

Holmes searches

first

I

wish now

to

interested in exploring the principal target of
the ’limits of the

working within the judicial process.

understanding

Man

Holmes’ discussion there of the relationship between
law and

morality. In so doing,

law argument

’theory’ also

at the 'Bad

the law functions, and

is

its

on a

criterion

as interpreted

by

In taking a perspectival approach to

perceived as functioning by the expert.

for an external or objective standard of conduct

evidential adequacy rests

meaning

where the

test for

of relevance determined by professional

experience. This serves as the backdrop for the development of the predictive theory
of

law and the heuristic of the had man.

It is

important to note that the bad

not a necessary condition for the predictive theory, but
as a dramatic illustration of it.

Although there

is

may

man argument

instead be better understood

no necessary connection between them,

they are related parts of the same story marking off the limits of the law by supposing
theory

is

anchored

in concrete practice

and experience.

91

is

In the absence of limits,

ends.

On

we

cannot fathom where one thing
begins and another

the limits argument, the
danger of confusing law and morality,
of not strictly

delimiting one from the other, of
not adequately distinguish.ng
between our beliefs about

what the law

On

is

from our beliefs about what

order to overcome this

investigatory skills

failure,

it

ought

to be, is

due

to

a failure of inquiry.

lawyers (and legal theorists), must
hone their

by identifying the proper subject of
investigation, which Holmes

conceived generally as distinguishing the
legal from the extralegal. At
not only the traditional

means of investigating

history and the social sciences, political

their disposal are

the law, but techniques imported
from

economy and

statistics in particular.

This provides a clear demonstration of Holmes'
focus on the legal profession
topic

on which the address begins and ends.

Holmes

In the justly

-

the

famous opening paragraph.

notes:

When we

study law

we

are not studying a mystery but a

well-known profession.

We are studying what we shall want in order to appear before judges, or to advise
people in such a
profession,

why

way

as to keep

people will

them out of court. The reason why it is a
pay lawyers to argue for them or to advice them,

that in societies like ours the

command of the public

force

is

is

intrusted to the judges

in certain cases,

and the whole power of the state will be put forth, if necessary, to
carry out their judgments and decrees. People want to know under
what
circumstances and how far they will run the risk of coming against what is
so much
stronger than themselves, and hence

danger

it

becomes

a business to find out

when

this

be feared. The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction
of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts
167 ).
( 1897 / 1920
is to

,

Here, although the bad

man has

not yet been mentioned,

suggesting the role of prediction by showing

behind the law in

light

how

we

can anticipate his

the legal profession views the force

of the legitimating function of the courts.
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arrival,

The assumption

is

that lawyers,

informed by

their professional experience

expertise, understand the nature
of judicial behavior; that

is,

based on their training, they

can make an informed estimate of the
way judges think and decide. Potential
confidently mine this knowledge to
their

own advantage

and

in order to

prevent

can

litigants

some

court-

sanctioned harm from coming their way.
Lawyers, in their capacity as legal
advisors, are
not necessarily the mediators of the
public force, but they are supposed
to be attuned to
the sorts of responses the courts might
make.
It IS

fair to

assume

as well that

most of those

in

need of legal advice care

little

or

nothing about various theories of adjudication,
or the court’s place within the legal
system;
but, they

Holmes

do care how the law
focus. Rather, he

will affect them. Yet, this does not
really

seems more interested

advisor prior to an action being brought or a

convincing a

way

as possible, with the

bad

trial

man

thirty years later, then

to

be

to generalize the lawyer's role as legal

conducted, and to link

argument. Indeed,

prediction theory explicitly in terms of judicial behavior
at

do more than

seem

he would have had a

trials,

much

as

if he

it,

in as

had

set forth the

Jerome Frank was

to

harder time in dramatizing

the idea of prediction.

Holmes does
probabilities

reliability

may

not pay

attention to the fact that the calculation of judicial

not be an easy matter, with several obstacles to interfere with the

of particular predictions, such as the great variations

Even lawyers of comparable
not necessarily arrive

same

much

case,

due

at

the

to the use

in

lawyer effectiveness.

training and experience, with similar social backgrounds, will

same outcome

or prediction even

when confronted with

of different precedents, placing greater weight on certain
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the

facts.

different inten, relation ofrulcs,
and so forth. TIte legal realists
of the 1920s and 1930s

emphasized

this variability;

Holmes' eoncern, however, was
mainly eonf.ned

to unraveling

the relation between law and
morality, and the confusion
which resulted from ignoring

what happens when

llie

two are confounded.

Some of Holmes'

have mistakenly interpreted his
prediction

critics

contingencies of what a particular judge
will do

Such a view

1988).

in

general will do

is

similar cases

m

in a particular case. (Sec,
c.g.,

Luban

in that

general type or class of cases, of which
the particular
is

possible, not so

much because

is

but an

particular judges decide

predictable ways, but because judges, as a
class, decide similar cases in

predictable ways.

By

prediction he does not

mean

to

exclude the prediction of the judical

behavior of the individual judge, but to focus attention
on
ranging over a generalized class of cases of a particular

For Holmes, the law

at its core, then, is

channel the incidence of the public force

Moreover, describing the law
relations,

on the

mistaken, however; rather. Holmes’ theory
focuses on what courts

For Holmes, prediction

instance.

to focus

in

to

type.^'*

defined as the power of the courts to

reasonably authoritative and predictable way.

ground

rights and duties with

nothing but prophecies.

decisions

terms of prediction simplifies the analysis of legal

encouraging legal theorists

The primary

in a

how judges make

their jurisprudence in actual legal practice:

which jurisprudence busies

One of the many

evil effects

itself

again arc

of the confusion between

legal and moral ideas.. .is that theory is apt to get the cart before the horse,
and to
consider the right or the duty as something existing apart from and independent of
the consequences of its breach, to which certain sanctions are added afterward.

But, as

^‘’This

was

1

shall try to

a point that

show, a

legal duty so called

is

nothing but a prediction that

Holmes had made more than two decades

(1870).
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before; see

Holmes

if a

man

does or omits certain things he
will be made to suffer in
this or that wav bv
^
court; and so of a legal right.
(1897/1920, 168-169).

judgment of the

In confusing morality and the
law, moral responsibility
legal liability, the duty

According

to

one person owes

Holmes, duties and

Their standing

is

rights

to another

who

becomes confused with

has a justified claim on

do not possess independent ontological

it.

status.

a function of the legal consequences
they have or might bring into

existence. In other words, there are no
such things as preexistent rights or
duties. For
rights

and duties

which

will follow their breach.

to

be valid, they must be defined in terms
of the legal consequences

Grounded

in experience, legal duties

effect logically equivalent to the rulings
of the courts

and do not do with respect

to the duties they

owe and

and rights are

m response to what individuals do
the duties

owed

to

them.

We may note here that Holmes does not insist on the correlativity of duties
rights, instead,

and the

which

he takes each

The

in turn.

idea,

would seem,

right-relation, as such, that invites attention

legal practice should

and does

preoccupation with duty over rights

turn. Further,

to

was

to conceive

it

at its

most

is

that

from the law, and

we may

it

it

is

and

the duty-relation

is this

around

understand Holmes'

stem from his overriding insistence on the need

distinguish between law and morality. That

duty,

it

in

is,

for

Holmes,

to

to

conceive the law in terms of

distinctive, to select that aspect

of the law which was

both most concrete and generalizable. Rights, on the other hand, conjured up the specter

of elusive abstract

entities, existing

independently of factual experience. The duty-relation

provided, for Holmes, the analytical key to a theory of adjudication grounded in
experience.

95

Does

the lawyer, in his role
as •prcdiclive Iheorisl', give

his prediction

on the

must he take both
law'

distinctive legal requirements

for their dcctsions are

it is,

element of contingency

granted.

opposed

It

-

was

what was most

into a specifiable class

how

when we cannot be

what actually motivated them?

prediclion, as a probabilistic method,

response

of a ease rather

factors into account? Further,
just

tenns of what judges say

in

good advice when he bases

It

far

can

sure

seems

It,

an court beltavior; or,

we go

titat

in

defining the

the reasons titey give

that, for

a reliable standard because

it

Holmes

at least,

absorbed the

arbitrary in predicting the
probable legal

of cases, whose

provided an immanent approach

to the

identification could almost be taken
for

containment of juridical contingency, as

to the recourse to transcendent
principles advocated

by Langdcll and

his

followers.^'

Holmes theory

rests

on the assumption

that predictions,

when

generalized and

reduced to a system, consist of a manageable number;
otherwise, there would be
reason to suppose that they would have

much

little

predictive force, since on the behaviorist

view, due to the contingent nature of the decision-making
process, the number of
predictions

This

is

would be very

compounded by

large,

and approximating

that

number would be very

difficult.

the fact that the institutional signature of the system of
predictions

A classic critique of this position was made by Henry M. Hart, who maintained that
Holmes’ theory was ultimately reducible to an "uncompromising behaviorism." Hart
insisted on conflating Holmes’ prediction with positivism, concluding that he (Holmes)
was unable to differentiate between the specifically legal requirements of a case, on
which judges are supposed to ground their decisions, and projected court behavior. This
is,

however, an overly narrow understanding of Holmes’ prediction theory. (Hart 1951,

932).
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are constantly evolving.

change.

From an

Precedent infonns the present but
does not close the door to

analytieal perspective, according
to

S''?"

m ,rr.h
I?
much
the whole
body of the
1

Holmes:

course of a generation take up
pretty
law. and restate

it from the present
point of view We
could reconstruct the corpus from
them if all that went before
burned. 111
use ot earlier reports is mainly
historical. (1897/1920, 169).

wL

Rights and duties, then, are analyzable
reducible to

strict legal

purposes of arriving

in

terms of prediction because they are

requirements, unblemished by extralegal
considerations for the

at dispositions.

As

a consequence,

vague circumference of the notion of duty shrinks
and
precise

when we wash

it

we

at the

are able to "see

of the law, of rights and

in the

is

how

the

same time grows more

with cynical acid and expel everything except
the object of our

study, the operations of the law." (1897/1920,
174). His object

specifying what

^

is

duties, in order to increase the accuracy

to define the parameters

of our predictions by

permitted and prohibited, as well as the penalties that

may be

expected

event of noncompliance. The domain of considerations having
to do with duties

wider than the domain of legal duties as such. What Holmes seems
the limits argument, then,

is

to distinguish clearly the

to set out to

is

do with

wider form the narrower domain.

Extralegal considerations lurking behind the legal definition of duty are only
irrelevant in a

narrowly legal sense: they should have dispository bearing on the instrumentalities of the
court,

way,

which

is

not to say that they do not

make

their presence felt, in

some

less articulate

in the law.

The confusions engendered by

the failure to distinguish these

the level of general theory and practical detail. Such confusions
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domains are

may be

felt at

attributed to the

difficulty

Holmes

of making the appropriate

distinctions, intellectual
laziness, or simple inability

set out his priorities early
in his

e

argument;

thing for a busmess-hke
understanding of the matter is to
understand its
imits, and therefore I think
it desirable at once
to point out and dispel
a confusion
ween inorahty and law, which sometimes
rises to the height of
conscious
first

r

eSg

reacnmg tne
tteTornt
point of consciousness.
(1897/1920, 169-170)

One of the

practical features of the limits
argument, the

attraction for the later legal realists,

of the law

may be just

law,

we

powers

to us.

the recognition that

we

Since

secretly covet

we do

not

know

do so

-

all

the

process. Nevertheless,

their

lies

below the surface

ways

in

what

which morality

-

so far as

we have enough

worry about the

way

that the

above.

infiltrates the

it

is

within our

trouble with

role morality plays in the legal

Holmes was equally wary of the dangers of taking

logical extreme, fixing limits in such a

lies

appearance in ways

by eliminating

the distraction. In other words,

specifically legal issues, without having to

Its

may make

are better off, or so the argument runs,

to

what

as motivationally efficacious or
inefficacious as

Preferences or ideals that

unbeknownst

was

one which held a special

this

argument

law would be drained of every

to

last

drop of moral content;

For my own part, I often doubt whether it would not be a gain if every
work of
moral significance could be banished from the law altogether, and other words
adopted which should convey legal ideas uncolored by anything outside the law.

We should lose the

fossil records of a good deal of history and the majesty got
from ethical associations, but by ridding ourselves of an unnecessary confusion we
should gain very much in clearness of our thought. (1897/1920, 179).
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To be

sure, there

would be advantages and disadvantages,
but

such a streamlined jurisprudence
would leave the law

the clear implication

in a scarcely

recognizable

is

state,

that

and

perhaps even of less use than before.^^
Indeed,

Holmes was

well aware of the fact that the
moral dimension of the law did

not vanish conveniently, even for
the purposes of adjudicat.on.

route Karl Llewellyn later would take,

of the

is

when he urged judges

and the ought. Although Holmes believed

judges should not make express appeals

to

moral

to effect a

that for the

ideals,

Holmes did not

take the

temporary divorce

putposes of adjudication

he did not thing the normative

could be taken out of the law, despite his
insistence, on the one hand, that judges
reach
thetr dectstons

on the basis of the distinctive

legal requirements

recognitton of the realities of judicial legislation,
on the other.

of the case, and

The

distinction

between the

clatms that the normative can be removed from the
law either permanently, temporarily,
or, in

some

sense, not at

all, is

subtle but important, and

it

rests

on a careful tracing of the

various limits between law and morality.

It is

more accurate

to say that

Holmes held

a belief in the possibility, and utility, of

distinguishing between law and morals, rather than in the belief
of a

between the two.
*^orifusions, the

It is

separation

a distinction that pointed to the linguistic and metaphysical

confusions of meaning, surrounding the relation between legal and moral

ideas or propositions. That

is,

in

conceding the "practical importance of the distinction

between morality and law," Holmes does not actually

^^The classic comparison here

makes

strict

is to

call for their separation in

any strong

Karl Llewellyn (1931), where, following Holmes, he

a strong case, for purely analytical reasons, of the desirability of effecting a

separation of

‘is’

and ‘ought’.
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sense, but underscores the
practical necessity of drawing
the line for the purposes
of

adjud, cation. (1897/1920.
170).

He

explains himself as follows:

When emphasize the difference between
I

law and morals I do so with
reference to
a single end, that of learning
and understanding the law....I do
not say that there is
ot a wider point of view from
which the distinction

becomes of secondary or no importance,
presence of the innnite. But
the object which

r

we

I

do say

as

between law and morals
mathematical distinctions vanish

all

that tha, distinction is

are here to consider

-

of the

first

in

importance

a right study and mastery of
the law

^

"nes

Almost as

0 8"9W1920 Tyt

if

he anticipated being misinterpreted
as an unrelenting

reaffirmed his position in no uncertain terms:
will misinterpret

what

1

have

to

race.

The

practice

good men." (1897/1920,

Holmes

of it,

it

for granted that

life.

in spite

Its

history

is

Holmes

no hearer of mine

say as the language of cynicism. The law

and external deposit of our moral

of the

take

"I

positivist.

is

the witness

the history of the moral development

of popular jests, tends

to

make good

citizens and

170).

insistence on the practical and pedagogical
benefits of separating law and

morality was rearticulated through the heuristic device
of the 'bad man'.

understand Holmes' introduction of the bad

man argument

I

believe

we

can

as a reflection of his

perspectival and experience-oriented approach to the law and
the relation between moral

and

legal considerations.

intersection

between

The argument served

citizens

and

to represent the

their legal institutions.

dramatically represent the violence of the state as
citizens through the instrumentality of the courts

the form of legal sanctions.
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it

-

fundamental nature of the

The bad man allowed Holmes

could be brought to bear on

its

the channeling of the public force in

to

The bad man

represents a type, a self-centered
tndtv.dual

to reach his objective with
as

the

little

whose primary concern

is

hassle as possible. Systems of
moral, ty do no, disturb

bad man's self-possession and
desire

to

achieve his objectives without
suffering

unpleasant consequences, but systems
of law do. The bad man, through
the advice of his
lawyer, picks out the characteristics
of the law that concerns him. In a
classic statement of
the argument.

Holmes touches on both

the practical and theoretical
reasons for adopting

the bad man's point of view:

You

can see very plainly that a bad man has
as much reason as a good one for
to avoid an encounter with the
public force, and therefore you can see
the
practical imponance of the distinction
between morality and law. A man who cares
nothing for an ethical rule which is believed
and practised by his neighbors is likely
nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid being
made to pay money, and will keep
out of jail if he can....If you want to know
the law and nothing

wishing

else, you must look
bad man, who cares only for the material consequences
which such
knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one,
who finds his reasons for
conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in
the vaguer sanctions of
at

it

as a

conscience. (1897/1920, 170-171).

The bad man does not

care about morality because

cares only about the law to the extent

it

may

it

does not figure in with his plans, and

affect him. All this is with a

view towards

predicting the probable material consequences of the alternative
courses of action open to

him.

A course of action is to be recommended if and only if

consequences favorable
course of action, then,

is

to the actor

it

will bring about

and avoid unfavorable ones so

right because

it is

far as possible.

good.

The confusion between law and morality shows up

in another

way, forging a

with the second fallacy which warns against the dangers of becoming embroiled
deductive, reason-based systems of traditional

passage Holmes manages

A

common

in the

law jurisprudence. In the same

to include the other crucial link
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link

between the bad man and

prediction; he concludes with
what amounts to the closest he
ever

came

to giving a

definition of law:

he confusion with which am
dealing besets confessedly legal
conceptions Take
le fundamental question,
What constitutes the law? You will
I

t

writers telling

find

you

that

sonK

text

something different from what is decided
by the courts
of Massachusetts or England, that
it is a system of
reason, that it is a deduction
from Pnncip les of ethics or admitted
axioms or what not, which may or may
not
if™" '"k" ‘he view of our friend the
bad
min
we
si?all
n find
f H m
that he does not care two straws
for the axioms or deductions,
but that
he does want to know what the
Massachusetts or English courts are likely
to do in
fack 1 am much of his mind. The
prophecies of what the courts will do in
fact and
nothing more pretentious, are what I
mean by the law. (1897/1920, 172-173)
it

is

'

Not only

is

the bad

man

indifferent to moral theory as such, but
he also

by the problems created by importing moral
language

empty phrases

to him.

is

into the law, for they are so

Moral vocabulary permeates the law,

yet,

we

unmoved

many

often overlook

its

presence. For Holmes, only if we keep the boundary
between law and morality in plain
sight can

we

avoid the inevitable terminological confusions and
ambiguities of meaning

stemming from

uncritical acceptance

language and legal meaning
Indeed,

Holmes

is

of our working assumptions. This link between legal

an important, albeit often overlooked, themes of the essay.

sets as his first order

of business, the need

to distinguish the

moral from

the legal language:

The law

of phraseology drawn from morals, and by the mere force of
language continually invites us to pass from one domain to the other without
is full

perceiving

it,

as

we

are sure to

our minds. The law talks about

do unless we have the boundary constantly before
rights, and duties, and malice, and intent, and

negligence, and so forth, and nothing
legal reasoning, than to take these

argument, and so

to

drop into

words

fallacy.

in their

may

more common in
moral sense, at some stage of the

is easier, or, I

(1897/1920, 171).
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say,

Moral language,

for

Holmes, prevents the law from being
interpreted

way. However natural

legal

much

may be

it

harder to judge a case on

its

in a distinctively

for us to lapse into such
language,

legal merits

it

lessons to be drawn from Holmes'
bad man.

and practice,
wish

to

that reasonably can

stark

The idea

of action

that will

be expected to flow

to

full

that

them.

it

is

one of the

pays, in both theory

if the interested parties

maximize the positive

practical

consequences

We need not, however, resort to the

metaphor of the bad man, whose only concern

appreciate the

is that

approach problems from different perspectives

to select the plan

it

and requirements.

Sensitivity to the importance of
perspectivism in the legal process

mam

makes

is

with

how

impact of Holmes' perspectivism. The bad

the law will affect him, to

man

a

is

way of dramatizing

a purely legal perspective, one where the only
value in sight

is

naked form. Adopting the bad man's point of view
makes

easier to identify law with the

it

self-interest in its

idea of prediction, but this should not necessarily imply
that the bad
identical with the predictive theory of law. Rather, the
law

because the actors

in the legal

instrumentality of the courts.

their legal counsel's ability

believe Holmes's argument

making generalized

The

predictive theory

how

is

man argument

is

identified with prediction

system observe that the public force

and concern with

is

is

most

is

levied through the

not reducible to the litigants and

individual judges will behave. Instead,

better understood to say that lawyers are concerned with

predictions as to

how

type; an approach ultimately determined

the courts will treat cases and issues of a certain

by a belief that the

real

grounds for judicial

decisions are not the "hollow deductions from empty general propositions," but policy

decisions distilled from the give and take of experience. (1894/1920, 120).
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I

By

characterizing his theory of law
in terms of prediction.

sense, maintaining a eons.stent
position vis-a-vis the

the development of the

eommon

law

may

common

Holmes

law. That

some

is, in

is,

Holmes,

for

be understood by the seareh
for an external

standard of liability, a standard
which appeals to the authonty of
experience for

its

grounding. The adjudication of
liability becomes a function
of an evolving standard

grounded

in

experience that ean be measured and
foreseen, to a reliable degree,
by

external signs observable only

An

letter

the experts within the legal
system.

external standard of liability that
raises experience to the level
of general theory

benefits from a

observed,

by

companson with

actuarial science.

when Holmes proclaimed

man may be

the

As Marianne Constable (1994)

that, "[f]or the rational

man of the present,

but the

study of the law the black-

man of the

and the master of economics," he was not just
engaging

future

is

the

man of statistics

in wishful thinking about the

positive future effects social science might hold
for the explanatory and predictive

of the law. Rather, he was making a plea
burdens according

system

in

to

which "the

coefficient.

how

the distribution of risks

was

rational study of the law" could

In doing so.

and authority of the

for a certain conception

Holmes was providing

of liability that imposed

correlated to the public good; a

be defined

in terms

legal profession as a whole. That

is,

could situate themselves in positions of power in order

Holmes was marking
its

of the very fabric of the law, finding

to facilitate

its

the

professional carriers

emerging

governance through the management of risk. The distribution of risk
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of a probability

the grounds for a reassertion of the status

contours for the future development of legal expertise, so that

to constitute part

power

is

now

strategies

of

understood

expression through the

formulation of public policy
within legal doctrine. The
sphere of professional
expertise

and authority expands
commensurately. This expansion,

I

would argue,

is

intertwined

with Holmes’ more fundamental
claims about the indeterminacy
of law manifest

in a

modernist legal space.

To

help explain

this perspective,

common

I

this,

would

why

I

think

it

is

important to look

like to return to Tocqueville

law and France’s

difficult to

and

at

Holmes’ work from

once more. Contrasting the

civilian codes, he observed;

"The French codes are often

comprehend, but they can be read by
everyone; nothing, on the other hand,
can

be more obscure and strange
French lawyer
the Engitsh or

is

simply a

to the uninitiated than [law]

man

founded upon precedents....The

extensively acquainted with the statutes
of his country; but

American lawyer resembles the hierophants of
Egypt,

sole interpreter of an occult science."
(Tocqueville

1

969/1988, 264).

for like

It

them he

is

the

would be

unsurprising to suggest that such complexity
works to the benefit of both the individual

lawyer and the legal profession as a whole, both

in

terms of preserving the legitimacy of

expert authority and social status. Understanding
the historically contingent nature of this

constructed complexity

is

another matter however. In Tocqueville’s America,
the

byzantine nature of the writ system was a principal contributing

we need
new

to

look elsewhere. Holmes’ contributions in legal theory and

legal discourse - with a vocabulary

prediction - laid the foundation for

common

factor.

law as complex,

subtle,

In the

its

emerging from the concepts

much

later
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era,

intimations of a

experience and

work, work that would represent the

and ultimately unknowable on

the outsider).

modem

its

own

terms

(at least to

As

I

noted in Chapter Two, David
Luban suggests that modernity
ean be

understood by reference

Luban points

to the

metaphor of the “Copernican
Revolution." Copernicus,

out. "taught us to mistrust

common

sense, to

view

system resting on eritieizable
presuppositions." (Luban 1994.

'Copemicanism"

for the legal

mind

(at least as

it

19).

as merely a belief

The

understood by Luban)

implication of

is

that "[t]he truth

about legal structures must be radically
different from the way they
manifest themselves
practice."

(Luban 1994,

By emphasizing

3).

in

the importance of perspective,
and

introducing a conception of indeterminacy,
or uncertainty, to the law, Holmes,

I

would

suggest, best represents the early contours
of legal modernism.

However,

as informative

indeterminacy poses certain
perspectives, ultimately,

in a

of a

risks.^^

style

of legal reasoning and

While seeming

to

privileges only one. That

it

legal practice,

open up the

is,

legal

world

for indetemiinacy to

given situation (for example, the lawyer/client
relationship),

it

requires

to multiple

be meaningful

some

external

constraint inducing regularity in the underlying
referential structure so as to allow
probabilities to be assigned

md prediction

to

have some efficacy. In other words,

it

requires that these regularities should be either experienced
and/or understood by a

knowing subject - the lawyer/expert.

As

far as

I

know. Holmes was the

first legal

theorist to consciously

develop a

jurisprudential focus from the perspective of the practicing lawyer.
This allows

“Aside from those already

him

to

detailed in the scholarly literature; that is, the dangers of
relativism or nihilism illuminated by ‘mainstream’ legal academics, as well as the
dangerous implications in the undermining of the tradition of the rights-based discourse of
liberal theory that Critical

Race Theorists have brought
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to

our attention.

,

radically challenge Austin’s
answer to the fundamental
question ofjunsprudence:
w/,at

law? However,

more important

tn

providing his

question:

own

who can

alternative,

say?
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Holmes

elides the implications
of the

CHAPTER 4

from individual to social
POUND AND THE VALORIZATION OF JUSTirp.
THE COMMON LAW

In his

important work on American legal
realism, William Twining
identified the

basic problems which have dominated

preserving the unity of the

modernization of the law

common

in the

modem American jurisprudential

law

in the face

wake of the

by the development of industrial capitalism

social

thought:

of the multiplicity of jurisdictions;

and economic changes brought about

after the Civil

War; and "simplification of the

sources of law, as the legal profession and
the courts became more and more

swamped by

the prodigious output of legislation,
regulations and reported cases." (Twining
1973, 3-4)

Concern with these problems, however, does not
necessarily lead
legal reform.

One of the unique

features of the

common

law

is that, in its

to systematic

day-to-day

workings, the legal system undergoes constant change.
Each published opinion of an
appellate court, every interpretation and application by
a

trial

court, contributes,

modestly, to the modification of the law. Over time, gradual
evolution
important change

in legal doctrine. (See, e.g., Cotterrell
1989, 21-32).

often-cited virtues of the

common

law system

is its

capacity to

may

however

lead to

Indeed, one of the

accommodate change and

thereby alleviate the need for sudden and wholesale change. The concept
of externally-

imposed

legal reform,

on the other hand, suggests a much more dramatic process.

Historically, the bar has

viewed such mandates

imposition on the autonomy of the profession.
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for legal

reform as an unwarranted

As Twining po.ms

out,

however, the basic conditions
of material

life

changed

dramatically after the Civ.l War.
These soeio-eeonom.e developments,
along w.th the

emergence of new technolog.es

to

meet a growing

industrial society, brought

new

challenges to the law as well as
to other areas of society.
(Twining 1973,4). Moreover,

according to Twining, no, only did
these developments help

change

Amencan

in

society, but they also transformed
the

understood. (Twining 1973,

bring about baste structural

to

way

in

which

legal

refo™ was

4).

The inHuence of industrial and

technological change

was

indirect.

First, certain

aspects of the law seemed to be out of
step with the concrete reality in
which average

Americans

lived

and worked. And, second, the social and
structural changes challenged

the self-image of the legal profession
in

reform the profession put forward

between

social reality

The changes

in

ways which helped

to

shape the sort of legal

an attempt to respond to the perceived
disjuncture

and legal doctrine.

in

American

life

brought about by the innovations Twining mentioned

did not, of course, go unnoticed by those

who

lived through them.

had indeed changed and many self-conscious attempts were
made

The

facts

to bring

of daily

American

society and government into line with the changed
material conditions of life.

of these attempts

commonly
has called

work from

at

life

change cannot be easily summarized, but are part of what

The

history

is

referred to as the Progressive era, or as the historian Richard
Hofstadter (1955)

it,

the "age of reform."

It is

also

common, when

referring to this penod, to

the assumption that the legal profession, or at least the elite segment of the
bar,

as well as the legal system as a whole,

was

to a great
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degree out of step with the

Progressive movement. Or.
perhaps more strongly, the
legal profession has
been
characterized as putting up
obstacles to the most broadly
accepted goal of Progress,
vis, n

—

social justice.

Part

situation

of the quest

of the

for social justice in the
Progressive era involved

common working person,

hnding expression

hours of work, improving working
conditions, and

compensation schemes

to provide

monetary remedies

from appellate judges who came from
within
Resistance was justified

States

Supreme

New York
work

story.

its

in a biscuit,

workplace

that

v.

However,

segments of the bar, as well as

ranks.

One of its more infamous

which ordered

injuries.

The growth of the

incorporation through the Fourteenth

Court's deeision in Lochner

statute

elite

limitmg the

of worker's

m the name of 'freedom of contract'.

doctrine of freedom of contract and

by now a well-known

its

for

improving the

in state statutes

in the creation

such laws met with severe opposition
from both the

IS

-

New

"No employee

chapters includes the United

York. (1905).

shall

Amendment

The case involved

be required or permitted

a

to

bread or cake bakery or confectionary establishment
more than sixty

hours in any one week, or more than ten hours
the majority, Justice

Peckham held

in

any one

day...." (1905, 46).

Writing for

that.

manifest to us that the limitation of the hours of labor as
provided for in this
section of the statute under which the indictment was found,
and the plaintiff in
error convicted, has no such direct relation to and no such
substantial effect upon
It is

the health of the employee, as to justify us in regarding the
section as really a
health law. It seems to us that the real object and purpose were
simply to regulate
the hours of labor between the master and his employees (all being
sui juris), in a

private business, not dangerous in any degree to morals or in any real and
substantive degree, to the health of the employees. Under such circumstances the

freedom of master and employee

to contract
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with each other in relation to their

or interfered with,

Against

this alleged

expansion of the liberty provision
of the Fourteenth Amendment,
,

Justice

Holmes

articulated

Amendment does
the case

one of his most memorable
judicial

lines: "Th,
"The
;

Fourteenth

not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics." According
Accor
to Holmes,

was "decided upon an economic theory
which

a large part of the country
does not

entertain." (1905, 64).

Lochner was only one of many clashes
between
during the Progressive

Throughout

era.

the judiciary and the legislature

this period, statutes

designed to further

Progressive reform were adamantly opposed
by significant elements of the organized
bar

and the judiciary. (See,

e.g.,

Paul 1969, 19-38).

examination of the reasons for
implications.^'* Rather,

I

this

wish only

bar, the self-appointed guardian

grounded

m the rule of law.

justice, the repeated failure

I

do not wish

to

pursue here an

divergence between judiciary and legislature
or
to note that its existence

its

posed certain problems

for the

of American legal culture and the principles of
justiee,

For many

who were

of specific reforms

dedicated to reform in the

in the courts,

name of social

such as the legislation

involved in Lochner, was to be blamed on the newly dominant
element within the

organized bar - the corporate lawyer - those
the expense of the

elite

who

common working man. Even

argued for wealthy

those

who were

clients' interests at

otherwise friendly to the

bar saw cause for concern in the increasing subjugation of influential
elements of the

^'‘For an excellent discussion of this topic, which suggests that the
issue is much more
complicated than simply the reactionary measures of a conservative bench, see Gillman

(1993).
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legal profession to co^rorate
wealth. This

tradttional claims to

profession which

autonomy which were grounded

owed primary

particular interests

was viewed

of the individual

The legitimacy of the

in its

cla.m to being a "public-

allegiance to the general interests
of society over the
client.

This assertion of neutrality was
quickly being

pushed aside by the image of the "hired
gun", linked
interests.

as detnmental to the
profession's

to specific political

and economic

legal profession's claim to
guardianship

of the law was

threatened by these developments within
the practice of law which
challenged one of the

cornerstones of the bar's claim of
professionalism, autonomy. This was
viewed as being
detrimental to the profession’s traditional
independence

of the "science of the law." As Holmes said

in

bom

of a mastery of the intricacies

"The Path of the Law,"

imagination of any scope, the most far-reaching
form of power

command of ideas."
If these

explosion

is

”[t]o

an

not money,

it

is

the

(1897/1920).

developments within the

legal profession

were not disquieting enough, an

m the reported opinions of appellate courts threatened to challenge the other

cornerstone of the profession, mastery of a 'determinate'
body of knowledge. Changes in
society as a whole only exacerbated the problem. Moreover,
the Progressive era

time

1

when

967,

1 1

the concept and role of the professional acquired

3- 1 2 1

).

As

the social stmcture changed and

new

was

a

importance. ( Wiebe

America became a national

society,

mastery over a politically neutral body of 'scientific knowledge' became an important
way
to

make one s

place in society respectable and secure. The politically charged atmosphere

of the Progressive era and the

legal profession's apparent complicity in resisting social
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reforn, efforts,

claims to

In

combined w.,h .he growing

'scientific neutrality'

percept, on of doc.rinul
indetemhnacy, n.ade

highly problematic.

February 1923, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes wrote

Some

of the virtuous under the

to

Harold Laski:

of Elihu Root and William
Draper Lewis meei
to talk of restatement of
the law (I
e eve).... wtll tiy to [look
in on them] but
will take no hand and
won’t believe
...I they produce the
goods. You can't evoke genius by
announcing a
call

[m Washington.D.C.] next week

here

I

I

That meeting and the resulting

institution

-

the

outgrowth of forces which had been working

two decades.

As

legal historian

^

American Law

for legal

Institute

-

were the

reform throughout the preceding

N.E.H. Hull has noted, "[t]he origins
of the ALI lay

the vision of a group of
'progressive-pragmatic' legal academics,

law and promote the influence of law
professors

in the

who wished

in

to reform

wider world of legal practice."

(Hull 1990, 56). This was accomplished
through joining with powerful

organized bar

(ALI)

members of the

m response to a perceived crisis in the adjudication of the common

law.

Citing to Roscoe Pound, the most influential
jurist of the era, Hull notes:

Pound

what many of his generation had begun to recognize:
that the
was applied in the courts-how judges
discovered law- had lost its explanatory power under
the accumulation of
articulated

classical-formalist paradigm of how the law

contradictory data.

The explosion

in published reports of cases by the
West Law
graphically illustrated inconsistencies between, and
even within, jurisdictions. Complaints about the confusion
of the law and the
multiplicity of cases in the last decade or so of the nineteenth
century was the
manifestation of the cognitive dissonance of a generation groping
with this

Book Publishing Company had

increasing contradiction between data and paradigm. Older
formalists futilely tried
to ignore the contradiction by either attempting to reconcile
cases or perfecting
their

schemas

for legal classification.

The progressive-pragmatist

generation,

through their spokesman. Pound, was the first to identify what the new case
data
was telling them, that the classical-formalist paradigm did not describe or explain
the reality of what

was happening

in the courts.
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(1990, 57).

In 1906,

Roscoe Pound had emerged

at

the eenter of national
attent.on with.., the

egal profession as a cnt.c
of the reactionary role then
being played by the United
States

Supreme Court, and by
social issues

the

the judiciary and bar

of the time. In

that year

American Bar Association

Administration of Justice,"

in

observer).

Pound was,

generally, with respect to the
pressing

he delivered an address to the
national convention of

entitled

"The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the

which he

judiciary and the legal profession.

more

laid a long

Somewhat

as a result, bitterly

list

of grievances

at the

doorstep of the

surprisingly (at least to the
contemporary

denounced

in conservative legal
circles as a

'radical'.

This imputation was, of course, unfounded.
Indeed, the essence of Pound's
work

throughout his active

life

was,

I

will argue, quite conservatively
single-minded.

advocated considerable innovation

in all aspects

of the American

legal system,

While he
he did so

only for the sake of preserving those
components of the system which provided the
legal
profession with

its

most powerful privileges

-

especially the

common

law technique and

ideology which entails a peculiarly dominant role
for the judiciary. His clashes with
conservative forces early in his career are best understood
as exhortations by him to a
recalcitrant, parochial

and backwards profession

to adapt

themselves to the changing

social conditions of the early twentieth century, so
as to avoid irrevocable 'damage' in

terms of the loss of power and professional authority.

When Pound
critical

voiced his criticisms of the American legal system in 1906, his

tone reflected a groundswell of popular animosity against the legal
profession.

Lochner had been decided only months

before, aggravating the already considerable public
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resernmen, of the courts'
pers.sten, intervention into
polittcal controversies
on behalfof
.he giant

monopoly

ant, -labor decisions

corporattons.

The LocUner case was

the culmination of a long

hne of

handed down by the United
States Supreme Court over
the two

decades which preceded 1905.
The doctrine of 'freedom of
contract' articulated

in these

cases was the product of an
ideological and discursive
framework from which both state

and federal courts acted
constitutional

to nullify

or ,nvert the punrose of the
post-Civil War, anti-slavery

amendments. Under the rubric of
'substantive due

construed the due process clause of
the Fourteenth

Amendment

process', the courts

so as to protect primarily

the liberties and property of the
giant corporations from regulation
by the government,
rather than for the purpose for
whieh they were enacted, namely, to
protect the newly

enfranchised African-Americans against
discriminatory governmental actions.

The perception of anti-labor
evoked a deep and

bitter

popular reaction which was rcHected

and statements of the Lochner
conflicts

in

between

capital

partisanship on the part of the state and
federal courts

era.

The decade

prior to

1

in the political

documents

905 was marked by repeated

and labor, and the side on which the courts had

allied

those eonflicts seemed 'obvious' to many. Arnold
Paul has depicted the era

themselves

in the

following manner:

The deepening of the depression

in 1894 and early 1895 had intensified the
grievances of Southern and Midwestern farmers, labor
unionists, the unemployed

and partially employed, and thousands of bankrupt and failing
businessmen.
President Cleveland's handling of the financial panic of 18931895. ..and his
vigorous suppression of the Pullman strike had alienated a large
section of the
Democratic party. While the silver miners flooded the country with free-silver
propaganda... both the Populists and the left-wing Democrats gained
strength, the
preparing to capture the Democracy for silver and thoroughgoing
antimonopolism in 1896. Into this seething political scene was thrown the E.C.
Knight opinion emasculating the anti-trust act, the income tax decision, and the
latter
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Debs

ruling.

A

surge of resentment swept
through the nrolostino

r

receiverships and other judicial
devices intcrrcriiig with stale
rceiil
Supreme Court itself had sticctimhcd
to the plutocracy

^.rc the

il'i™,

And

llli’noir

hiltcrly

denounced Cleveland’s intervention
in
n,rp“Tr’
"govcmmcnl by injunction," added the
Supreme
Court
to
the
list of people
nr'l s oppressors and "lackeys
of capitalism " Ho soon hoo.,
!
the most powerful figure in
the Democratic intraparty
connict.
224425)"
'’“‘i

(1%9

The popular resentment aroused by

the /.oc/»,«-era decisions

the judiciary, but extended to
the entire legal profession.
Speaking
in

at

was not

Harvard University

1905, President Roosevelt rclleclcd the
public's attitude toward lawyers:

most mllucntial and most highly remunerated
members of the bar

make

their special task to

it

wealthy

can evade the laws which arc made

the interest of the public the use of
great wealth."

(Quoted

in

spirit

of dumb anger against

all

"Many of the

every center of wealth

work out bold and ingenious schemes by
which

clients, individual or corporate,

producing "a

in

limited to

their

very

to regulate in

Such lawyers, he suggcsicd, were

laws and of disbelief in their efficacy."

Auerbach 1976, 32-33).

Louis Brandcis also was moved to

criticize the social role

being played by the legal

profession. Speaking to Yale law students in
1905, he predicted "a revolt of the people"

the bar did not take stock of the

new

social realities:

For nearly a generation the leaders of the bar with few
exceptions have not only
failed to take part in any constructive legislation
designed to solve in the interest
the people our great social,

likewise to

if

economic and industrial problems, they have failed
oppose legislation prompted by selfish interests.. ..The leaders of the

with rare exceptions, been ranged on the side of the corporations,
and
the people have been represented in the main by men of very
meager legal
bar.. .have,

immense corporate wealth will necessarily develop a hostility from
will come to us unless the excesses of capital arc
curbed. ...There will come a revolt of the people against the capitalists unless
the
ability.. ..The

which much trouble
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of

aspirations of the people
are given

By

legal expression.
(1905,

559-

the turn of the eentury,
the public had succeeded
in identifying the
leaders of

the legal profession as the
proponents
this situation

American

some adequate

- or 'lackeys' -

of the large corporal, ons.
Indeed,

provided the organizing theme for
Jerold Auerbach's inlluemial
study of the

legal profession in

which he observed

that,

*e corporation became the object of public
scrutiny and then the target
of
public hosti hty, as it increasingly
did after the turn of the century,
the new
pro essional elite was vulnerable.
The private corporation, a legal person
entitled
not to be deprived of its liberty or
property without due process of law,
owed
its
legal existence...to the innovative
skills of lawyers and judges.
(1976,
[ojnee

32).

Thorstein Veblen stated bluntly in
1899 that the legal profession was
-'immediately
subservient to ownership and financiering...."
(1899/1934, 231).

seemed

to

And Woodrow Wilson

be merely renecting popular sentiment
when he remarked before the American

Bar Association

m

1910

that "lawyers... have

been sucked into the maelstrom of the new

business system of the country," and that they
had been "intimate counsel in

been going on. The country

has

all that

distrusts every 'corporation lawyer'."
(1910/1983, 174).

Public sentiment against the monopolies and the
law was not only manifested in

growing reform

legislation, but also in

legal profession: an increasing

what Pound perceived

movement toward

as a

more

direct threat to the

the establishment of administrative

agencies. These were legislatively-created bureaus and
agencies, run by the executive

branch of state or federal governments, which sought
abuses of the monopolies.

As

the executive branch

to regulate

some of the

greater

was immediately responsible

for the

enforcement of the policies and regulations of these agencies and commissions, the
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effect

was

,0 by-pass the courts’
usual role in enforcenten,

Much

to

Pound's concern,

this

and adjud, cation of
v.olat.ons of law.

arrangement generally met with
public favor.

Shortly before the Lochner
decision was announced.
Pound wrote

Philosophy of Law?" (1905)

,n

common

We Need a

which he extolled what he
considered the glorious history

of many centuries of
Anglo-American

and struggle, the

"Do

common

law.

law system had succeeded

Pound argued
in

that despite opposition

driving out from the United
States

practically every vestige of the
colonialist French and Spanish
civil law systems, even

entrenching itself in the contents of
all state and federal
constitutions. Indeed, Pound
went
so far

in his

zealous advocacy of the

Constitution contained

English

common

little

of the

would have been new

common

to express certain fears,

power of King James

[common]

law."

to

Lord Coke, the prominent

however, or concerns about the present

law. In a rather strange bit of
historical analysis.

the current hostility towards the law
with
the

law as to suggest that the United
States

law judge of the early seventeenth
century.

Pound did go on
status

that

common

I

its

popularity

by proclaiming the

Pound noted

Pound contrasted

when Coke had attempted

king’s authority to be "under

to curb

God and

that,

[t]oday,/or the first time, the common law finds itself
arrayed against the people;
for the first time, instead of securing for them
what they most prize, they know it'
chiefly as something that continually stands between
them and what they desire. It

cannot be denied that there
system. (1905, 344).

That he could sincerely
that the

the

common

common

is

a growing popular dissatisfaction with the legal

state that this

was

the

first

time

in

Anglo-American history

law was unpopular betrays much of Pound's excessive partisanship

law system and for the

legal profession. But, there
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was perhaps another

for

reason for Pound’s excessive
zeal. That

.s.

Pound secnrs

>o

have at.cnp.ed to reach an

understanding of the nature of the
eontetnporar. Cash of forces.
To large segnrents of the
population, a connict between
capital and labor, or
corporations and the general
public,

was

apparent. And,

it

was

- or so

also the ease

,t

scented

-

that the legal profession,

both bench and bar, was largely
alligned with the fonner and
against the

however, sought
In other

to restate the conllicl as a
clash

words. Pound attempted

handmaiden

was

to the

common

He

of the increasing public

portrayed the legal profession, not
as a

to corporate wealth, but as
independent professionals

common

law. In so doing.

Pound

between the public and the conunon
law.

to recharacterize the nature

animosity toward the legal system.

latter.

Pound sought

law tradition which might explain the

whose only

allegiance

to discover those factors within
the

fact that,/o/- ihe first time, the

common

law had incurred the wrath of the general
public.
In the

causing the

1905

article,

common

Pound presented

law's unpopularity

was

the hypothesis that the current deficiency

its

proclivity for attending to rights of

individuals at the expense of those of soeiety. This
theme of a conHict between things
individual and things 'social'

was

to

become one of the fundamental elements of his

critique of the existing legal system, and also another

of his era

in non-political

and non-cconomic fashion.

way of restating

the basic conflicts

In this early statement

of the

problem, he wrote: "No amount of admiration for our traditional system
should blind us
the obvious fact that

for the

it

exhibits too great a respect for the individual.. .and too

needs of society, when they come

with the present age." (1905, 344).

To

in conflict

respect

with the individual, to be in touch

illustrate his point
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little

Pound

to

referred directly to the

rash of cases in which
state and federal courts,
pursuant to their powers of
'judicial

review, had struck down and
nullified pro-labor legislative
enactments. Alluding

to

freedom of contract' and similar
doctrines he wrote;

are

common-law

soetety and the
gislation

IS

doctrines.

common

And

this

means

that a struggle is n
p

law; for the judicial

m the nght line of common law ideas.

It is

a plain consequence of the

doctnne of the supremacy of law, and
has developed from a
run back to Magna Carta.
(1905, 345).

However,
not simply pride

it

seems

that

m Anglo-Saxon traditions, but a concern

hands of the

common

law

this regard.

and reason

common

is

the law,"

Pound hoped

in favor

law would allow

Pound observed

that the

common

and loyalty

it

common

of individualism.

to liberalize

its

own

that the

that this

movement toward

in the

the ability of the

He

believed that the

doctrines from within. In

law's "cardinal doctrine

meaning

law was

to the

law system maintained

Pound consistently advocated

own imbalance

to correct its

of the

fiexibility

position.

legal profession. Therefore,

common

for,

of precedents
preceaents mat
that

line

what lay behind Pound's defense of the

extraordinary privileges and powers which
the

^

oLts

power over unconstitutaal

law would inevitably adapt

is

that

law

itself to the

is

reason

reasonable

the 'rational' could be helped along

through the enlightenment of a new generation of lawyers,
coming from progressivelyoriented law schools,

who would

lead the

common

law

to "a

more even balance between

individualism and soeialism."

Three points from the foregoing deserve special note as they mark the contours
of

Pound

s

basic position,

the legal profession,

first.

whose

Pound's devotion to the

privileges

it

'traditions'

justified; second, his
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of the

common

law and

to

concerns for the present state

of the contnton law denved fro™
confliet

between

common

h.s

percephon of the struggles of
the

law traditions and the
legislative enactments
favored by the

public at large; third, Pound's
confidence that the bulk of the

be maintained
take a

more

if.

t.nres as involv.ng

common

law privileges could

through the law schools, the
legal profession could
be re-educated

to

flexible and 'rational' approach
to the popular social
reform legislation.

In the following year, in the

delivered his.

now famous,

Association.

When

midst of the furor over the
Lochner decision, Pound

address before the national convention
of the American Bar

placed in the context of the pervasive
acrimony of the times, his

observations and conclusions seem rather
moderate

m tone:

"we must not be

deceived...into overlooking or underrating
the real and serious dissatisfaction
with the

courts and lack of respect for law which
exists in the United States
today....Courts are
distrusted,

and executive boards and commissions with
summary and plenary powers,

freed, so far as constitutions will permit,

(

from judicial review, have become the fashion."

1906 730 ).
,

This

much was

hardly deniable; nevertheless. Pound incurred
the enmity of many

conservatives within the profession by placing the
blame for the situation largely on the
courts and the judicial process.

To

support his position. Pound cited sixteen separate

causes for the unpopularity of the legal system.

themes thi-oughout

Of these,

several were to

his long career: the transition to an 'age

common
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staple

of legislation'; the mechanical

operation of rules of law; the unduly individualist bias of the
law's proclivity for contentious procedure; the

become

common

law; the

common

law doctrine of the supremacy of

law; .he lack of general
,deas and of legal philosophy,
which

American law; and

The

"so characteristic of
Anglo-

the defects of case-made
law." (1906, 731-749).

point

ftrst

,s

was

reflected in Pound's fear

of the encroachment of
administrative

agencies on the courts' prerogatives.
The second point was an
expression of Pound's vtew
that

one of the inevitable drawbacks

mechanical
will

mode of decision which

be more or

were

identified

Certainly,

system

m

it

less material in

by Pound

was

to

uniform application of rules of
law was a

could "never entirely avoid
eliminating factors which

some

particular controversy."

as long-standing attributes of
the

not Pound's intention to attempt
to discredit or

of his entire career could be summarized
as the search

common

law prerogatives

in the face

for

five points

weaken

On

means

of threats

to

the

common

were those Pound

felt

most

in

need of attention

in

to preserve as

it

much

from the previous year,

yet,

as

from the legislature

order for the

common

law

withstand the tide of popular resentment against
the courts. Several had appeared
article

law

the contrary, the essence

and from the burgeoning number of
quasi-judicial administrative agencies.
These
then,

all

Anglo-American common law.

favor of continental civil law, or
any other system.

possible of the

The remaining

points,

to

in his

because of their perceived importance, were reiterated

and elaborated upon here.
In regard to the final point noted above, the
defects

was able

to appreciate

Suffice

it

to

how

its

shortcomings appeared

of a case-law system. Pound

to the public:

say that the want of certainty, confusion, and incompleteness
inherent

and the waste of labor entailed by the prodigious bulk to which
ours has attained, appeal strongly to the layman. The compensating
advantages of
this system, as seen by the lawyer.. .are not apparent to him.
What he sees is
another phase of the great game; a citation match between counsel, with
a
in all case-law,
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certainly that diligence can
rake up a decision
conceivable proposition.
(1906, 741.

somewhere in support ofauv
Emphasis in original).

Interestingly, however.

means of aiding

Pound seemed amenable

to

some forms ofeodincation

the courts out of their
self-created morass of eonllietmg,
overlapping and

obscure 'precedents-. While he
eschewed codiDcation of the
the judiciary of the

power

at

in the

United States as a means,

first,

it

statutory

of ridding the

inevitably develops within

second, of providing "fresh starting-points"
from which judges and lawyers

could begin to create entire

Pound closed

his

new

bodies of ease-law.

1906 address with an exhortation to the
bar associations to throw

off their "yoke of commercialism" and
to revive
in the scientific

faith

and pride

accomplishments of American law schools.

in their

professionalism and

In the context

of the great

rifts

society between the monopolies on the one
hand and the factory workers and farmers

on the other, Pound urged the bar
pride from the "spirit of the

considered by

many

of his work was
to

law type which deprives

law, he lauded the efforts

law of the grosser anachronisms
and inconsistencies

Itself and,

in

civil

new

to create

systemization of law then current

common

as a

to

adopt an

common

law."

air

Perhaps

conservatives as a radical

to seek

only those changes

enable the judiciary and bar

to

of independent professionalism, deriving

critic.

in the

it

was

for this reason

he was

But, as suggested above, the essence

common

law system as were necessary

maintain the great privileges and powers they exercised

by means of it.

Pound urged continued
legal profession

faith in

eommon

law traditions and renewed efforts by the

and the law schools as the means of deliverance from social

impending upon the

legal system.

He

crisis

repeatedly stressed his belief that the key to a
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permanent resolution of the connict
with the pubhc

of lawyers

in

a

new

legal

philosophy and improved judieial
methods.

What, then, did Pound propose
the profession? Initially,

lay in re-educat,„g the
next generation

two

things:

to offer in the

first,

way of new

ideas and materials for

the introduction of concepts
and techniques

which had recently been developed
by jurists of the

civil

law countries

to

meet similar

problems; and, second, the benefit
of the insights and ideas of the
social sciences and of
social philosophy

which Pound perceived

to

be

in

advance of the jurists

in their

understanding of the conditions of the
twentieth century. While certainly
familiar with
their leading conceptions, Pound's

have had any direct impact on
pragmatism. Rather, Pound's

knowledge of the

his philosophy

social sciences does not appear
to

of law, save perhaps

to lead

real distinction lay in his
extraordinarily

him

to

embrace

broad knowledge of

the history of law and legal philosophy,
not only of England and the United
States, but of
the European continent as well.

due

to his grasp

The

great advantage he held over his
contemporaries

of the entire history of Anglo-American law, not
only

context of the parallel history of the

eivil law.

what respects the American system might

From

this perspective.

benefit from the use

in itself,

was

but in the

Pound could see

in

of ideas, methods and

practices of the continent.

By

1908, however, Pound had

jurisprudence', and

become

a strong proponent of 'sociological

by 1912 he had advanced a version of 'interest

understanding law as a type of 'social engineering'. Indeed,

understood his

life's

work

to

it

theory' as the basis for

would seem

that

Pound

be the refashioning of these various sources into instruments
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for the use

legal

of the Anrericau

legal profession to

system and thereby preserve
the
In his early

enhance the delivery ofjustiee
within the

bar’s status

and authority.

work. Pound identified the
key problem of the

common

nievitable tendency to construe
legal controversies as
questions of
liberties, rather

than as social problems.

the "socialization of the

common

fact that

and the social sciences

,t

its

v,V/,m/ rights

correct this troublesome bias.

and

Pound urged

law." Indeed, throughout
his early work.

displayed a recognition of the

in that

To

law as

Pound

American jurisprudence lagged behind
philosophy

had no. reformulated

its

premises

in

accordance with the

general shift from the individual to
the social as the focus of
theoretical inquiry and
explanation. These

new developments

in the social sciences led to

an attack on the natural

law explanations which had deduced
social standards from axioms
developed through
consideration of hypothetical, abstract
individuals supposed to live prior
actual societies

pragmatism as

human conduct

-

that

part

is,

social contract theory.

[t]he sociological

on abstract

first

or outside of

Pound recognized philosophic

of this general movement and praised

rather than

to,

principles.

To

its

proposal to focus on actual

this end,

he observed

that,

movement

in jurisprudence is a movement for
pragmatism as a
philosophy of law; for the adjustment of principles
and doctrines to the human
conditions they are to govern rather than to assumed
first principles;

the

human

factor

m the central place and

for putting

relegating logic to

its

true position as an

instrument. (1908a, 609-610).

Along these same

lines,

Pound condemned

the "liberty of contract" doctrine and

other such rationales used by the courts against labor
legislation as the unfortunate result

of a jurisprudence of abstractions." Criticizing
decisions.

Pound borrowed

their strained rationales for pro-business

the phrase 'mechanical jurisprudence' from
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Rudolph von

Jhenng. ,he German .heons,
of sociologica. jurisprudence.
Pound ridiculed wha, he called
the 'philosophical' approach
to junsprudence wh.ch
"divorced .he juris, from .he
ac.ual

of today, and

that entertained an

image of the

ideal

judge as one

who was

life

translated to a

heaven of juristic conceptions
and seated before a machine
which brought out of each
conception

results...."

its

nine hundred and ninety-nine
thousand nine hundred and
ninety-nine logical

(1921a, 205).

Pound observed

American judges of the end of the
of rights and

liberty

of contract

last

that "[s]uch jurists

century

in the face

who

insisted

of notorious

have

upon a

social

their counterparts in

legal theoty

and economic

of equality

facts.

On

the

other hand, the conception of law
as a means towards social
ends, the doctrine that law
exists to secure interests requires
the jurist to

keep

in

touch with

life."

Borrowing heavily from Rudolf von Jhering,
Pound theorized

(1921a, 205).

that the starting

point for reasoning on legal problems
should be shifted from 'abstract'
doctrines on the

nghts and freedoms of individuals,
problem. That

is.

Pound saw

to the 'concrete' interests

of society

demanded by

Individual interests are

by, or

was devoted
competing

by

means by

to the concrete,

human

sociological jurisprudence.

For Pound, interests were

made

stake in the

Jhering's concept of the social interest
as the

which discussion of legal controversies could be
brought down
level

at

to

be defined as demands, or wants, or claims.

demands made by

individuals, and social interests are

virtue of involvement in, society.

to presenting

for recognition

Much

of Pound's work,

it

demands

would seem.

an interpretation of legal history as the interplay of interests

and satisfaction under the guise of various

legal doctrines.

am content to think of law as a social institution to satisfy social wants — the
claims and demands and expectations involved in the existence of civilized
society
I
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—

hy giving

cl Icct 1o as

much

as

we

imiy with

llic least s'icri Hr,*

i;

l’cc'^'“inr'uur«^^

iiUiot,

moic

The

It,

himtat,

enjoyment of the goods ofexislenee

cdicacioiis social engineering.

tasks.

Ilis

l'<>nmiltiling policy;

he

is

lo

make

'

was

part ol his attempt to

and responsihilily ol

dial a

that the

decision, even

do suhconsciously, wlien

claims ofthe parlies as individual human claims,

under generalized claims involved
Irame a precept or

interests that

llie

jutlicial

common

to

eoulinne to

provide the

Amencan

process, taking into

law judge

lor

judge nuisl consider social

Taels if

balancing or weighing ofeonnicting inlerests
was usually

dynamic orjudicial

(hat wlial courls

lo

enough

policy edeelively and conseienlioiisly.

(he underlying

endeavor

eonlinu-dlv
^

ofthe judge with theory,

the judiciary strong

and secondly, emphasi/ing

Pound Iheorized

suhmK

role

new concept of the workings oflhe

ol all, the activity

lirsl

make

theory orinleresis

legal prolession will, a

accoiinl,

in shotl,’ a

1922/1955, 47).

conunnn law law-making

Icchnitptes and materials that
wonl.l

its

-

esse, tee, then, ofl-onturs
tnlellcelnal career can he
ntulersloo.l as an alletnpl

to reinroree the peculiar

perlorm

(

wc may

when

the judge

was unaware

(liey are al their best, is to

to

subsume

in life in civilized

society

ofit:

"1

generalize the

the claims so generalized

in

the time and place, and

state a principle that will secure the

most of those social

with the least sacrillce." (1923, 955).

I\)und proposed that the judge Irankly acknowledge his law-making
capacity and
that ideally

he should address himselfto the underlying interests

decision.
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in a Idur-step

process of

(I) the interests

cTned

which the law may be

recognized and to what extent,
(3) the means by which the law

^763)'^
(191
That

is.

"

Pound believed

''mi'ations

that interests

may

secure

tire

effective legal action.

were discovered by the judge or
Jurist, not created

by them. The existence of interests
was taken by Pound
thejudicial process.

upon

The jurist simply

as the objective starting
point for

•catalogued’ the interest he found;
the judge simply

rccogntzed' which interest were
competing in the case then before him.
Ironically,
respect. Pound's theoty

criticized, those

who

was not

all

that dissimilar

from

that

in this

of the classical theorists he

understood thejudicial role as discovering
a pre-existing law or

source of law.

In 191

entitled

1

and 1912, Pound published a

series

of articles

in the

"The Scope and Purpose of Sociological
Jurisprudence."

Harvard Law Review,

In these articles, he

praised Jhering for his contribution to the
development of a sociological school of legal

philosophy by being the

first to

conceive of legal developments and institutions
as the

products of social rather than individualistic forces.
The articles also reviewed the history

of sociological-philosophical theories generally from
to the date

their inception

under August Comte

of Pound's writing. Pound identified "mechanistic,"
"biological," "economic,"

and "psychological" stages of the development of sociological
sociological philosophies had in

common was

that, as

theories.

What

these

distinguished from the classical

philosophies which had centered on individualist conceptions, they
attributed the leading
role in explaining and justifying history and social institutions
to various forms of social

forces or social causes.
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In 1921. addressing

himself ,o professional sociologists.
Pound observed:

This address identified a turn

from social psychology,

in

Pound's thought that had begun
some years before; a tun,

instincts

and the behaviorial sciences
generally, and toward a

reconceptualized notion of social interests.
The turn was prompted, in large part

it

seem, by the influence of American
pragmatism, and the work of William
James

in

By

particular.

of law as

191 3,

Pound had published

his first statement

would

of this view of the foundation

"interests" defined as 'demands'
or 'claims'.

[UJsmg

interest to

mean

a claim which a human being or
a group of human beings
,t is convenient to speak
of individual interests, public interests,
that is
interests of the state as a juristic
person, and social interests, that is

may make

community
Yet,

interests

at large.

Pound was not always

literally; that is, as

of the

(1913, 755).

demands 'made

clear whether social interests

were

to

be construed

by' society, as though society possessed
a certain

agency. Indeed, in later years he would qualify
and reformulate

this conception.

A

characteristically ambivalent formulation appeared
in his 1921 article; there, he suggested
that

the interests

individual

human

group as such

which the

legal order secures

may be

claims or wants or demands of

beings immediately as such [individual

[social interests]." (1921b, 241).

theory of social interests,

Pound attempted

at this time,

interests]. ..or

And, just as

was heavily indebted

to distinguish

of the whole social

clearly, his formulation

to the

of a

work of William James.

himself from the nineteenth century schools of

jurisprudence by denouncing their rigid, "mechanical" conceptualism. Rather, he
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advocated a jurisprudence whose
principal commitment would
be

to the justness

of the

concrete results achieved rather
than to the logical rigor of
the form of decision.
In

announcing a

shift in priorities to the
concrete', the 'human', the
results

experiences', and

away from

the 'logical', the

echoed the themes of his contemporaries
Indeed, in his 1908
sociological

article,

movement

'.deal',

and the

of 'actual

'abstract individual',

in the philosophical

world

-

Pound

the pragmatists.

"Mechanical Jurisprudence," Pound
announced that "[t]he

in jurisprudence is a

movement

for

pragmatism as a philosophy of

law." (1908a, 609).

Although Pound had attempted

to give his theory

of interests a strong

philosophical grounding by borrowing
heavily from James' work, there were,
nevertheless

senous conceptual weaknesses. For example,
Pound's understanding of interests lacked

any significant analysis or discussion of the
concrete
sees

interrelations

among

One

interests.

m Pound the presumption that regardless of their objects, all claims are

to

be equally

taken into account. The 'weight' assigned to
an interest depends not on the nature of its
object, but

on the extent

to

which

dispositions of the case at hand.

case

at

hand

is

Only

as

it

would be

affected

must be decided

by

alternative

for the particularities

of the

there consideration of the concrete interrelations of
the posited interests.

Pound did give some

historical analysis

interests, in his theory

Pound

that objective

of the origin and evolution of various social

of the stages of legal development. However,

it

seems clear

that

consistently failed to take an identifiable position as to what social
forces, groups,

or interests are fundamental to legal and social development. In

fact.

Pound

criticized the

'philosophical jurists' for attempting to assign intrinsic value to various interests in order to
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clUummc which were

the

weighing „r interests was

I•n.ther, l-„uncfs

interest

in.txxssible

its

ideals' accord,

which they were weighed.

ng

,|,e,n as pa,-,s

individual

tnost part, the contents of each

eompanment and

compartment were

called

ro,tl,

is,

tavored.

there

Any

was no provision
interest,

of how unworthy
deeply

its

for evaluating

so long as

ohjeetives

it

existed,

may have

critical ol legal |,hilosophies ba.sed

ol abstract

to

was

been.

on

eompartinent

Yet, for tbe

in

gmund of evaluation. As

favor of ex/.vh,,^, interests.

interests shonht be

credited with value in

As

i|,a|

promoted or
favor, regardless

its

a consequence, although

'absirael concepts', or

on the

Pound was

abstract rights

men, he made the analogous mistake of founding
jnrispriidence on

atomized claims or

one

treated as scpai ate but equal,
at least

be a bias

what

IVon,

to the ease a, bar.

equal in the sense that each was
equally legitimate as a possible

an extension of this, for l•ound, there
seemed

Iron,

of an overall strueUue of society,
liaeh

only when .ecognized by the j.nisl
as having applicability

That

any such absolute

tendency was towards eoneeptnal
isolation ofin, crests

as opposed to nnifying

was assigned

Instead, I>ouiul argued
(hat

because ofthe continually
tluCuating urgency of

and tluelualion of, he received

interests,

attothe,-,

more imporlanl.

abstract,

interests.

Pound's Interest Theory as Apology for Jndieial Lan'-Makinf>

Beyond

the signilieant induenee of William .lames' work,

heavily inllucneed by the work ofthe

German jurist Rudolf von

especially indebted to .Ihcring's view ol law as a scll-eonscious
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Roseoc Pound was also

.Ihering.

human

Pound was

product; a view

that, in

Pound's eyes, distinguished
Jhering from the historical
school of law and from

what Pound characterized

as "Nineteenth Century
Jurisprudence."

Nevertheless, Pound

was

of Jhering's emphasis on

critical

legislation

legislatively-created administrative
agencies as the definitive forms
of

administration of justice. This
tendeney

in

and on

law-making and the

Jhering conllicted with
Pound's desire to

preserve and strengthen the
law-making powers which the courts
and legal profession of
the United States had seized
early in the nineteenth century.
Accordingly,

m redirecting the course of interest theory into a
power of the common law
into a generalized theory

courts.

Pound's purpose was,

of law-making

equal partners with legislatures

justification

in

in effect, to

adapt interest theory

law-making

and

to institute various

worked

to

the

the

1

800s,

the British inheritance of common
law

forms of legislative codification. The historical
school, however,

conceal the fact of judicial legislation, by
recourse to the fiction that judges

merely discover and apply a pre-existing,
contended

virtually co-

capacities.

American courts had made law, with some
enthusiasm, throughout

away with

assisted

of a plenary, quasi-legislative

which the courts were placed as

in their authoritative,

despite sporadic popular efforts to do

Pound

that

Lochner

albeit unwritten, law.

such dissimulation was no longer possible

line

of decisions. The

had become obvious

to

political, partisan,

Pound, on the other hand,

in light

law-making

of the public's reaction
activity

of the courts

broad sectors of an increasingly hostile public. As Pound

observed,

we have

a great deal oifreie rechtsfmdung in America, while disclaiming
theory, and that too in a way that is unhappily destructive of
certainty and

it

in

uniformity. Not only do lawyers and law-writers perceive this situation,
but it is
to be understood, in an age of publicity, by the public at large.
Necessary

coming
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to

.he endeavor .o secure
in pracice a
freeJorn^fluTcTaTIcl’^n^ZZc^L^d
ii^eacu
theory, is a prime cause.
(1908b, 407).

Of course Pound

did not wish to strip or limit
the court's powers.

he wished to foster and popularize
the
that for this puipose, the
best course

the courts

were making laws, and

were more or
writings.

less

Pound

to

"spirit

was

of the

common

to forthrightly

go on

to

defend and justify

insisted that throughout history,
systems

of the "imperative"

for

that activity as

example, even

of the specially trained

and lawyers. (1915, 353). This

is

fell

though

it

in his earliest

of law have contained alongside

(legislative) element, an equally
essential "traditional”

to another

Pound

to the public that

element which

consists of a heritage of customary
practices and accepted concepts
passed

one generation

the contrary,

law." Therefore,

acknowledge

normal and universally accepted.
Thus,

On

m
iT'

legal professionals; that

down from

is,

the judges

but one example of many theoretical
constructs in

Pound's work which seek to establish judicial
law-making as a nomi. Pound recognized
that if

American jurists did not acknowledge and seek

were wielding, the public might come

to justify the great

to feel that the courts

making powers which properly belonged

powers judges

had suddenly usurped the law-

to the people’s elected representatives in
the

legislatures. (1915, 358).

The

legal profession,

by and

large, eventually agreed with

Pound's assessment of

public sentiment and began acknowledging and rationalizing
the extraordinary powers

wielded by American judges. But, there was
justify such powers. Indeed, this theoretical

little

agreement as

to

what theory could

problem has remained a continuing source of
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crisis (actual or potential),
for the jud.ciary

and legal profess, on. From
Pound's t,me

present day, American
jurisprudence has focused

to the

attention quite disproportionately
on

its

attempting to ra.ional.^e the
role of the judge.” Pound
attempted to accomplish the
task

of justification of judicial power
through recourse

According
interests

to

Pound, the

competing therein and

first

to

task

to his interest theory

of the judge

of law.

deciding a case

in

is

to identify the

decide which of them merit
recognition. At

preliminary stage, Pound believed
the judge should have
(as reasonably possible) of all
the various interests that

at his

this

disposal a complete listing

have been recognized

in prior

decisions, statutes and other legal
authorities, that have warranted
legal protection.

While
of courts,

this

manner of identifying

statute books, legal authorities,

sociological.

and so

-

that

forth

is.

by culling from actual decisions

- seems highly juristic and

Pound believed he was justified and perhaps
compelled

method because of the
'instincts'

interests

lack of agreement

among

non-

to resort to this

social scientists as to the nature

of

or any of the other 'social forces' that were
being proposed as explanations of

social institutions

and arrangements. His argument was, as follows:

There remains a method,

may

yet yield

less pretentious [than

more enduring

basing interests on instincts], that

Legal phenomena are social
phenomena.... Why should not the lawyer make a survey
of legal systems in order
to ascertain just what claims or wants or demands
have pressed or are now
pressing for recognition and satisfaction and how far they
have been or
results.

are
precisely what has been done in the case of
individual interests, although the process has been concealed
by a pretentious

recognized or secured? This
fabric

is

of logical deduction. The same method

may be

applied to social interests.

For example, H.L.A. Hart has observed that, "I confess I find myself strongly
inclined
...to characterize American jurisprudence...
telling
you
in
unqualified
terms that it is
by
marked by a concentration, almost to the point of obsession, on the judicial process "
(Hart 1983, 123).
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jnuyim

stoulcl be clone
conseiously...wilhonl

OCconrse, iflhc

interests,

were derived exelnsively

which were
Iron, past

evaluation toward maintaining

tlic

any cover of melaphysies or

to serve as the p, in, ary

logie.

determinants ofevalnation,

or present law, the,e was an
inherent prejndiee

,n

status quo.^^’

I'onnd classilled interests into
llnec categories ordemands:
pnhlic, social and
individual.

lor

The

llrsl

example, laws

of these, public

interests,

for collecting taxes

involved interests of the stale as
an entity;

and against the hrihing of pnhlic

were those "demands or desires involved
immediately

interests

asserted in

title

oflhat

life."

(l-ound Ih43, 2).

As

ofllcials.

Individiia

in the individual

for social interests, the

hfc and

most sign.llcant

category. Pound held that there were
basically six, with several sub-headings
under each.

Pound's

riillcsl

which he

discussion

came

in his

1921 article,

"A Theory of,Social

Interests," in

identified the lundamental social interests to
he: in the general security, in the

security of social mslilulions, in Ihc general
morals, in Ihc conservation of .social

resources, in general progress, and

I

in

the individual

laving determined what interests are

at

life.

(1921b, 243-245).

play and competing

are important for recognition, the judge must next decide

one against the

other.

I

hat

is,

the Judge

how

Pound

criticized the efforts

weigh the several

36

in

of his predecessors: "Social

interests in terms

halance the

must decide what principle

dcteimine their relative weights, and which should give way
point.

to

in the case,

to

interests,

in

order to

case ofconllict.

utilitarians

of the end of law. But have

we any

This was a point made early on by ITlwin Patterson (1947, 566-567).
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apply

and which

would

On
say,

given to us

this

absolutely?" (1922/1954,
46). Rather, Pound had
observed that philosophical
and juristic
ideas of the purposes of
law had varied widely from
place to place, and from one
era to

the next. Therefore, he
rejected the attempt to
’pre-value' interests as an
unwarranted

reversion to the absolutism of
natural law theories. Instead,
Pound maintained that there

must be a new valuation, or weighing,
from case

to case.

observed that "[p]hilosophical jurists
have labored
the intrinsic importance of various
interests.

whereby we may be assured

In an article

from 1913, Pound

reduce some method of getting

to

They have sought

for

some

that the weightier interest
intrinsically

at

absolute formula

should prevail.

1

do

not believe in such attempts for a
moment." (1913, 765). Nevertheless, Pound
did

advance two principles

that should

be followed

in the

evaluation process:

The

first is that individual interests
are to be secured by law only
because and to
the extent that they are social interests.
There is a social interest in securing
in ividual interests so far as securing
them conduces to general security, the
security of social institutions, and the
individual moral and social life. Hence
while
individual interests are one thing and social
interests are another, the law, as I have
said, secures individual interests because
of a social interest in so doing. No
individual, therefore, may claim to be secured
in an interest that conflicts with any
social interest unless he can show some
countervailing social interest in so securing

him-some
conflicts.

social interest to

The second

outweigh

principle

is,

with which his individual interest
at all times the greatest number of

that

secure

interests possible, with the least possible sacrifice

change

in their incidents, in their intensity,

of other

and even

interests. Interests

very nature. Hence
such a principle recognizes that there can be no final
work on any point of the law.
The legal system must be kept flexible and law-making must
accommodate
in their

itself

perennially to shiftings in the quantity and quality of the interest

it

has to meet

(1913,755-756).
Finally, according to Pound, the three categories of interests

exclusive. That

restated in the

is.

were not mutually

Pound's view was that any public and any individual interest could be

form of a social

interest.

In

some

simply generalized statements of individual

sense, he considered social interests to be

interest.
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For example, an individual's personal

.nteres, ,n his property
could also

be looked

the security of acquisitions.
Moreover,
interests should only

be protected

at

from the standpo.nt of the
soc.al mterest

Pound urged

that, in

most cases, individual

if restated as social
interests.

And, Pound warned

the intrinsic preference of the
legal system for social interests
over individual ones

m the weighing or balancing of interests in a given

such that

compare against each other only

interests in the

by our very way of putting

it."

(1921b,

to serve well

we must

"If we put

we may decide

that

was

be careful to

one as an

the question in advance

2).

Pound's theory of judicial decision as
consisting

seemed

case,

same category:

individual interest and the other as a
soc.al interest

in

two of his highest

priorities: It

in a free balancing

of interests

explained the failures of the

absolutistic theones to be adequate to the
task of coping with the conflicting
forces that

the contemporary courts were ever

acknowledgment

to the public

more compelled

of what

many

to handle; and,

already

knew -

it

contained an

that the courts

were actively

and consciously making laws.

However, Pound's theory simultaneously created a dilemma
which has
continuously plagued
decision

lie

is

statute,

how

is,

if the ultimate

to

how

can one

know whether

ground of

one's legal rights will be respected?

can one anticipate what interests a judge will deem to

precedent or

deem them

That

not strictly legal rules or rights, but the interests which the
judge supposes to

behind those mles,

Moreover,

modem American jurisprudence.

right,

;

how

be involved and

in

lie

behind any given

strongly he will evaluate them; or, to what extent he will

need of protection under the circumstances of the given
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case? Indeed, the whole
nc.on of a

'rule

of laW seems threatened by
Pound’s theory of

interests.

Further. Pound's

revised

And,

it.

it

was

list

of interests was highly speculative;

clear that the catalog

were the most important

in fact,

of interests was only

interests represented

and protected

he periodieally

hts opinion as to

in the

what

thousands upon

thousands of volumes of decistons,
statutes and commentaries
from which he abstracted
them.

One of Pound's
To be

harshest critics on this point

was Karl Llewellyn, who observed:

we do not know what interests are. Hence,
behind
we now have interests [which] we need not
check

sure,

rights

substantive

against anything at

all
and about whose presence, extent, nature
and importance, whether the interests
be
taken absolutely or taken relatively
to one another, no two of us
seem able

to

agree. (1930, 435).

Llewellyn concluded sarcastically, "[t]he

scientific

advance should.. .be obvious. Complete

subjectivity has been achieved."
(1930, 435).

While Llewellyn’s criticisms were sharp and

to the point,

he was hardly alone

in his

negative assessment of Pound's reliance on a theory
of interests as the ground for judicial
decision.

Many

of the charges are familiar ones, yet

distrust judicial activism:

still

have resonance for those

what justification does a judge have

in

who

assuming the authority

to

reformulate legal rules according to a purely subjective interpretation
of the interests

claimed

to lie

behind the rules? What control does the public have over the enormous

freedom of the judges

to 'reinterpret' the

law?

And

so on. Walter Kennedy, a

conservative Catholic jurist was quick to assail Pound's work, noting that
suffice to shuffle the

as

many

as

we

can

mass of wants and claims

in so far as

harmony

does not

into a confused pile and then give effect to

will permit."
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"[i]t

(Kennedy 1925,

71).

Nor could

Pound

find theoretical refuge

demands seemed

to provide

demands were equally

among

no basis

friends;

William James' theory of
interests as

for ranking

one abstract demand above
another

valuable. Pound's attempt
to

depan from the

trad.t.ona,

-

all

view of the

judge's function as the
impartial discovety and
application of existing law
created the basis
for

what H.L.A. Hart would characterize

that the traditional

image of the

from the highly politicized
expectations which

it

politically neutral

legislator,

incites are

as the "nightmare" of
American jurisprudence:

was

doomed

little

and objective judge, as distinguished

more than "an

illusion,

and that the

to disappointment...always...[or]

very

frequently.- (Hart 1983, 126).
For Hart, this judicial arrogation
of legislative powers

suggested "a cynical interpretation of de
Toequeville's observation that
in the

United States sooner or

later

become judicial

political questions

questions." (1983, 126).

Nonetheless, Pound was himself well aware
of the inadequacies of this early
attempts

at interest

balancing. Therefore,

we

find in Pound's

work supplemental

conceptions with which he proposed as theoretical
limitations to the extreme expansion of
judicial

powers suggested by

Kantian approach

to the evaluation

notion that the judge

civilization,

his conception of interests. Turning

is

from James' neo-

of desires. Pound ultimately advanced a neo-Hegelian

guided and restrained by certain

and by "received ideals" of the

"jural postulates"

legal profession.

The jural

of his society or

postulates of the

time and place, a conception Pound borrowed directly from
Josef Kohler, served

to play a

stabilizing role for Pound's theory of judicial decision

the judge

IS

guided by legal standards

may

by helping

in his empirical search for

new

to explain

rules of law,

how

even though he

not base the decision directly on established rules of law. Following Kohler,
Pound
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attempted to show that adjudication
was not merely a matter of arb.trary
or idiosyncrat.c
personal construction. In a
passage from Kohler that Pound
often referred

makes

this point

more

g.

the former

clear.

WWl!™’''
lie we had come

who made history
fficient

to,

*e sociological
to the conviction that

it

was not

but the totality of the peoples,
in law-making

only the person of the law-maker.

aw-maker

signifteance of
the individual

we

recognized as

We overlooked completely that the

is the man of his time,
thoroughly saturated with the thoughts
of his
time, thoroughly filled with the
culture that surrounds him, that
he works with the
views and conceptions which are drawn
from his sphere of culture,

that

r

history behind

he speaks

them and whose meanings were

nr'ii!
Ihe sociological process of a
thousand years oflinguistic development,
and
no hrough the personality of the
individuaI....Hence the principle; rules
of law are
not to be interpreted according to the
thought and

will of the law-maker, but are
be interpreted sociologically, they are
to be interpreted as products of
the whole
people, whose organ the law-maker has
become. (Kohler

to

1921, 187-189).

Jural postulates, then,

were certain general underlying presuppositions
which were

unstated, unformulated and perhaps quite
unconsciously entertained

by

a society's legal

system. Although they were unformulated until
brought to light by the perceptive jurist,

they were firmly embedded, in fact presupposed, in
the theory and practice of a given
society's

system of law. According

postulates

was

"to formulate

to

Pound, the purpose

in formulating the jural

what was presupposed by the law

as to possession, as to

property, as to legal transactions and resulting relations, and as
to wrongs." (1942, 113).

As

distinguished from the absolute principles set forth by various natural law
theories.

Pound characterized jural
from one society

postulates as being temporally and culturally contingent, varying

to another

and also from one era

to another within a

given society. Yet,

because the changes in jural postulates would develop gradually, they served
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to

provide a

desirable blend of stability
and eont, nutty.

which a judge could value

As

a eonsequence, they
provided the

conflict, ng interests

Another means by which Pound
sought
subjectivity

was through

his identification

(Pound 1923, 953). According
judges have

in

mind regarding

to

method by

and decide whieh to reeogntze.
to

assuage fears of radical judicial

of the "received ideals" of a
given legal order.

Pound, received ideals were
idealized pictures

that

the general nature and
puqioses of the legal system or of

principles and standards of law. In
part, the received ideals are
coincident with legal

philosophy, so

that, for

example, adherents of the "nineteenth
century school" of

jurisprudence entertained received ideals
of the purpose of law as consisting in
the

maximization of liberties of individual human
beings considered

in the abstract.

They

entertained ideals of the nature of the judicial
function as a purely passive 'discovering'
of
pre-existing precepts. But, according to Pound,
received ideals undergo development just
as

any other part of the

legal system,

nineteenth century notions with the

wherein the judge
engineer

who

is

and he hoped

new

no longer engaged

actively develops

new

to supplant the

ideals represented

govern

and should be consciously used
ideals

have acquired a certain

of the law quite as much as

and

in the process

of decision.

fixity in the judicial

becomes a

modem

For Pound, the received ideals were part of the law

outdated

by sociological jurisprudence,

in passive discovery, but

rules to help

now

itself,

He

'social

society.

not merely adjuncts to

noted

that,

it,

”[w]hen such

and professional tradition they are part

legal precepts. Indeed, they give the latter their living content

in all difficult cases are the ultimate basis

jural postulates, the received ideals

of ..decision." (1923, 654). Moreover,

change from era
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to era,

and from place

to place.

like

depending on the peculiar

social experiences

of the t.me. But, according
to Pound,

received ideals are occasionally
altered wuhin a given era;
hence, they are not to be

understood as

static

conceptions like those of the
'nineteenth century school' or
natural

law theory. Rather, they anse from
within
It.

legal experience itself,

and are not external

Nevertheless, they provide a necessary
measure of stability in that they
remain

most

part, constant within a

Pound hoped

to explain

given era. Thus, by means of the
concept of 'received

how

stability

and

reliability

,

to

for the

ideals'.

could be maintained simultaneously

with the nexibihty for experimentation
and growth that his

activist interest theory

seemed

to give to the judge.

By
this

view

introducing jural postulates and received
ideals, Pound extended his reliance
on

in

an attempt to bolster his account of judicial
decision. That

articulated an activist

decision

model of adjudication

- Pound recognized

-

is,

having

one of social engineering through judicial

the need to reinvigorate the traditional
image of the judge as

impartial discoverer and interpreter of pre-established
laws. In explaining that the judge

is

m part constrained by such postulates and professional traditions or ideals, constant within
a given era of a society,

Pound hoped

to reach

an acceptable compromise between two

functions of the judge which he thought equally indispensable:

One of upholding and

applying the existing system of legality; the other actively to foster
developments in the
law.

The need

for the latter

The mistake of the

had been clearly evidenced by the Lochnef

courts in those cases, and of their academic allies,

line

was

of decisions.

in their one-

sided insistence on the stabilizing function of the courts and of legal doctrine, thereby

ignoring the equally fundamental need for development of the law.
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Pursuing this line of thought
to
to universalize his conception

presented

it

its

logical conclusions.

Pound eventually attempted

of the conflicting needs of
change and

as the fundamental element
of all legal philosophy.

He

stability in law,

and

suggested that the

varying balances struck by
societies between the dual
needs of stability and growth

undergirded and explained the distinct
aspects of the five stages of
legal history.

Consequently, Pound viewed legal histoiy
as a

dialectic, propelled

forward by alternating

socio-legal concerns for stability and
consolidation on the one hand, and
growth, change

and reform on the other. The jurists of
late nineteenth century
America,
clearly

this

emphasized

stability at the

War. But,

historical

example, had

expense of growth and reform. According
to Pound,

emphasis had been appropriate

Civil

for

to the era

of economic consolidation following
the

developments of the early twentieth century
demanded change

and growth

in the laws; a

to persist in

methods of analysis appropriate

development

Further, he suggested that

it

is

stifled

by various attempts of the courts and jurists

to

an earlier period in time.

the "social interest in the general security"

which

is

responsible for the alternations between the great eras
of legal history. The waxing of
society's interest in security, he argued, brought

interest

corresponded to periods of growth and reform. For example,
according to Pound,

the crisis of his

system

on periods; while the waning of that

to

interests

own

era

was due

to the conflicting pressures

remain stable and consistent, on the one hand; and

and demands through reforms on the

other.

brought to bear on the legal
to

accommodate new

The nineteenth century schools

represented the former pressures, while 'sociological jurisprudence' represented the
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latter.

Pound gave

clear articulat.on ,o this

v.ew

in h.s lectures a,

Cambndge

University

in the

early 1920s:

Law must

be stable, and yet it cannot stand
still. Hence all thinking
about law has
truggied to reconcile the
conflicting demands of the need
of stabifity and the need
ange. The social interest in the
general security has led men
to seek some
ixed basis for an absolute ordering
of human action whereby a firm
and stable
social order might be assured.
But continual changes in the
cLurtancefoI lL
demand continual new adjustments to the
pressure of other social interests
as well
as to new modes of endangering
security. Thus the legal order
must be flexible as
-A^ordingly the chief problem to which
legal thinkers have
rdd essed themselves has
been how to reconcile the idea of a
fixed body of law,
a ording no scope for individual
wilfulness, with the idea of change
and growth

and making of new law. (1922/1967,

As we have

seen,

Pound

early

^

1).

on argued

that legal rules, principles

and concepts

should not be "imported from an external
source of reality beyond," as he alleged
the
"nineteenth century schools" had done (that

were not

to

is,

Langdell and his progeny). Legal rules

be mechanically derived by deduction from
pre-established religions or

idealistic conceptions.

Rather,

Pound contended

course of legal experience: they arise
experience. Reworking

some

in

that legal rules

which

in the

experience and, once formulated, are tested by

basic themes in

American pragmatism. Pound contended

that the received ideals, as well as the jural
postulates,

dogma

and concepts arise

though not so fixed as religious

or idealist precepts, nevertheless did not "impair the certainty
and predictability
are

demanded

for the general security."

On

the contrary, "rightly used, the

recognition of these elements makes for a real as distinguished from an illusory,
certainty."

(Pound 1936,

81).

For Pound, what was distinctive about both the notion of received

of jural postulates, was

that,

ideals,

and

that

while they provided for stability or certainty, such certainty
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was always
era.

It

was

relative; tha,

stability

,s. i,

mthin

was

ultinra.ely subjeet ,o the

changes of a given

historical

a gradual process of social
and legal change. Both
concepts

served as Pound's means of
providing for what he saw as
the inevitable need for a

compromise between

the two.

Through them, he believed he had
solved,

as well as

practically possible, the quest for
certainty in the realm of law,
without recourse to the
Illusory goal of the natural law
and historical schools of jurisprudence:
discovery

immutable

It

of

legal principles.

would seem,

then, that

Pound turned

to the concepts

of received ideals andjural

postulates in order to demonstrate that
the freedom of the judge

Pound's earlier emphasis on a theory of
interests
quite delimited. That

is,

- was only

the judge theoretically exercises

-

a freedom implied in

apparent, while in actuality

some

or

all

of his functions as

interest-balancer' (recognizing interests, weighing
interests, delimiting interests,
enforcing
interests), against a

background of relatively stable standards and
principles

(jural

postulates and received ideals), established by a
given civilization's legal system and,

importantly,

its

legal profession. In this

way, the general security

inevitable changes brought about through judicial
decision. This

between the need

for stability

is

is

and the need for change. According

more

maintained despite the
the

to

compromise

Pound,

[ijdeal pictures of the social order and of the end of law
are means of directing and
organizing the growth of the law so as to maintain the general security...
[and] are
guides to lead growth into definite channels and insure a reasonable
continuity and
permanence in the development of rules and doctrines. 1923 657
).
(
,

Yet,

Pound

clearly recognized that such received ideals could only serve their function
of

stabilization if there

was widespread agreement upon
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their content

among

the legal

Thus, he urged his colleagues

n.

to "learn

how

to

supply substantially the
same

ideal picture to all our
magistrates." (1923, 662)

What

is

implicit in Pound’s theory,
however,

is

no, only an unquestroning

acceptance of an important role for
the legal profession
stability

in the

and order, but a valorization of the
judiciary as the

maintenance of social

focal point

of legal certainty

and professional development.
Clearly, the great powers or
freedoms accorded
Judiciary have been a centuries-old
characteristic of the

endeavored

to

common

to the

law system. But Pound

enhance an already powerful position.

Much more

explicit in

Pound’s work was his struggle

reconciliation of the conflict between
judicial

ostensibly championed

power and

to achieve a theoretical

the democratic freedoms he

m his critique of loc/me.-era decisions.

Pound’s concern was not

with expanding the sphere of democratic
accountability, however; rather, he was
nearly
obsessive in his single-minded concern to
preserve and enhance the status and authority
of
the legal profession. Against the backdrop
of the

of popularly supported progressive

Supreme Court’s

legislation, as in

persistent nullification

Lochner, Pound suggested an analysis

of the underlying problem as a conflict arising from the
differing ideals of law held by the
people and by the legal profession. (Pound 1912, 227).

Pound suggested, on
American

the other hand, that the people - standing on the classical

ideals of democracy - held that the law of the land

so long as that ‘will’

was duly expressed

in a

through their state and federal legislatures.
in the history

of the

common

was what they willed

it

to be,

democratic and constitutional manner

On

the other hand, judges and lawyers, trained

law, viewed the premises and fundamental doctrines of
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const, tutional

democracy

as

little

more than restatements of
pre-existing,

eternal and

universal pnnc.ples of justice
and right, which had long
been recogn,^ed and protected
by

various institutions and doctrines
of the
principles

were the

so

embedded

law.

Among these common

classical conceptions associated
with the rise

property, freedom of contract,
and a

From

common

number of political

liberties

law

of capitalism; freedom of
and

rights.

the legal profession’s perspective,
according to Pound, such principles
were
in the legal traditions

States Constitution

was

to

of common law jurisdictions

be considered

as, in

that

even the United

essence, a recapitulation of those
principles

and corresponding nghls. Legislative
enactments inconsistent with such
fundamental
principles must, then, be set aside.”

The

courts, therefore,

assumed

it

to

be their duty to

discover such inconsistencies and nullify the
offending statutes. According to Pound,
both
sides - lay public and the legal profession believed, in good

faith, that

they were acting

according to the law, and that the other was
unjustifiably interfering with the exercise
of
its

lawful powers.

To

(

1912 227 ).
,

way of reconciling

suggest a

this apparent conflict

of legal

ideals,

Pound drew

an analogy from British political history; the struggle
between Lord Coke and King James
I.

Coke had been

rule

was not

able to curb the powers of the

absolute, but subject to

"God and

monarch by proclaiming

the

common

that the king’s

law." Although

James

objected that law was nothing more than reason, and he could perceive
and deploy reason
as well as anyone, ultimately he

^^This understanding
in derogation

of the

was forced

was encapsulated

common

to

concede

that

only the judiciary had the

in the familiar interpretive reference that statutes

law were void.
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practiced

common

wisdom

to understand the intricac.es

law was based.

In praettce. this

of the

meant

that the king

detemrinahons of the courts. This, as
Pound po.n.s
doctrine, integral to the

What
history

is

is

no. so

common

law,

known

as

“artilicial

out,

reason" on which the

must defer

marked

to the judicial

the establishment of the

"supremacy of the law."

important about Pound’s retelling
of this familiar piece of English
legal

much

his reminder

of the origins ofjudicial supremacy,
but his analyt.eal

confiation of the two sovereigns.
Specincally, Pound argued that, in
disputing the court’s

common

law powers, the contemporary public
had adopted the same untenable position

taken by King James. Certainly, Pound’s
historical analogy

of levels. What

interests

me

m and of itself.

comparison

here,

however,

Rather,

I

objectionable on a

number

not the questionable character of such
a

am more

putting the question as such, and the lessons

good deal about

is

is

concerned to suggest

Pound then draws from

that the

very fact of

his analogy, reveal a

his understanding of the role of legal expertise
under conditions

I

have

described as those of legal modernism - conditions
of uncertainty and complexity in the

law - and the corresponding

threat such conditions

posed for the continuing authority of

the legal profession.

Here,

I

would argue. Pound

is

explicit in his concern to justify

privileged position of the judiciary, and with that, to
status

of the

sovereignty.

legal profession as a whole.

Pound argued,

the

make

and protect the

a claim for the expertise and

Having succeeded

American public must bow,

to the king’s position

of

as did the king, to the special

expertise of the judges in interpreting the traditionally received principles of reason, justice

and

liberty,

which were supposed

to inhere in the
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common

law. Insofar as law,

drawn by

the judges from

common

law sources, conflicts with
dentocratic law enacted by the
will of

the people,

the latter.

Pound contended,

'[mjere

i,

is

will, as such,

conflict

I,

‘Have

I

must give way. He observed

has never been able to maintain

sovereign peoples that their will

of James

that

is

will

and

The complaint of our

disregarded must be put beside the
querulous outburst

not reason as well as

between popular

itself as law.

.ha,

my judges?’"

legal authority.

(1912, 231). Recognizing a

Pound’s attempt

at

resolution

seems

rather one-sided in favor of the
privileged claims of expertise. His
conclusions regarding
reconciliation of any such tensions lay
not in favor of expanding the sphere
of democratic

contestation over the meaning and application
of law. Rather, for Pound, "the

hes

in

strong courts with

hampered by an

infinity

full

way

out

powers of doing justice, guided by the law-giver,
but not

of rules, the

full effect

foresee." (1912, 231).
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whereof in action no one can hope

to

CHAPTER 5
FREEDOM, CONSTRAINT, AND THE
CREATIVE ROLE OF THE .IIJDCECARDOZO AND COMMON LAW ADJUDICATION

often has been argued that the
rule of law

It

is

essential to the preservation
of

individual freedom and the maintenance
of a viable and legitimate democratic
political
order.

Proponents of the rule of law ideal identity

neutrality, uniformity,

(See, e.g.,

and predictability

Raz 1983, 210-229).

in the

common

In

its

principal virtue as the guarantee
of

formulation and application of the law.

law countries, the rule of law

is

often

associated with the concept of s,an decisis,
or the rule of precedent. Further,
because the

Anglo-American
--

system

legal

is, in its

origins, a

common law system,

the role of the judge

m particular, the appellate judge - assumes a place of central importance.^*

The

concept of the rule of law serves as an ordering principle
for the legal system. In deciding
a case, judges must apply and rationally elaborate
upon the appropriate pre-existing rules,
established precedent, and settled legal principles.

concede

that this is not a

mechanical process;

constrained under a process that

Most adherents

to the rule

of law ideal

yet, adjudication is nonetheless alleged to

be

governed by the basic elements of neutrality,

is

objectivity and rationality. Consequently, legal determinations are
understood to be
relatively determinate

and

law, they do not create

not initiate

its

it.

free

from the

The judiciary mediates

deployment; power

^*See Posner (1990,

arbitrary exercise

is

viii), where he
Anglo-American jurisprudence."

of power

- judges

apply the

the exercise of political power, but does

thereby constrained and ultimately dissolved in law.

identifies the appellate

150

judge as "the central figure

in

However, since the emergence
of the
if

Realist

movement

American

in

legal thought,

not before, the rebuttal
to this ‘classical’ vision
has remained fairly
consistent: iudicial

decision-making
that is separable

is

from

rationally determinate;
there

is

no

mode of legal

distinct

political tdeology; the
theoretical d.stinction

the political should be. and

is,

reasoning

between the

collapsed. Contemporary
critical legal theorists

legal

who

renewal of the Realist project, argue
that the inherent indeterminacy
of language

and

urge a

in

general, and legal rules in particular,
justifies doubts about the
determinacy of any legal

system and the exercise of power
legitimated through reference
basic argument

is that, to

the extent that a legal system
rests

determinate rules and their application,

it

thus

to

such a system. The

on a foundation of

becomes necessary

for that legal

system

to

rebut this form of rule-skepticism to
claim legitimacy.

The claim

that

law

not an autonomous sphere of activity,
separate from the

is

realm of politics, problematizes the traditional
understanding of the judge as a neutral
arbiter

of legal disputes, objectively identifying and
applying the law

situation.

to a

given factual

Rather, the rule of law, from such a skeptical
perspective, seems

little

more than

an ideological cover for the arbitrary and unconstrained
exercise of political power.
Indeed, contemporary champions of the rule of law
ideal, such as Ronald Dworkin,

contend that legitimate government under law

is

impossible

if the

law

is

substantially

indeterminate. (Dworkin 1977, 84). Bringing the original
Realist position into sharper
political focus,

uncertainty

is

contemporary

critical legal theorists

maintain that legal indeterminacy or

evidence for their claim that the rule of law

ruse, the pretense of legality

masks

the extent to
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is little

more than an

elaborate

which systematic bias and prejudice

affect

Judicial decisio„-„u,king.
Ci.i.ens arc (hereby

oppression and are (hereCore

nr, hie

r,

.rrisicc,

ahou,

,|,e

aeu.al reaso.rs ,hr (hei,

(dens (heir resis(anee and
rescn„nen( npon (he real

cause of their suffering.
In

a,nlM,ukrn SociCy (1976,

ccmral role legal analysis plays

in

any

192). Rr,l,er(o

erilieal

Mangabeira linger

assessn.em ol lhe

law: "A(, r(ndcrs(anding of liberal
soeiely illnminales, arrd

orihal society's legal order and legal
ideals,
(he soni of, he nrodern slate.

same lime
the

liberal .society

that

one hand,

it

Uself."

fully

men

lo struggle for the rule

achieving this ideal."

Unger 1980). The

shift in

(

oflaw

ideal al Ihe

1976, 67-68). That

- suggests the neeessity

is,

on

— the

to struggle for

While, on the other hand, the inherent subjectivity
of adjudication

longing for both freedom and order,

I

awareness

of uneonstrained governmental power
and of our fellow citizens

suggests the impossibility of achieving the

well, as

ar,

or (he rnle of law has been
(rnly said (o he

desire lor individual freedom and politieal
order
the rule ol law.

illn,nina(ed by,

Yet, according l„ linger, the
very nainre of

"predisposes

keeps them Irom

lear

(henry of (he rnle o

Ihe stndy of (he legal sy.s(em
lakes us straighi (o (he ceniral

problems faced by Ihe society
conicmporary

l

is

liberal

idenrillerl (he

is

ideal.

In

Unger’s analysis, the simultaneous

characteristie of the modernist predicament. (See

recognition, indeed the obsession with, judicial
subjectivity emerged as

have argued above,

emphasis, Irom Ihe

in the

late

modernist

era.

fhis was, of eourse, part ol'a larger

nineteenth century on, to the aesthetie, ethical and political

ramilications of cognitive modernism

(i.e.,

radical, or unconstrained, subjectivity).
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The

Realist

The

Backdrop

to

Cardozo’s Thought

intellectual historian, H.
Stuart

which began

in the 1890s,

and

set the

Hughes, identified an

‘intellectual revolution'

terms of social thought for the
twentieth century.

At the center of the revolution was the
problem o{ consciommss. According
“tt

was

itself

the period in which the subjective
attitude of the observer of
society

forward in peremptory fashion.” (Hughes
1961,

essentially cognitive problem: the
disparity

15).

to

first

Hughes,
thrust

Subjectivity “presented an

between external

reality

and the

internal

appreciation of that reality.” (Hughes
1961, 16).
In the legal field, the question of
subjectivity

form of the debate between formalists and

emerged most prominently

their critics

in the

over the nature of judicial decsion-

making. American Legal Realists devoted much
time and

effort to

an exposition and

understanding of legal doctrine as the product of an
epistemologically-situated subject.^^
In short, the realist

political

argument was

power and was not

that a given legal determination

the necessary product of an abstract, rational
determination;

another judge, with another political position,

outcome. The

realists

was authorized by

may

well have provided another legal

urged a complete subordination of objective sources of law,

privileging the political ideology and personal idiosyncracies of the
individual judge,

deciding the particular case then before him. The slogan, “law

became a

is

what judges do

legal shorthand for their ‘new’ recognition of judicial subjectivity.

in fact,”

They

rejected

the importance attached by previous legal theorists to rules and principles as actual

take this to be at the heart of the old claim, all law

is politics', that is, doctrine does not
flow in some rational process from a neutral and objective judicial determination, but is
largely dependent on how the judge sees the world.
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determinants of deciston. For
example,

observed that

‘•[a]!!

in a frequently cited
arttcle,

the amb.tious attempts
to define [,aw]...agree
that

system of rules and principles
enforced by
fundamentally erroneous and that
particular problems.”

Realist

it

is

political authority.

(Bingham 1912,

And,

3).

center of reference in thinking
about law,

is

of substantive law are of far

in

consists of a

believe that this idea

is

its

one of the founding documents
of the

that “the use

of precepts, or

rules...as the

a block to clear thinking
about matters
less

importance than most legal theorizers

have assumed.” (Llewellyn 1930,
431, 442). Or,

emphasis of American law and

I

it

a bar to a scientific
understanding of our law and

movement, Karl Llewellyn contended

legal....[R]ules

Joseph Btngham

legal thought

on

in

Jerome Frank’s view, the

rules

and principles was due

traditional

to

a “childish

need” for an “unrealizable certainty.” (Frank
1930/1970, 21)
Thus, at the heart of the realist position

Expanding on Pound’s work, yet

in

was a thoroughgoing juristic

many ways

critical

of it as well, the

subjectivism.

realists

derogated

the importance of the objective sources
of the law, while simultaneously elevating
the

importance of the subjective role of the judge.
Where Pound had urged a recognition of
the fact of judicial creativity, so too Frank
contended that judges should openly

acknowledge

their

freedom and thereby take responsibility

for the creative role they

inevitably play in the development of the law:

The

pretense, the self-delusion, that

borrowing,

when

commands given them by some
efficiency.

must

when

[judges] are creating they are

they are making something

They must

rid

learn the virtue, the

new they are merely applying the
external authority, cannot but diminish their

themselves of this reliance on a non-existent guide, they
the practical worth of self-authority

power and

(1930/1970, 121).
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Curiously, the Realists
presented as a novel discovery
the fact that judges are
rarely

bound by common law
precedents, and

are in fact largely free
to man.pulate

preeedents io justify the outcome
they destre. This great
‘discovery’ had of course
been

made even more
realists

law

forcefully by

Jeremy Bentham more than
,50 years

seemed unaware of the view

‘rules’

that the attempt to crystallize

was a development owing more

and uncertainty

in the law.

earlier.

Indeed, the

and organize

common

to the Langdellian efforts
to confront

chaos

Instead, the realists maintained
that judicial subjectivity

inevitable and, therefore, that the
only meaningful focus of study

was

was judicial behavior,

method and technique.

The question

that

emerges from a rehearsal of this familiar
engagement

the effect of openly invoking the
problem of certainty in the law; that

ultimately endanger

Status

its

own claim

of judicial reason.

demystification

I

to truth

would suggest

by repeatedly

to ask

of

does realism

calling attention to the 'fictive'

instead, that the result

was not enlightenment, but simply

is,

is

of this process of

to defuse the critical tension inherent
to

the problems of judicial power. In short,
the realist argument served to reinstantiate
the

power of the American judiciary. Their

'radicalism' tended to conceal the fact that
they

were, because of their institutional location and
academic concerns, ultimately

little

more

than apologists for the Anglo-American tradition of
judicial supremacy. Just as Pound's
'radicalism'

was

better understood as

legal profession to the incursions

prepared to

make

at

advocacy of a more far-sighted adjustment by the

of the legislature than those most of his colleagues were

the turn of the century, so the later realist critiques were a renewed

attempt to justify and maintain professional hegemony
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in the face

of an increasingly

insistent

ba.age of popular

legislation.

were "profoundly conservative,
not

As Bruce Ackemtan

tconoelasttc.

has observed, the reahsts

Rather than transfomnng
traditional

legal discourse, the realist
critique allowed the
profession to survive the

restructuring

its

basic conceptual equipment."

In criticizing the

jurisprudence, Roscoe

(Ackerman 1984,

formalism and rigidity of the
‘nineteenth century’ schools
of

Pound had already

stressed that there

was more

to

law than rules

rules, the law,

Pound, also consisted of methodology
and purpose. Relying on Pound’s

but moving beyond them, the reahsts
suggested
substantive sense, and urged that

of the law and

legal system.

that

it

it

little

was

that

is,

as a

means

realists

to

in

any

in a

critical analysis

accomplish those ends, they rejected

the responsibility of jurists to determine
what the goals and

maintained the need for a separation of is and ought,
contending

position

initial insights,

accepted Pound’s argument that

purposes of the law should be. Following Llewellyn’s
(and Holmes’)

was outside

according

relevance for legal doctrine,

be pushed into the background

And, although most

law exists for social purposes,

Pound’s suggestion

Deal without

5).

and principles. Besides the substantive
doctrinal content of legal
to

New

that

lead, the realists

normative evaluation

the scope of a truly rea/A/ jurisprudence. Instead,
the dominant realist

was

that the principal

concern of legal analysis should be the scientific study of

techniques and methods used by judges in their production of
legal doctrine.

This criticism

of,

and apparent move away from. Pound’s attention

purposive elements of the law - and the role of the legal profession

in its

was important, but

is, I

not as significant as

that the realist position

it

might

at first

seem. That

simply subsumed Pound’s valorization of the
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to the

development -

would suggest

common

law and

tant centering

process.

The

realists

Methodology,
work,

it

of the judge into a quest

for

an empirical understanding
oftliis

sought to focus attention on
the question of judicial
method.

until then,

had largely been neglected.
Yet. with the innuence
of Holmes’

had slowly but steadily come

to the foreground.

object of principal concent for
realist scholars. (See,

According

to

e.g..

talking in largely traditional

1

7).

was

Summers

ways about

without raising the large abstractions
that had gotten the
It

the |.)20s,

it

had become an

1982, 136).

Bruce Ackerman, "[w]hat was
desperately required was a method
by

which one might coniinue

troubles.

By

common

particular disputes

law into such

precisely this that Realism could
offer the profession."

political

(Ackerman 1984,

This emphasis on method rellected the
Realist’s awareness that the
Anglo-American

judge was

free to

dominate the doctrinal elements of law through
professional techniques

of adjudicatton. Although such domination
had been argued

for at least since

Coke’s

elaims on behalf of the ‘artidcial reason’ of
the law, the realist-inspired emphasis
on

method should be understood
legal

modernism; a discourse

as an integral part of the

that

was

development of the discourse of

constituted by, and in turn constituted the
changing

nature of professional authority and legal expertise
that began with Holmes, was

developed by Pound, and would come
In his influential essay.

[t]he essence

of Modernism

to fruition in the

Modernist Painting," Clement Greenberg contends

lies. ..in

the use of the characteristic

to criticize the discipline itself, not in order to subvert

its

1920s and 1930s.

area of competence." (Greenberg 1966, 101.

impulse behind, and the effect of the

realist

it,

methods of a discipline

hut to entrench

My emphasis).

that

This

is,

it

1

more firmly

believe, both the

emphasis on judicial method. Although
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in

Greenberg’s analysis

of getting

at a

is

devoted to modernism

m painting,

type of cntical thought exemplified

[mlodemism used

is

it

m legal realism.

- the

The limitations that constitute the
surface, the shape of the support,
the properties of
the Old Masters as negative factors
that could
be

or indirectly. Modernist painting
has

disparagement of the importance of legal doctrine

Greenberg’s characterization of modernist
it

art.

Initiated

is,

in

many ways,

similar to

consisted of a vigorous attack on the role of
conceptual categories.

the law-making process. Corresponding to
this
abstract

to regard

by Holmes, adopted and

Such categories merely served a mystifying function
and

The

come

acknowledged openly.

096^^1 02

promoted by Pound,

Greenberg observes

flat

pigmen - were treated by
acknowledged only implicitly

realist

way

art to call attention to art.

medium of painting

The

nevertheless useful as a

was denigrated

at the

was an

inhibited a direct examination of

elevation of the role of experience.

expense of the concrete; the universal derided in favor

of the particular; the general displaced by an emphasis on the
narrow or

specific.

Ultimately, products of thought were discredited, while those
things that could be

observed were privileged. Finally, the claim

deemphasized

in favor

for connections

among

things and events

was

of an understanding of discontinuity and the uniqueness of each

event.

This empiricist attitude permitted the

realists to justify a disdain for the

conceptualistic jurisprudence of Langdell and other formalists. However, there

was

also

an inevitable tendency toward the valorization of subjectivity, an emphasis on the ad hoc
nature of adjudication, and, ultimately, a justification of judicial freedom. Bruce
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"

Ackemian seems

correct, then, to

have stressed the essentially
conservative nature of

realism, while fully acknowledging

New

its liberal

attitude towards the reform
legislation

of the

Deal. While accepting such
legislation in a partieularist way,
realist methodology

thwarted any movement toward the
development or expansion of doctrinal
content or
principles of the

juristic

New

empmcism;

Deal. Instead,

the result

was

it

pushed

to the center

of attention the principle of

to privilege the continued

domination of the legal

profession - judge and lawyer. The realist
flight to particularism, to narrowness,
to

minute inspection and observation, served, then,
conflicts

which were a

to deflect attention

part of the historical crises to

which the

New

from the ideological
Deal ostensibly was

directed.

In another context,

Georg Lukacs defended

realism), against abstract expressionism

literary realism (specifically, socialist

by observing

that

[gjreat realism... does not portray an

which

is

immediately obvious aspect of reality but one
permanent and objectively more significant, namely man in the
whole

range of his relations to the real world, above

Over and above

all

those which outlast mere fashion.

captures tendencies of development that only exist
incipiently and so have not yet had the opportunity to unfold
their entire human

and social

To dwell on
the

to

that,

it

potential. (1977, 48).

the surface of things, as

much of legal

immediacy of (visual) experience,

realism

was content

inevitably renders the object of analysis, according

Lukacs, "opaque, fragmentary, chaotic, and uncomprehended.

Certainly, legal realism - at least

its

to do, privileging

(Lukacs 1977, 39).

most prominent exponents - recognized the

judicial creativity and the resulting uncertainty of the law. Yet,

it

reality

might be the case

of

that

they failed to truly probe the depths of judicial freedom', the impact of judicial subjectivity
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on the process of decision.

was not

A plausible rendering of realist work may

to celebrate the possibilities

claims to certainty were grounded

be

that their

of legal uncerta.nty, but to
demonstrate

in

myth -

the

how

myth of fomialist reasoning and

efficacy of coneeptualistic legal
categories. Yet, this process of
demystification
the

first

step in the process

Turning again

of what
reality

legal realists

and

to

Lukacs’ work on

literary realism,

were gesturing towards:

perhaps

the old

the false

was only

legal certainty.

we

can get some hint

"to penetrate the laws governing
objective

uncover the deeper, hidden, mediated, not
immediately perceptible network

of relationships
however,

to

of forging a new, more empirically
sound,

purpose

that

go

to

make up

society." (1977, 38).

Lukacs goes on

to observe,

that

[sjince these relationships

make themselves

felt in

trends, the labour

of the

do not

on the surface, since the underlying laws only
very complex ways and are realized only
unevenly,
lie

as

artistic

and an

intellectually

realist is extraordinarily

arduous, since

it

has both an

intellectual dimension. Firstly,

and give them

artistic

he has to discover these relationships
shape. Secondly, although in practice the
two

processes are indivisible, he must artistically conceal
the relationships he has just
discovered through the process of abstraction.... This
twofold labour creates
immediacy, one that is artistically mediated. (1977,
39).
If we use Lukacs’ insights into the critical
potential

of a heuristic construct by which
tends to

come up

to evaluate legal realism, then

short in the comparison. This

emphasis on an empirical posture. In
exponent of the

realist position

because Cardozo

‘^“Although, as

we

is

science’ to rescue

of literary realism as something

is,

this sense,

somewhat

is

I

so

I

I

believe the latter

work

think because of the realist

would suggest

ironically,

that a

more compelling

Benjamin Cardozo40; ironic

not generally considered to be a part of the realist movement.

will see below,

some of the

Cardozo ultimately

potential

relies on a rather nebulous ‘social
problem areas of ‘sociological adjudication’.
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Moreover, he was subjected

one of realism’s
of his

final,

called

State

it.

to a rather snide

central figures -

and condescend.ng critique

the hands of

a,

Jerome Frank. And, Cardozo, devoted
the bulk of one

and most important, extra-judicial
works

(Cardozo 1932/1947). Yet,

in that

Bar Association - Cardozo ultimately

to a critique

of "neo-realism," as he

same piece - an address
identifies his

movement. Nevertheless, Richard Posner
justified

own work

to the

New York

with the

realist

his decision to "pass over"
those

thinkers traditionally identified with
American legal realism in his treatment of
American

jurisprudence for the following reason: "At
least about the large questions
of
jurisprudence...the legal realists had
earlier."

it

little

thought, or

to

way of talking

my decision

development. And, perhaps,
line

to characterize realism as a

Perhaps, however,

form of legal

it

lends

self-conscious of this jurisprudential

some support

for

my

decision to end the discussion

of legal thought with an examination of Benjamin Cardozo,
who,

understood the problem of judicial subjectivity and,
interesting attempt to

come

to

occupying the heart of what
still

settle the matter.

drives

much work

said

about the law, that emerged sometime before
the published

work of those who were, perhaps, more

that

Holmes and Cardozo had not

(Posner 1990, 20). Obviously, this does not

does lend some support

of this

to say that

I

in

terms with

have

its

in

I

response, provided the most

implications - a problem that

I

see as

tried to characterize as legal modernism', a

American jurisprudence.
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believe, best

problem

Cardozo and the

Common Law Judge

In his theoretical writings,

authority of the

More

common

specifically,

Cardozo, like Pound, attempted

to

enhance the role of the judiciary

in the

governing of

of flux. Cardozo’s work suggests
both a conception of the

law’s role in society and an argument
as to
particular - should

of the lawyer

maintain the

law against the perceived threat
oflegislative encroachment.

Cardozo sought

a society in a state

to

fulfill that role.

As

how

such,

it

common

the judiciary - the appellate
bench in

provides an implicit framework for
the role

in society as well.

Underlying much of Cardozo’s extra-judicial
work was the understanding

United States was a

pluralistic,

not particularly profound; yet,

that the

continuously developing society. Such an
observation
it is

is

important to the development of Cardozo’s

jurisprudence. According to Cardozo, fundamental
social norms are never fully shared

among

citizens within the larger political

community. Nor are they

static

over time.

Instead, they reside within the continuous flux
of social and political development. This

conception of society entailed an integral function for the

Cardozo, the

common

law ought

to articulate

citizens in a pluralistic and evolving society

and enforce

do hold

in

common

that limited set

common

importantly, according to Cardozo, the principal task of the
appellate judge in particular -

is to

restate ]\isi

The attempt
Cardozo

s

to confront

theoretical work.

it

is that

first

was

common

in the

for

of norms

that

law judge - the

beliefs are, thereby

common.

law drove

the problem posed for a
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is,

any given time. More

they hold in

two fundamental problems

The

at

what those shared

enabling citizens to recognize and reaffirm what

law. That

common

much of
law.

precedem-based system by the
proliferation of eonilicting
preeedent.
suggested above, eoncemed

mueh of the aeademie and

onward. The second problem
was
social order

the Yale

m

which

Law School

In

problem, as

I

have

practicing bar from the
1870s

caused by the continual
transformation of the

law operates. For example,
Cardozo opened

his

1923 lectures

at

with the following observation:

f

‘he need of some restatement
certainty and order out of the
wilderness of precedent This is the
legal seienee. The second is
the need of a philosophy that
will n^^^d

'Ti

t
V of
task

all

that

A

1

at

The

first

problem complicated the task of both judge
and lawyer and threatened

to reveal

inconsistency or worse, contradiction, in
the process of common law adj
udication, thereby
calling into question the legitimacy
of the entire system of justice. For
Cardozo, however,

the nature of the problem suggested

which jurists could catalogue and

its

response; that

classify legal doctrine

access to relevant legal precedent. Cardozo’s

was

his call for a "Ministry

is,

first

the need for

and thus

attempt

at

some mechanism by

scientifically

a resolution to this problem

of Justice" (1921) and, ultimately, would find him
giving

support to the Restatement project launched by the
newly formed American

The second problem,
taxonomic tasks assumed

manage

in part

subsuming the

for the Restatements.

first,

That

is,

called for efforts

Law

full

Institute.

beyond the

beyond the categorization of

already existing precedent - the job of legal science - there was
also a need for legal

philosophy; a need arising from forces external to the law itself In his
"Address to the

New York

State

Bar Association," Cardozo observed

jurists to find refuge in

philosophy "has

its

that the felt

origin in causes
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need of contemporary

more profound and

fundamental [than

emerged

the]

avalanche of precedents."
(Cardozo 1932/1947,

8).

Rather,

it

as "a response to the
agitations and the promptings
of a changing civilization

demanding

outlet

and expression

in

changing forms of law and a
jurisprudence and

philosophy adequate to justify the
changes." (1932/1947,
philosophical jurisprudence which

rest

Law and

society required a

was capable of understanding and
explaining

"growth of the law;" one responsive

demands between

8).

to the

and motion," and

the

needs of reconciling the apparently
conllicting

"stability

and progress." (Cardozo 1928/1947,

252).

Cardozo's ideas concerning the need for
a "principle of growth"

is

best understood

within his larger framework of how the
law functions. According to Cardozo,
the

problem of the law’s growth cannot be

fully grasped without lirst

understanding of the law’s social origins.
(1923/1947, 247). That

common

law as the codification of norms of behavior

people within their respective societies. For example,
Process, Cardozo suggests that

be fixed as law.

life."

Law

"[Ijife casts the

that

in

were

having some

is,

Cardozo viewed the

traditionally observed

by

The Nature of the Judicial

moulds of conduct, which

some day

will

preserves the moulds, which have taken the form
and shape from

(1921/1947, 132). These norms,

in turn, refiect behavioral patterns that

have proven

useful to social groups overtime. (1921/1947, 150).

According

to

Cardozo,

at

any moment

in history,

many of these norms

will

be

widely endorsed by, and enforced among, members of a given social group. For
example,

m Paradoxes of Legal Science, he notes that "[t]here are certain
at

forms of conduct which

any given place and epoch are commonly accepted under the combined influence of
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reason, practice and tradition,
as moral or immoral."
(1928/1947, 274). Consequently,

these

norms

create widely shared
expectations of how one ought
to behave.

Depaitur.

from expected behavior will
be condemned and, perhaps,
fonnally sanctioned. Yet,

Cardozo denied

that societies share, or
that they should adopt,

any one

of nonns.

set

Rather, he believed that the
norms that govern individual's lives
are historically and

geographically contingent: "The forms
of conduct...are not the same
places." (1928/1947, 274).
Moreover,

were

it

was not simply

that

a, all

times or

in all

norms of moral obligation

specific to certain times and
places, but that this cultural

web of expectations and

obligations - inculcated in individuals
through formal education and less
formal

expressions of public opinion - constituted
the very identity of a given
social group.

(1928/1947, 282-283). For Cardozo, then,
individuals

may

lead seemingly atomistic

existences; nonetheless, they always live
within the existing structures of society
and not in
isolation

from them. (1928/1947, 305-306).

Cardozo

insisted, then, that "[l]aw accepts as
the pattern

of the community." (1928/1947, 274).

A community,

norms defining

owed by

that shared

their social interactions.

the obligations

Such norms,

in

modem,

of its justice the morality

for Cardozo,

individual

was any

members

to

industrializing societies,

but varied in several important respects: between different
communities

at

social group

one another

were not
the

and within the same communities across time. Further, Cardozo
recognized

same

that

sociologist Albion Small, Cardozo suggested that

time,

the

American communities

form "a union of disunions, a conciliation of conflicts, a harmony of discords."
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fixed,

modem

American communities were, somewhat paradoxically, heterogeneous. Relying
on

work of the

in

(1928/1947, 306). That
yet.

it

was

is,

Cardozo sought

to stress the inherent
plurality

a pluralism that existed
always w.thin a larger unity.
Further

identify the continual process
of evolution

common

and determined,

in large

he hoped

to

common

law

in social

and

measure, his views on the role and
function of the

law judge.

Cardozo’s work
idea of which

IS

that

is

informed, then, by a particular image
of social

members of a given

define the obligations citizens

about

still,

communities. Both perspectives

informed Cardozo’s understanding
of the importance of the
political life

of communities;

how

people ought

to

owe

behave

to

society recognize certain

norms

life;

the basic

that

m turn

one another. These norms establish
expectations

in various circumstances.

Traditionally, according to

Cardozo, these expectations were reinforced
by means of education, indoctrination, or
the
sanction of community opinion. However,
with the complexity of modem society,

have developed laws and
these obligations.

Even

legal institutions to arbitrate

so, these

and

settle definitively the

we

content of

laws will naturally tend to enforce those
obligations that

have gamed a certain standing and recognition within
a community. As Cardozo observes
in

Paradoxes of Legal Scienee,

"[t]he judge, so far as

freedom of choice

is

given to him.

tends to a result that attaches legal obligations to the
folkways, the norms or standards of

behavior exemplified in the

life

Importantly, however,

common

about him." (1928/1947, 260).

when norms of obligation

law, they gain a special status. That

judicial decision, the naturally coercive

greater coercive

power of the

state.

is,

are incorporated into the

once these norms are written into a

power of public opinion

is

reinforced by the

Thus, for Cardozo, "[djuties that had been conceived

166

of as moral only, w.thou,
other human sanction
than the opinion of society,
are found to
be such that they may
effectively and wisely be
subjected to another fom,
of sanct.on, the

power of society. (1928/1947,
customao. behav.or

tha,

277),

The common

law,

Cardozo observed,

,s

that part

of

has been "stamped tn the
judical min, as law, and
thereafter

circulate[s] freely as part of
the coinage of the realm."
(1923/1947, 199),

As

a matter of description, then,
Cardozo seemed to believe that
the law generally

reftecs historically recognized
nonns of obligation.

though, tha, the

common

he believed tha,

i,

ought

law does

"Law

to:

community whose conduct

it

reflect

More

importantly, Cardozo no, only

and enforce community standards
of obhgat.on;

accepts as the pattern of „s just.ce
the moral., y of the

assumes

to regulate." (1928/1947,
274).

perspective, for Cardozo, the proper
role of the

common

law judge

obligations observed and respected by
the community. That
the judge to recognize and interpret
the ‘social text’ in
beliefs

life,

have been inscribed. While

Cardozo

insisted that

this

might

initially

any given community

evolving over time. Thus, the task for the

is

is

Given

this

to articulate those

he assumes the

is,

ability

which a given community’s moral
suggest a monolithic view of social

inevitably pluralistic and constantly

common

law judge

is

to

determine the point

which he goes beyond simply enforcing obligations
widely recognized and followed
community, and

among

impose an

artificial

orthodoxy. The task

the full range of moral duties recognized

recognition.

that

starts to

To

assist

them

in the

judges "follow, or strive

by

is

to

at

in the

determine which

different groups deserve legal

accomplishment of this

to follow, the principle
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of

task,

Cardozo recommended

and practice of the

men and women

of .he comnn.„i.y

„ho„

.he social

mind would rank

as in.elligen, and virtuous.

(1928/1947, 274).
Stanley Brubaker (1979)
has characterized this
position as a form of Platonic
perfectionism. Brubaker portrays
Cardozo as believing that the
puprose of law in a libera,

and democratic society

is

to define, articulate,

and enforce the standards
of intelligence

and virtue prevalent among the
noblest portion of the
conduct endorsed by such a group,
society
law acts a

s

By

citizenry.

enforcing the code of

itself "rank[s] as intelligent

and virtuous;" and

a mechanism for imposing the
norms of the society's most developed
persons

on society as a whole. (Brubaker
1979, 250). For Brubaker,
Cardozo's jurisprudence...has as

”[,]he social

mind

in

cause the cultivation of in.elligen.
and virtuous

its final

people." (1979, 250).

Such an

interpretation certainly gains

some support from Cardozo’s many

addresses to lawyers and law students,
wherein he maintains

of law both requires nobility of character
and ennobles

Cardozo 1939/1947). However,

I

think these impulses

the context of the Progressive-era politics

its

that, at its best, the practice

practitioners. (See, e.g.,

may

be better understood within

which Cardozo subscribed

on government by experts and of a type of moral
perfectionism

many
that

it

efforts at social

is

and

the duty of the

citizenry.

political reform.

common

law judge

that

to,

with

seemed

common

emphasis

to undergird

Moreover, Cardozo rarely seems
to contribute to the

its

to suggest

perfection of the

Rather, for Cardozo, in a pluralistic and democratic
community, the state

cannot hope to impose a comprehensive view of human perfection
on a citizenry whose

moral views often diverge. In

this sense,

I

think that Brubaker fails to appreciate the
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ambiguity

Cardozo’s thought. Moreover.
Brubaker tgnores the modernist
elements

in

driving Cardozo-s attempt
to work through the
relationship between state
and individual

wtlhin the context of a legal
order. That
pluralism, and

its

Brubaker discounts the

,s.

implications, to Cardozo’s
thought.

real intportanee

of

The notion of pluralism within

a

larger union reBected
Cardozo's attempt to identify and
control certain antinomies

fundamental to

modem

life

which are

reflected in the

title,

Paradoxes of Legal Seicce.

There, Cardozo attempts to provide
the theoretical foundation
from which the

common

law judge could recognize and, thereby,
constrain the tension between
individual and
society, stability and growth,
freedom and restraint.

For Cardozo, ”[t]he

state exists to subordinate to
law,

and thereby to order and

coherence, the rivalries and struggles of
its component groups
and individuals.

m the words of [Albion]

Small

‘a

reflects a

common

minimum

subscribe. That

is,

law judges are

ethical

code

to

is

to strive to enforce a standard

which

all

members of a

law, for Cardozo, must identify "a

that, as

at

that

community can

ethics, that is to

say the

a given stage of social

absolutely indispensable." (1928/1947, 277). If the
citizens in a pluralistic

they go about their individual

to certain standards

functions well

of decent conduct

pluralistic

minimum

community cannot agree about many questions of religion
agree

maintain a peaeeful

is to

whole combined requirements of morals, whose observance,
development,

thus,

union of disunions, a conciliation
of connicts, a harmony

ofdiscords’." (1928/1947. 306). The law's
function, then,
coexistence;

It is

when

of respect and

it

care.

lives,

they ought to treat each other according

According

captures those standards in
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or morality, they can and do

to

its

Cardozo, the

rules

common

law

and finds points of agreement

that

can bind the diverse
membership of the community.
In his estimate, the
principal

function of judges

was "not

to

transfonn civilization, but to
regulate and order

i,

(1928/1947, 286).

Language and the Judicial Function
Cardozo’s conception of the

why

considering

funetion. In this

articulate those

Law
language.

reality

it

IS

It

it

is

way we

norms

may be

vital to the realization

that

creates

it

is,

it

is

it

is

of ,ts

not something separate from

legal

to engage.

it

structures the very

language not only describes a given legal

as well. Thus, legal language

this instrumental charaeter

And,

by

form the core of their respective
communities.

does not exist prior to or outside of
language; instead,

it

further elaborated

can gain a better understanding
of his basic notion that judges

expressed through language, but

which Cardozo seeks
situations.

law’s function

he thought the proper use of
language was

then seeks to describe. That

relationship;

Indeed,

common

is

of legal language

Legal language

is

both descriptive and instrumental.
that

poses the difficulties w.th

articulated in response to concrete

beeause the outcome of legal discourse carries
such great

eonsequences for the everyday

lives

of members of a given community

that the

element of

continuity in that discourse takes on such great
importance.

Throughout

his writings,

Cardozo displayed an appreciation of the importance of

language for the work of courts; he readily acknowledged the
obvious point; judges trade
in

words. For Cardozo, "[t]he sentence of today will make the right
and wrong of

tomorrow." (1921/1947,

1

13).

And, while he was well aware of the potential
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for legal

language ,o inhibit action
and obscure thought, he
was equally aware of the

fact that

,t

could be harnessed for
constructive punroses.
Because judicial rulings def.ne
and enforce
the obligations that
c.tizens
in

which they are delivered

whhin

a pluralistic

affects the viability

community owe

is

not the

and the feebleness

make

it

what

opinions are,

is."

it

in

same

that is

as the

argument put

bom of lack of form

(1930/1947, 340).

It

The

feebly.

is,

forth.

that "[t]he

For

argument

strength that

is

bom

of form

are in truth qualities of the
substance.

would seem

to

They

follow from this that judicial

Cardozo's understanding, cracial
elements

judicial function. That

one another, the manner

of the principles they put

example, in his essay, "Law and
Literature," Cardozo
observes
strongly put

to

in the

proper exercise of the

they are not mere recitations of
authority; rather, judicial

opinions, for Cardozo, represent the

means

moral obligations and of giving content

for an explication

to the fomial

of the exact dimensions of

and generalized rules of the

common

law.

As noted above,

for

Cardozo, the function of the

that capture the evolving core

common

also that the exact contours of this

fact,

Cardozo suggests

web of obligations

As Cardozo was

complex and constantly evolving;

to observe:

in

develop rules

that

we must

understand

it

is

is

The

confronted with a "social

a text that

is

never fully

articulate.

"The moral code of each generation supplies a norm or

standard of behavior which struggles to

John Goldberg,

to

are never easily defined.

principal difficulty here derives from the fact that
the judge
that is both

is

of moral sentiments shared by members
of the judge’s

community. As a consequence of this

mind

law

make

itself articulate in law."

(1928/1947, 261).

an important study of Cardozo’s thought, observes that
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"[i]t is

precisely

because the content of the
social ntind

is

contpiex and evoiv.ng
,„a,.

in

rendering h,s

decsions. the judge simultaneously
shapes that social mind he
ostensibly

That

is,

the judge

makes

clear

what

is

makes them more compelling,
according
at

to

Thejudge

to beliefs

also animates these rules
and

Cardozo, by dehberately
employing language

persuading the legal profession,
and society

outcome adheres most closely

trying to read.

only scuart.culate, by
translating moral sentiments

into legal rules." (Goldberg
1990, 1344).41

aimed

,s

at large, that a
particular rule

or

already held. In short, thejudge
both discovers

and creates the social mind.
(1923/1947, 228)

Cardozo captured

this interplay

between discovery and creation

For example, he spoke of judges
having

to "interpret the social

m several ways.

consciousness"

(1932/1947, 13); he referred also to
"reiteration" and "restatement,"
both of which capture
his belief that the principal role
of the

common

law judge

is to

restate that

already been expressed, albeit cryptically,
by the community. (See,

Cardozo’s

own

extra-judicial writings are

e.g.,

which has

1921/1947, 162).

exemplary of the relleralive method.

reads Cardozo’s most famous work. The
Nature of the Judicial Process, one

immediately struck by the extent

mosatc of quotations from other

to

which

thinkers.

his philosophical writing

Recognition of this

dismissal of Cardozo as an unoriginal or derivative
thinker.

generous

fact

is little

When one

is

more than

a

has often lead to the

Edwin Patterson was more

in his appraisal, suggesting that "[Cardozo’s]
inveterate habit

of quotation

expressed his genuine humility and his belief that he was
a product of the culture of his

"Much

of the argument
of Cardozo’s work

in the

remaining pages
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is

heavily indebted to Goldberg’s treatment

epoch." (Patterson 1939.
74).
at

work

here.

For Cardozo,

method he recommended
of thinking
is,

.s

in the

rs

I

the

was a

to all

same basic

would suggest, however,
fully self-consc.ous

common

that there

was something more

method of legal analysis -

a

lawjudges. At the hear, of this
reiterat.ve

insight that infomrs

much of Cardozo's

mode

legal thinking.

That

midst of social flux and
intellectual complexity, the
fundamental task of the judge

to define

and amplify -

to reiterate - the basic
points

of agreement among

citizens

m the

community.

It is

generally understood that the

common

law

process; but, a major par, of the
process, for Cardozo,

is

the product of an incremental

is reiterative.

Cases that apply a

particular rule of law continually
restate that rule in slightly
different contexts. This

movement

helps to reinforce a set of opinions
about the obligations individuals

owe

to

one

another. In this sense, Cardozo
maintained that "fundamental [legal]
conceptions once
attained form the starting point from
tentative

124).

and groping, gain by

If,

which

reiteration a

are derived

new consequences, which

new permanence and

certainty."

at first

(1921/1947

through reiteration, the contours of legal principles
become better defined, the

members of a

society will have clearer rules to guide their
conduct. Ideally, then, judge-

made law

will help to give

members of a

articulate

what they

even as the content of what they share changes over time.
This

IS

share,

pluralistic

community

their

moral bearings and

a task that can be accomplished to define and articulate
moral obligations. According to

Cardozo, judges serve

their

examine prevalent moral

communities by helping the citizenry elaborate, order, and

intuitions,

even though those intuitions are contested and
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exist in

a constant flux.

It is

in this

manner, says Cardozo,

that the judge helps
to "order

and

regulate" the community,
providing for both "stability
and growth."

Common Law Adjudication and the

‘Method of Sociology’

Although Cardozo never developed
a precise methodological
prescription from

which judges could

satisfy the confl.eting

demands of stab.lity and growth,
he

an analysis of common law
adjudication that purported

to

show why

judges to believe that they could
consciously adapt the law

to

changes

without undermining the rule of law.
This argument culminated
style

it

in his

was

to

examine

legal issues

however,

that

mores,

exposition of the

this

method,

and decide certain cases by direct
reference

mutually recognized obligations that
fonned the core of their communities.
to add,

realistic for

in social

of adjudication he characterized as
the "method of sociology."
With

judges were

did provide

Cardozo intended the scope of its application

cases that crossed a certain threshold of
difficulty

-

one

that

came

to the

It is

important

be limited only

to

after the

to

methods of

philosophy," "evolution” and "tradition” had
been turned to and found inadequate to the
task.

It IS

some

indication of Cardozo’s uneasiness with this

method

that,

even

in the

cases that suggested reliance on the method
of sociology, he urged caution. Such
limitations

were important

to ensure that judges

to

Cardozo’s prescriptions for adjudication because they
helped

would not use

the

method of sociology

in

a way, or with a

frequency, that threatened the demands of stare decisis, a
principle that he

still

found

important to the legitimacy of the judicial function. Nonetheless,
Cardozo readily
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admitted that judges should
/eg./ute, but that they should
do so only interstihally;

only in the gaps

left

by the other sourees of law.
Cardozo exp.atned

direction and

Aceordtng

to

its

-tde

^

distance. (1921/1947,
133)

Cardozo, the method of sociology

is,

th.s as follows:

-

ittlelrrC^oToTa^y^

that

existing rules

^

calls for the judge to

^

apply

standards which have been
distilled from the more
general ideas and beliefs then
current
society. This suggests a certain
similarity to the

method of sociology was

qualitatively different

method of tradition;

yet, for

n,

Cardozo, the

from the other three methods. As
Edwin

Patterson has observed, with the
methods of philosophy, evolution, and
tradition - unlike

sociology - established authontative
materials provide the legal doctrine."
(Patterson
1939, 162). That

is,

the other three

modes of common law
least as

Cardozo saw

it,

reasoning.

that

it

methods embodied what might be teimed
‘ordinary’

It

was

method of sociology,

is,

the

method of sociology

explicitly recognized

judges must sometimes ask not only what the law
on a given question

what the law ought

what values a

to be.

The method of sociology,

particular adjudication

According

to

only indirectly; that

Cardozo, the

is, it

formulation of general
‘radicalism’ of the

at

raised concerns about the ability of
particular laws to

function for socially desired ends. That
that

the unique quality of the

for Cardozo,

is,

but also

was concerned with

would promote.

common

law traditionally achieves any particular goals

seeks to promote a particular vision of social welfare through
the

that,

when

consistently applied, will help to attain those goals.

method of sociology,

at least for
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Cardozo, was that

it

The

dispensed with

the indirection tha,

Instead, the

was

a, the heart

of the

common

method of sociology asked
judges

to temporarily ‘forge,
' the

accumulated precedent and
Mrecfy address the
so.

,t

law. prccodcnt-bascd,
system.

social usefulness

explicitly adopted a
perspective external to the

justification

of a particular doctrine

in light

of the

common

of a

bonds of

legal rule.

law by looking

fact that ”[,]he final

a,

In

doing

the

cause of law

is

the

welfare of society." (1921/1947,
133).

Cardozo-s reference

to "social welfare" here
is not to

shared values of a particular society.
Therefore,
sociology, he

is

when a judge

examine prevailing assessments
concerning

to

different beliefs, practices, rules,
and institutions.

application of the

case

in

an abstract

method

in his

He

ideal, but ,0 the

uses the method of
the relative worth of

provided an example of the

second series of Storrs Lectures, referring

which the Court of Appeals changed the
common law of the

to a

state to

New York

make

an

action for "criminal conversation" (a civil
suit brought against a party
engaged in adultery

with one’s spouse) available

to

women, where

it

had been available only

to

men. Cardozo

explained that "social, political, and legal reforms
had changed the relations between the
sexes, and put

woman

and man upon a plane of equality. [Contrary
precedent] founded

upon the assumption of a bygone
ought not

to

be permitted

inequality

to prescribe a rule

of sociology asks, then, whether the

norms on which

there

is

leal

were unrelated

to present-day realities,

and

of life." (1923/1947, 231-232). The method

doctrine in question squares with prevailing

some degree of consensus.

Nonetheless, Cardozo was anxious to

insist that

departure from accepted judicial practice; that

is,
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he was not advocating a radical

a judge

was

still

expected

to

analyze

difficult cases

was

by

a question

first

developing analogies from
past precedent.

of law or

fact that

was open

more than one

to

existing precedent, and
that could not be resolved
practice; or,

the judge

where existing precedent was

was encouraged

he perceived

to

It

was only when

there

plaustble solution under

by reference

to history or present

clearly out of step with
prevailing norms, that

to reconcile ‘directly'

proposed dispositions of the
case by what

be contemporary community
values. Indeed, Cardozo
was anxious

to

note that his methodological
prescriptions effectively advocated
a form of judicial
restraint.

That

is, in

what was heretofore

articulating the

in the

method of sociology, Cardozo sought

shadows. In so doing, he

serve their role best in attempting
to perform

method of sociology,

in

it

tried to

directly only

make

public

persuade judges that they

on

rare occasions.

Cardozo’s view, was an indispensable
analytic

the judge’s only tool. Yet, by
offering the option of the

to

tool,

The

but

it

was

not

method of sociology, even under

a fairly narrow set of circumstances,
he wanted judges to recognize that
his prescription
for dealing with the "tyranny of concepts"
(formalism), did not

law

undermine the

common

itself.

What, then, are judges actually doing, according

method of sociology? They

are,

to

Cardozo, when they use the

he says, interpreting the "social mind;" which
means

that,

m any evolving, pluralistic community, they will be involved in the attempt to determine
which among various competing

beliefs in that

community form

Cardozo, adjudication under the method of sociology
conducting a

‘poll’ to

Rather, the judge

is

determine "the

called

upon

whim

or

is
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ethical core. Thus, for

more than simply

humor of the

to identify the ‘deeper’

its

a matter of

hour." (1928/1947, 281).

judgment of the community, even

when

it

is

embodted

in a

minority view. Given

somenmes seems more an

aspiration than actual

this.

Cardozo’s method of soctology

method - one incapable of actually

constraining judicial behavior,
but serving more as a
translator’s guide. Moreover,
one

might ask whether

th.s

methodology served

to replace a

tyranny of sociological adjudication;
where the

"tyranny of concepts" with
the

common

law judge imposed his

own

reading of the -social text' onto
the law. not under cover
of formal rules, but through
Ihe
authority of sociological ‘method’.

Cardozo

common

anticipated, but ultimately
dismissed, anxieties

law judges using the courts as a
forum for the expression of their
personal

"The judge, even when he

He

IS

provoked by the specter of

is free, is still

not a knight-errant, roaming

goodness." (1921/1947, 164). In

not wholly free.

at will in pursuit

part,

of his

He

is

own

Cardozo was willing

to

not to innovate

ideal

biases:

at pleasure.

of beauty or of

exempt such

possibilities

out of his belief that most cases simply
did not require the application of the
method of
sociology, but instead involved a relatively
unproblematic application of prior case law.
Further, anticipating the arguments of
contemporary neo-pragmatists such as Stanley Fish,

Cardozo suggested

that

even when judges were to employ the method
of sociology, they

still

functioned as part of an ongoing profession with rules,
traditions, and habits that were

part

of a deeply

felt

culture

which served

to ensure a certain regularity in professional

behavior.

Yet, even if a thoroughly ‘professionalized’ judge, familiar
with and responsive to
the duties and responsibilities of his office, will not engage in
arbitrary decision-making,
the question remained as to whether such judges will
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still

not be susceptible to ‘deeper’

subconscous n,o„vations.
Cardozo did no, dismiss
addressed u
.hat,

a. .he

this

problem ,„i,e so .uichly, hu,

end of T„e Nan.re
of,„e MUaa, Process. There,
he aeknowledge

although the method of
sociology requ.res judges
to in.etpre, the mores
of their time.

founr Xtetin^oflT''

on

Although education might help
minimize the element of subconscious
conceded

that

it

could never eliminate

it.

Consequently, he insisted

bias,

[a

Cardozo

that, to identify

those

portions of the social mind to
be incorporated into law, judges
must exercise self-

conscious discretion.
the judiciary,

It

would seem, however,

Cardozo was nonetheless willing

that in his appreciation

common

abilities

of

to subject citizens to the
potentially anti-

democratic authority ofjudges. Thus,
although Cardozo sought
for the tendency within

of the

law adjudication

to valorize

to

provide a comective

precedent

at the

sake of

everything else, he did so only through
identifying a new theoretical
‘problem space’:

judical subjectivity. Yet, the answer

to the

problem of subjectivity,

for Cardozo, lay in

the need to distinguish between the
subjective origins of a judicial account
of the social

mind and
In

its

subsequent justification.

The Nature of the Judicial Process, Cardozo had
suggested the

theoretical

implausibility of the classical tradition in jurisprudence
because of the inevitability of

human

subjectivity; "In this mental

to see things as objectively as

we

background every problem finds

please.

eyes except our own." (1921/1947,

1

10).

None

the less,

we

its setting,

we may try

can never see them with any

Although Cardozo emphasized the subjectivity

179

of judicial decision-making,
and the

resultant potential for
indetenninacy in legal doctnne,

he concluded by finding certainty
and

he reassured

stability in sources
external to the law.

his listeners that nihilism
need not prevail

from

In

doing

so,

h.s reaUs, observations.

Rather, anticipating anxiety
over h.s claims of the inherent
subjectivity of the judical
process, he responded by noting
that "[w]e
all

these forces of individualism,
there can

the void.

Those

are the

moments

in

may wonder sometimes how from
come anything

which we exaggerate

the play of

coherent, anything but chaos
and
the elements of difference.
In

the end there emerges something
which has a composite shape and
truth and order."

(1921/1947, 123). Cardozo’s confidence that
uncertainty and complexity were

manageable,

that

some

sort

of objective binding was possible, was
grounded

in a belief in

the potential for social science - as the
necessary adjunct to the method of
sociology - to

provide the certainty and stability that "scientific
jurisprudence” had once promised, but

now

clearly lacked.

As with Holmes and Pound, Cardozo seemed

future of law, outside of law. This,

somewhat paradoxically,

authority of law.
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in

to place his faith for the

order to maintain the

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION: REALISM

AND/as;
the reconstitution oe
professional authority
In this work.

I

have attempted

theorists to a perceived crisis
in

to

explore the responses of
three Ameriean legal

American law and

charactenzed the situation as a
‘cnsis’ by recourse
to capture the

complexity

dominant tropes through whieh

in the law.

consciously directed

The

to the

was

legal profession, in a situation

I

have

tenn legal ,no,lernis„,

m order

discussed: uncertainty and

this crisis

-

although often they were

concern for the continued legitimacy
and authority of the law and

although the period

1

‘responses’ (jurisprudential
writings) were not always
self-

meeting

at

it

for the legal profession.

its

- but

1

believe that

principal carriers, the

of uncertainty and complexity, was
always present. And,

examine stretches from 1870

of what was involved here continues

to

to the early 1930s,

1

believe that

much

have relevance for our understanding
of the

relationship between the legal profession
and the law.

Philhpe Nonet and Philip Selznick observed
pointed to

justice.

its

inadequacy as a

Those

way of ministering

anxieties remain, but today a

cnsis of legitimacy." (1978,

4).

This crisis

new

to

that "[cjritics

change and achieving substantive

note

may be

of law have always

is

struck

by repeated references

to a

understood as posing a threat to our

ability to sustain a belief in the foundational
principle

of our legal system - the rule of law.

Indeed, for some, the very persistence of the ideal of the rule
of law in contemporary legal

thought

may

present something of a puzzling phenomenon.

might assume

that the

myth of the

rule of law
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From

this perspective,

had been sufficiently debunked,

if

one

not by

legal realisn,, then

legal

by

pos.-,oalisl socio-logal
scholars

working both wilh.n and

o, aside ,he

academy. Noneibeless, as
Allan Mmehinson and
Pa.riek Monaban have
recently

noted: "Tbe rule

ollaw

is

a rare and prolcat,
prittciple

ofour

political tradition.

withstood the ravages oL.iurre
and retains a contemporary
clanon-eall

Apparently transcending partisan
cottcerns,

it

is

It

has

to political justice.

embraced and venerated by

virtually

all

shades orpohtical op, t, ion. The
rule of law’s central core
comprises the enduring values

of regularity and
(

1

987,

embodied

in the

slogan of,,

governmem ofhws.

not

men"

xiii).

A
law.

restraint,

The

target

orthc contemporary radical critique
oflaw

legal

academics associated with the Conference
on

Studies (CLS). In large part, the

CLS

argument may be understood as

sophisticated restatement of the familiar
refrain: all

grounded

in the critical

recognition of an allegedly

"indeterminacy thesis" - which can be understood

detcrmmacy,

a

Critical Legal

more

km is politics,

'fheir position is

blow

oflaw

fatal

to the rule

in contrast to the

ideal - the

notion of rational

a claim that the authoritative legal materials
and their reasoned elaboration

by judges yield

pre-existing, discoverable, right answers to legal
questions.

While betraying

common

the very .deal of the rule
of

assault on this foundational concept
of liberal legalism has been led,
most

by a group of

recently,

is

a continued allegiance to the

law legal theory, contemporary

judicial decision-making

legal reasoning that

is

is

‘

judgc-ccntcrcdncss’ of traditional

critical legal theorists

nonetheless maintain that

not rationally determinate, and that there

is

separable Irom political ideology. For example,

such as Duncan Kennedy (1976) and .loseph Singer (1984), argue
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no distinct mode of

critical theorists

that the inherent

mdetemiinacy of language

in general,

and legal rules

in particular, justify

doubts about the

determinacy of any legal system
and the exercise of power
legitimated through reference
to

such a system.

and

To

the.r application,

the extent that liberalism
rests

thus

it

becomes necessary

skepticism in order to (re)claim
legitimacy.

on a foundation of determinate

for liberalism to rebut this

As Singer

can appear to apply the law rather
than make

autonomous sphere of activity,
traditional understanding

it"

form of rule-

suggests: "Determinacy

to the ideology of the rule of law,
for both theorists and judges.

It ,s

rules

the only

is

necessaty

wayjudges

(1984, 12). The claim that law

is

not an

separate from the realm of politics,
problematizes the

of the judge as a neutral arbiter of legal
disputes, objectively

Identifying and applying the law to a given
factual situation. Rather, the rule
of law, from
this perspective,

seems

little

more than an

ideological cover for the arbitrary and

unconstrained exercise of political power. Moreover,
CLS’s claims ultimately would seem
to

undermine the legitimacy of the practicing

monopoly over

legal

whose

authority and

power rest on

its

professionally ‘determinable’ legal doctrine and
procedural rules.

According
suggests an

bar,

to

John Brigham and Christine Harrington,

interesting paradox;" that

academics and social

scientists,

it

is,

is

"although

it

this realist

(realism)

is

approach

treated as a given

by

also continually advanced as a vanguard project"

(1989, 41). Moreover, Brigham and Harrington suggest that "[rjealism manifests an
essentially anti-law rhetoric while serving as the rationale for law-reform
as the basis

of a

modem

legal

orthodoxy" (1989, 41). Building on the work of Brigham

and Harrington, Austin Sarat and William
clients (1995),

have found

movements and

that

Felstiner, in a study

many members of this

183

of divorce lawyers and

their

sub-specialty within the profession

often characterize the legal
sys.ent, in their interactions
with clients, as a highly

indetemnnate and radically
subjective decision-ntah.ng
process. Legal
play imie part

m a given decision.

Rather, the idiosyncracies
of the judge are

predominant. The only constraining
factor
perspective) process
transcripts"

is

rules are sa,d to

the lawyer's

in

an otherwise arbitrary (from
the clienfs

knowledge and understanding
of the "hidden

of the law - how the system
really works. Knowledge
of the judge, how he

or she has ruled

in the past,

knowing suhjec, -

which clerk

will help with late filings,
etc., constitutes the

the experienced lawyer

who can

give a more or less competent

prediction of future behavior. Individual
experience supplants "special access
to an

objective body of knowledge"
authority.

(i.e.,

The legitimacy of this

tension, always threatening

its

the fomral legal rules) as the
basts of professional

realist expertise,

own

undoing.

object, accessible in the external legal
world;

mediated account of the

legal process

perspective, the legitimacy of which

and

is

its

however, exists

What
it is,

is

real here

is

in a

constantly uneasy

not an unmediated

rather, a professionally

distortions.

What

is real is

and discursively

the lawyer’s

determined by a principle of professional

recognition.

Although limited

in scope, Sarat

empirical support for claims

CLS

wants

and Felstiner’s work might seem
to

make

Certainly, as others have observed, however,

them

(see, e.g.,

Stumpf

to

provide some

against the legal system as a whole.

much of the CLS argument

is

not original to

1996). For example, James Flerget has noted that ”[t]he critical

legal scholars are th latest in a long line of jurisprudential thinkers
to direct our attention
to the judicial process in order to point out that ‘hard’ law
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is

really soft, that legislated

rules and precedents

do not detennme the outcome
ofcases

percept, on nevertheless
persists that judges are

down

elsewhere- (Herget 1995,
59). This

would attempt

to deny,

to the legal real.sts

however;

in fact,

I

part

Jr.

somehow bound by

and

that a false

the rules of law laid

not something those
associated with

is

most readily acknowledge

CLS

their nrtellectual debts

of the 1930s and 1940s, the
sociological jurisprudence
of Roscoe

Pound and Benjamin Cardozo; and,
beyond
Holmes,

u, court,

that, to the

seminal work of Oliver Wendell

(see, e.g.. Singer 1984,
48).

have looked ‘backward’ as well,
examining those

of the theoretical backdrop

for debates within

texts

which provided a large

contempora^ junsprudcnce.

I

began

wtth a brief discussion of the emergence
of Langdellian formalism. Several
important
interpretations

of the period have argued

that

formalism was instrumental to the

consolidation and maintenance of political
and economic power by privileged
capitalist
interests

m a period of rapid

industrialization.

emergence of formalism was due,

1

have suggested, however,

in large part, to a

that the

perceived threat to the

epistemological structure of legal doctrine, thereby
threatening the continued legitimacy of
the legal profession as well.

Although he provided
these matters,

law

(in

both

it

its

is

little in

the

way of an extended

nonetheless clear that Langdell sought to advance the notion
that the

practice and study),

is

an autonomous discipline.

erect boundaries around the law, creating a space within

reside.

theoretical discussion of

The developing sense of chaos caused by

which

By

this,

he meant

to

legal expertise could

a precedent-based system spinning out of

control could be tamed, Langdell believed, within these boundaries, through the scientific

185

arrangement of the

,e.,s

of the law - appellate
opinions. The relevant
principles of law

could then be inferred from

this,

now manageable,

lihrar,.

The new

h

protessors o. taw - were to
be the caretakers of this body
of knowledge, prov.dtng
the
judiciary with the appropriate
material from which to deduce
•eneeee,. legal
the ‘correct’
outcome

m any given case.

Their decisions were governed
by reason alone; the rule of
law

preserved.

Locating the study and arrangement
of these texts within the newly
emergent
universities, clothing

its

students with the prestige of
scientific expertise, held
obvious

attractions for a legal profession
desperate to enhance
‘scientific’ character

Its

prestige and legitimacy.

of the inquiry elevated the study and
practice of law

to a level

specialized, technical expertise, available
to the few only after years of
study.
the investigation of law to the

politics

domain of ‘neutral’

expertise, separate

and policy, was an important means by which
the

dominion over the law.

In a legal space characterized

The
of

To remove

from the world of

legal profession could assert

by the judicial application of

determinate rules to analogous factual situations,
lawyers could claim a monopoly

to

represent citizens in legal matters. This ‘classical
legal consciousness’ was soon enough

shorn of LangdelTs version of scientific method, but the
formalist undergirding of
professional authority remained -

This was not

formalism (and

its

and conservative

my principal

successors)

some semblance of which remains
target,

came under

political implications.

movement known

however. Almost from

as legal realism, that

attack, both for

It is

I

was

this attack,

interested
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its

its

to the present day.

inception, Langdellian

methodological shallowness

most often associated with the
in.

However, because of what

I

was looking

for,

approach was somewhat different
than that generally found

The most obvious

Hterature.

theoretical

work

assumption was
in this

my

that

that

difference

is

that

I

ehose

to focus

on the important

preceded legal realism: Holmes,
Pound, and Cardozo.

most of what

is

between realism and formalism,
picking a winner, and
in

calling

expertise - what stands in

its

To

a day,

I

engagement

have had

its

What

place?

to the authority

of legal

constitutes a reaUst version of legal
expertise;

implications for the legal profession, and
for the relationship between
non-

lawyer citizens and

done here

,t

critical

mind: in the wake of the critique
of legal formalism - a type of
legal

reasoning that implies a justification
of professional claims

what are

My

important to the realist position
was already evident

work. More importantly, though,
instead of focusing on the

something else

in the

is, 1

set

their

laws? This seems

to

believe, only a beginning - but

about accomplishing

this task,

principal theoretical texts of Holmes,

me to be a very
it

I

is

no

less

large task,

and what

I

have

necessary because of that.

have engaged

in a fairly close reading

Pound and Cardozo. Like Langdell and

of the

his

successors, they also were responding to the problem
of uncertainty - doctrinal

indeterminacy - and complexity

and legitimacy of expert
law and sought

to

in the law,

with

authority. All three

attendant consequences for the status

emphasized the inherent indeterminacy of the

debunk the formalist approach of constraining

organization and understanding of legal doctrine.

of reason, but one

its

politics instead, are there

behavior? And, can lawyers

still

If,

it

through the proper

however, adjudication

is

not a matter

any truly meaningful constraints on judicial

lay claim to a specialized and technical expertise?
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As

I

have shown above, none of
tl,e three wished,

formalism, to leave the situation
of legal uncertainty

formalism provided an inadequate
resolution

misunderstood the

real nature

to this

numage

it

problem;

in the

of legal

They simply believed

intact.

and proper function of the law

Cardozo accepted uneertainty and
complexity
to

in the.r erit.ques

law as a

in part

itself.

fact;

because

that

adherents

its

Holmes, Pound and

they sought, however,

- through "external
standards," "prediction,”
"social interests." "jural

postulates," or the interpretation
and rearticulation of a "social mind;"
and through the

incorporation of the social sciences into
the law. The false science
of Langdell must be

replaced by a ‘true’ science of the social
world.
instrumental

means

to non-legal ends; as such,

than the product of particular interests.

an alternative orthodoxy - a

What

‘realist legal

Law must be approached

as an

law should be understood as nothing
more

this

suggested to

me was

the formation of

consciousness’ - from which claims to

professional expertise could be nourished. Like
formalism, realist forms of reasoning and
justtficattons

most evident

of professional authority have certain
in

political implications.

Holmes, Pound and Cardozo’s arguments

and authority of the

legal profession, vis-a-vis other

rapidly modernizing society. Each

privileges of the

American

profession (formalism)

was

was

One

is

perhaps

for the continuing relevance

forms of expert knowledge,

clearly intent

legal profession.

This

upon maintaining the

status

in

a

and

claim to the authority of the legal

rolled back only to be reconstructed in another, equally

pervasive form.

Further, the critique of formalism

I

is

grounded

in

epistemological claims that have,

believe, important ethical and political implications separate from, but related to.
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at.en,p,s ,o rccharaCer.ze
,he logi,in,a,e authority
of the legal profession as
a whole.

Rcahsnr beeomos a way of ‘seetng’
the world and

wake of the

eritique of formalism,

what

will

now

-talking- ahottt

it.

However,

,n the

support the claim to a monopoly
over

the representation of citizens
in legal matters?
In

Chapter Two,

Luban and

I

made

Ins understanding

reference to the contemporary
legal philosopher, Davtd

of the idea of legal modernism
through the concept of the

"Copemican Revolut.on." W.th
Copemieanism, Luban rem.nded
the world

we

live in.

legal structures

practice."

The

must be

(Luban 1994,

its

us, taught us to mistrust

last

our everyday understanding of

implication of this for legal modernism

radically different from the

3).

way

is

that "[t]l,e truth

about

they manifest themselves in

For Luban, Holmes serves as the
quintessential legal

modernist. This aspect of his work
1870s, to his

emphasis on the tmportanee of situated
perspeet.ve,

is

evident from the earliest published
material in the

major jurisprudential

effort,

"The Path of the Law," published

in

1897;

the attempt to look beneath the surface of the law
in the belief that appearances too
often

deceive. This tendency, though less obvious in the
there, a product

I

of Holmes’ influence on

returned to

indeterminacy

Holmes

in

order to examine the emergence of the idea of legal

that, to date,

In

doing

so,

m the law.

Holmes went

point of view; in particular a

common

I

sought to emphasize an aspect

has not received the attention

deserves - the articulation of a type of perspectivism that

indeterminacy

is still

their thought.

in his extra-judicial writings.

of Holmes’ theoretical work

work of Pound and Cardozo,

is

I

believe

it

related to the identification of

to great lengths to look at the

law from a lawyer’s

law lawyer. Further, along with the emergence of
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the idea of legal .ndeten^inaey,
in fact as a corollary
lo
the origins of a dislincl.ve
fonn of legal discourse; a

and with
as

it,

il,

we

can find

1

would

Holmes' work

new language of power

the outline of a different
fonnr of legal knowledge.

Holmes’ "prediction theory" of law,

,n

sttggest,

may

What

is

if you will,

generally idenl.fied

be better understood as an

attempt to reconstitute the
grounds of legal knowledge, or
expertise, and professional
authority.

debunking

In

contemporary

trope;

critical legal theory,

Holmes helps

us to see

its

indetenuinacy generally

ts

deployed as a

constitutive elements as well.
His

perspectivism - here, the attempt to
conceptualize law from the practicing
lawyer’s point

of view - discursively carves out a
space within which professional

(legal) experience

could provide the basis for a reconstituted
form of expert authority.

Holmes jurisprudenee
practice. This

new juridical

contains within

it

an implicit reconceptualization of legal

discourse of expertise and professional
authority subsumes a

discursive space’ of law - judge, lawyer, client
and

common

reconstructed in Holmes’ modernist jurisprudence.
In

Pound and Benjamin Cardozo

examine

this (re)construction

my opinion,

fleshes out, in important ways.

contributions to American jurisprudence.

The

reconstruction, implications which,

I

I

the

work of Roscoe

Holmes’ seminal

project of this dissertation, then,

of the space of law

century American legal thought. Further,

law legal doctrine - arc

in late nineteenth

was

to

and early twentieth

sought to explore the implications of this

believe,

still

resonate in contemporary jurisprudential

discussions.

One of the concerns which animated
as the elision

of the normative

possibilities

this project

had

to

do with what

1

perceived

of law - and, therefore, the possibility of a
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democrat.cally meaningful understanding
of justice - in the reconstructed
juridical space of

what

realism;

argued,

I

have characterized as

was not on

officials,

modernism. The focus of legal
modernism,

1

the normative content of law,
but the observable behavior of
legal

whose decisions

are explained

interests that really motivate them.

must stake

legal

by the

political,

Law becomes mere epiphenomena.

their claim to professional authority

play; to see things ‘hidden’ from the
rest of us.
attribute our understanding

of law

to

what the

on the

It is

of law.

the tendency to

legal profession says is law and, thus,
with

to construct

to suggest a certain professional

possibilities within the space

Legal experts

ability to recognize the interests
at

The concern was with

an apparent foreclosure of any meaningful possibility

world through law.

economic, or psychological

our

own

hegemony over

normative

the ethical

My argument, then, was that the realist/modemist

account of law, however compelling as a critique of formalist
legal reasoning, ser\'ed as
well to reclaim the authority of professional expertise in the
assault.

That

is,

realism advanced in the

wake of its claim

obfuscations of formalism, while simultaneously eliding
legal space that is

that

which went

wake of its own

at

its

(apparent)

having demystified the

own

role in constituting a

no more real and, ultimately, no more hospitable

to

new

popular access than

before.

My reading, here, is admittedly anachronistic.
work of Holmes, Pound and Cardozo,

As suggested above,

I

approach the

not as an historian of American legal ideas; but as

one informed by contemporary issues and concerns. In

turn,

I

believe that an engagement

with these texts provides a theoretical space outside of the present, from which to reflect

back on the present.

We continue to

live

under the impact of a

191

realist tradition in

law

that

begins with the jurisprudence
of Holmes. Pound and
Cardozo. But.

aware of how realism works

we seem

to preserve
legal/professional authority.
This

far less

means

that

we

tend to reject the self-presentation
of law as an objective system
of abstract rules, neutrally
applied by .ndependent judges

reasoning

and seek

in

which they have been

to pierce, the false

more than what theyWge

at the

to

it is.

rather,

And,

it

is

it

means

its

means

critique

I

It

that

means

we no

we

are suspicious of,

that

law

is

nothing

longer believe that law can

this is generally

faith are naive, or

Without defending formalism

.

strong suspicion of its realist critique.

constantly performing

It

that

through a direct course of
legal

is

valued only as a means to some
other end.

beginning of the dissertation,

miss the point

law

specially trained.

development. Defenders of a formalist

simply

to the

appearance that law creates.

says

make any claims of its own;
suggested

whose access

do so because

it

As

viewed as a progressive

worse; to •believe’ in law

itself,

I

I

do want

has been

my

is

to register a

sense that

in

of formalism, certain "consequences” of
realism have too

often avoided critique - a realist justification
of legal expertise being

my specific concern.

This concern has been given some empirical
illumination by the recent work of

Austin Sarat and William Felstmer on the relationships
between divorce lawyers and
clients.

In their investigation,

which seeks

to operationalize

insights of Brigham and Harrington’s critical

lawyers consistently debunk their

work on

What

far

more

basic theoretical

realism, Sarat and Felstiner heard

clients’ belief in the relevance

adjudication of claims within the legal system.

people and places

some of the

their

What was

of legal rules to the

relevant

was a knowledge of

inaccessible to the average layman than the rules themselves.

Sarat and Felstiner were describing

was

realist legal
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consciousness

at

work. They

were witness

,o

thereby, ever

more dependent on

was not

non-lawyer cit.zens experiencing
a loss of control v,s-a-vis
the law and,

the one they

saw with

the legal expert.

their

own

eyes,

end of his chapter on the "Sociology
of Law,"

it

The

truly

meaningful world of Ihe law

was something h.dden

to

them. A, the

Max Weber observes that,

hat,

a result of technical and
economic developments, the legal
ignorance of the
layman will increase. The use of
jurors and similar lay judges
will not suffe tl
stop the continuous growth of
the technical element in thelw
and hence of its
character as a specialists’ domain.
(Weber 1978, 895).

My argument has been that,
emergence of a

realist discourse

response to that

speaks

of;

it

crisis, realist

has, in

in the

wake of the

of law and

its

crisis

critique

of legal modernism, the

of the inadequacies of fomialism's

jurisprudence has not slowed the developments

Weber

some ways, exacerbated them.

In suggesting this,

I

perhaps expose a certain naivete that the

cautioned against. Gilmore opened his Storrs
Lectures

at

Yale

Law

late

Grant Gilmore

School by reminding

his audience that.

[f]rom the beginning of social time there have been
institutions like courts which
have generated.. .something like law. In all societies beyond
the most

primitive a
professional class of lawyers and judges has emerged and
maintained itself In most
societies at most periods the legal profession has been
heartily disliked by all nonlawyers: a recurrent dream of social reformers has been
that the law should be (and
can be) simplified and purified in such a way that the class of
lawyers

can be done

away

with.

The dream has never withstood

the cold light of waking reality.

there has always been law and there have always been lawyers
(1977,

While
there

is

I

wish

something

point, however,

is

in

to challenge

Gilmore

s

Thus

1).

conflation of law with lawyers, believing that

law worth maintaining beyond

its

professional representations,

not to situate the argument within the tradition of Bentham and
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my

Rantoul, seeking

some plan of cod.fication

workings of a new

legal order. Rather,

,ha,

would render lawyers rrrelevam

wish simply

I

to

to the

examine the emergence of a new

justiftcafon for expert authonty,
one grounded in the identification
and problemat, 3at.on

of judicial

subjectivity.

new defense of the
social

But. in so doing.

wish

I

to

suggest as well a critical reading
of this

legitimacy of professional
power. During a period of
tremendous

and economic change, the

traditional defense

of the legal profession’s authority -

formalism - began to seem more and
more out of place and
It

appeared to the emergent

power and

injustice.

critics as little

Claims

positivist expertise

danger of losing

the rhetorical

to professional authority

were challenged by a

legal rules

more than

in

credibility;

mask of illegitimate

once grounded

in the

detemiinacy of

based on the observations and

predictions of judicial behavior. This
modernist sociological jurisprudence,
or realism,

seemed

to

many

better able to support claims to
professional authority under these

historical conditions

critical

of the

availability

- a moment of crisis for the
American legal profession. Ostensibly

classical orthodoxy, this

of a progressive

saying

the dominant

this,

1

emergent movement

politics through the

of legal decisions, thus exposing

By

new

lead a

provides the realist vision with

of relevant legal

to suggest that realism supplanted

image of law from which the

now

thought promised the

unmasking of purely formal justifications

their real bases in the interests

have not meant

sustenance. Rather, both

in legal

legal profession could

draw

complex coexistence. Indeed,

much of its

continuing potency.

in

It is

its

actors.

formalism as

theoretical

some ways,

this

an example of what

Stanley Fish has referred to as the law’s ability to contain and deploy what would appear
to

be mutually contradictory discourses

as one; "a discourse continually telling
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two

stories.

one of which

denying

is

that the other

,s

being told" (Fish 1991,
203). Yet,

reads the contemporary critical
literature, this

is

nowhere

in

when one

evidence. Peter Gabel and

Paul Harris (1982-83), working
from a realist/CLS perspeelivc,
provide a good example

of this

sort

of analysis. Rejecting the

and Harris observe
state altempts

"that the legal

l.beral-legalist valorization

system

of the rule of law. Gabel

an .mportanl publ.c arena through
which the

,s

- through manipulation
of symbols, images, and ideas -

social order that

most people

Gabel and Harris

find alienating

insist that "the

and inhumane"

(

1

to legitimize a

982-83, 370). Nonetheless,

very public and political character
of the legal arena gives

lawyers, acting together with clients
and fellow legal workers, an important
opportunity to

reshape the

way

that people understand the existing
legal order

and

their place within

it"

(1982-83, 370).

1

hey identify both what

is at

stake and what are the possibilities for
critical legal

thought and practice. Yet, they seem largely ignorant
of their

own

complicity

in the

reproduction of domination through the very legal
system they critique. For Gabel and

Warns, politics
understood

is

interests.

it

overwhelms law. Law’s ‘weakness’ here can be

m the recognition that currently existing law is nothing more than an elaborate

rhetorical cover,

individuals.

ubiquitous and

masking the

Law

Even

is,

distribution of power

then, nothing

so, the (radical)

Gabel and Harris,

in the

institutional apparatus

more than

lawyer

still

among

the product of these social and political

has an important role to play, according to

advancement of a progressive

of law. This role

is,

various interest groups and

politics within the traditional

in part, to help clients

piercing law’s pretensions to fonnality and political neutrality.
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understand law by

I

concede

that there is

much

argue as well that the image of
law

undermine

why do we

to

agree with in Gabel and Harris’
analysis,

that

need lawyers, radical or otherwise,
is

would

informs this critique ultimately
works to

their stated des.re for a
’democratic’ reshaping

analysis? Clearly there

I

to

engage

of the

legal order.

Crudely

put:

in critical pohtieal (or
legal)

nothing unique that the radical
lawyer, as lawyer, has to offer to

those interested in progressive
po/hicn/ activity. The question remains
open regarding the
citizen s ability to achieve political
ends within the space of law.
In another context, Sarat

and Felstiner suggest

that,

[i]n a legal order whose legitimacy
is said to rest on the claims
of fonnalism
procedural justice, and, to a lesser extent,
on those of equity, the law talk of the
divorce lawyer’s office is replete with ‘rule
skepticism’....If the presentation of a
formalist front...is necessary to legitimate
the legal order, then the presentation
of
the legal process at the street level may
work to unwind the bases of legitimation
that other levels work to create. While
critical scholars are devoted to proving
the
proposition that legal rules are indeterminate and
to enlisting practicing
professionals in the project of demystifying and
exposing the claims of legal
formalism, divorce lawyers seem routinely to be engaged
in this same project as
they counsel clients (1995, 107).

In light of this recognition, Sarat and Felstiner (see,
e.g., 1995, 87) express

amazement

that

contemporary

critical legal scholars

such as Gabel and Harris continue

advance realism as a "vanguard project" (Brigham and Harrington
1989,
its

basic tenets

seem

practicing bar. This

to

be accepted and routinely articulated by

is attributable,

I

would suggest,

Brigham and Harrington, and

later

show

at least

41),

to

to

even though

one segment of the

to the fact that realism has not

adequately analyzed as a discourse of expertise which serves
authority. This dissertation has attempted to

some

been

ground professional

that the paradox, first suggested

by

observed by Sarat and Felstiner - of lawyers identifying
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.he i„de,erm.„acy of rules
w.thin .he legal system ,n order
,o advance .heir

authority based

It;

one

that

tradition

I

on the contingencies of

has a history, and

is

‘local

cla.ms ,o

knowledge' - has a theoretical
dimension

better understood

once located within

to

that theoretical

have examined above.

In laying out a partial history
of this development, focusing

from

own

that history,

I

do not wish

my argument

on

certain

key

texts

be understood as calling for the return

to

to

a pre-reahst. or formalist, grounding
for professional authority.
Rather, in suggesting that
realism should be understood not so

much

attempt to ground professional authority,

law with the

legal profession.

I

I

as a critique of formalism, but as
another

wish

have sought

to

to call into question the

do

this in order that

very conflation of

we might

law claim

the ethical project of law - justice - a project
that, otherwise, seems secondary
to the

endless processes of professional closure.
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